

PROPERTY OF
ZESN RESOURCE CENTRE
ACGN No.



ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK

2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
REPORT

MARCH 2002

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Acronyms

CEDAW	-	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIO	-	Central Intelligence Organisation
EU	-	European Union
ESC	-	Electoral Supervisory Commission
ICCPR	-	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDs	-	Identity documents
MDC	-	Movement for Democratic Change
MISA	-	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MMPZ	-	Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe
NCA	-	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organisation
POSA	-	Public Order and Security Act
SADC	-	Southern Africa Development Cooperation
UDHR	-	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMP	-	Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe
UN	-	United Nations
War vets	-	War veterans
Zanu (PF)	-	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZBC	-	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZESA	-	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZESN	-	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZTV	-	Zimbabwe Television



Acknowledgements


This is the ZESN report of the 2002 Zimbabwe Elections which took place from 9 -11 March 2002. There were three elections taking place in Zimbabwe. In Harare, the elections were for the Mayor, City Councillors and the National President. In Chitungwiza, elections were held for the Mayor and the National President. In the rest of the country, voters only voted for the National President.

Any election is a process, not an event. It is a process which can be divided into three major phases, namely pre-polling, polling and post-election. In most cases, what happens on the polling day is but a confirmation of what will have taken place before the actual poll.

ZESN activities for the 2002 elections were targeted at ascertaining that the general conduct would be such that the result of the elections would be locally, regionally and internationally recognised as acceptable. To this end, it was necessary to engage in a process of voter education, research and advocacy, monitoring the media and monitoring the pre-polling environment, the polling environment and the events in the post-polling period.

We acknowledge the efforts of Farai Chiweshe, Perpetua Bganya and the ZESN secretariat in the production of the working document for the report. ZESN member organisations contributed at various levels towards the achievement of ZESN's objectives, giving information and editing the report. Their contribution was made through membership of the various structures including the board, management committee, national activity taskforces and provincial taskforces. ZESN members worked as observers, supervisors, voter education trainers and facilitators amongst others. We extend our gratitude to them.

Thanks also go to the members of the ZESN secretariat for their efforts in facilitating and co-ordinating the activities of ZESN towards the achievement of its objectives. Our funding and networking partners also assisted by providing the technical and financial support base for the implementation of various activities. Without them, the achievements of ZESN would not have been possible. Our sincere thanks go to them.





It is our belief that this report represents a true account of the events which took place, before, during and after polling for the presidential and municipal elections in 2002. We offer this report as our own contribution to the development of a free and fair electoral process and a democratic political process in Zimbabwe. We hope that our observations and conclusions are considered as genuine and honest attempts at assisting in the process towards national development at the social, economic and political levels.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Reginald Matchaba-Hove', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Reginald Matchaba-Hove
Chairperson-ZESN

29 April 2002



Executive summary

Zimbabwe's third presidential election in March this year represented the first real opportunity since the introduction of the post of executive president in 1987 for the nation's electorate to vote for a leader of their choice. While the two previous presidential elections saw several contenders stand against President Mugabe, none had hereto presented a serious national challenge to the authority of ZANU (PF)'s candidate.

However, the emergence of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 provided Zimbabweans with a realistic democratic alternative to ZANU (PF) rule and this was put to the test for the first time in the 2000 parliamentary elections. That election witnessed an expression of substantial support for the opposition MDC throughout the country, despite a sustained nationwide campaign of violence and intimidation against MDC supporters and the electorate in general.

Since then, increasing levels of political violence continued to afflict Zimbabwean society which for the first time saw the organised emergence of state sanctioned and financed paramilitary youth militia stationed at bases throughout the country. This constituted a totally unacceptable militarisation of the ruling party's presidential election campaign, and demonstrated the extent to which the ruling party used state resources to campaign for its candidate.

This intensely hostile political climate was exacerbated by the introduction of repressive, anti-democratic laws and the determined efforts by the government to undermine the fairness and transparency of the electoral process.

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) notes with the gravest concern that as a result, thousands of Zimbabweans were prevented from casting their vote, many more were disenfranchised by legislation, the electorate in general were subjected to intolerable levels of violence and intimidation that also prevented the political opposition from campaigning freely, and that the voting process itself was fatally compromised.

Accordingly, ZESN is unable to endorse the 2002 Presidential Election as meeting basic democratic standards and cannot declare this poll to have been either free or fair.

This document summarises the findings that compelled ZESN to make this declaration.

Systematic nationwide campaign of political violence

The Human Rights NGO Forum reported that between 1 January 2002 and 14 April 2002, 54 deaths occurred as a result of politically motivated violence. Other incidents of political violence reported included 945 cases of torture, 214 kidnappings, 229 cases of intimidation, 143 cases of unlawful detention, 29 disappearances, 99 cases of unlawful arrests, five cases of rape, 48 school closures and the confiscation of



about 1 000 identity documents. These acts were allegedly perpetrated against opposition party supporters by ruling party supporters and other state institutions.

In addition, the Forum reported that since January 2001, 70 000 people were displaced from their homes as a result of indiscriminate politically motivated violence and intimidation. The internal displacements intensified in the election campaign period.

The Forum's reports also noted that camps and bases housing paramilitary militia youths supporting the ruling party were systematically established in the immediate vicinity of polling stations throughout the country and resulted in the direct intimidation of voters before casting their votes. These militia were also responsible for the abduction and torture of civilians and, during the election itself, for the detention of opposition party polling agents and independent observers from civil society.

Legislative excesses

The Government fast-tracked repressive and anti-democratic legislation through Parliament, which, in some instances, was passed into law in unconstitutional and unorthodox circumstances. The legislation subverted the democratic process, especially relating to electoral laws and institutions, and severely curtailed the lawful democratic activities of opposition parties and civic organisations.

The controversial legislation included the Broadcasting Services Act, General Laws Amendment Act, the Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act and Electoral Act.

Civic organisations and the MDC turned to the courts to challenge the constitutionality of some of this legislation, and in one instance the Supreme Court declared null and void the General Laws Amendment Act because it ruled that the Bill had been unconstitutionally reintroduced into Parliament following its initial defeat in the House.

However, President Mugabe reinstated many of the anti-democratic provisions contained in this legislation just days before the election using statutory instruments contained in Section 158 of the Electoral Act which empower him to take such action.

As a result, repressive regulations affecting the qualification of voters, the management and monitoring of the electoral process, the voters' roll, voter education and the postal ballot, among others, were gazetted in the closing hours of the election campaign.



This greatly added to the confusion of the electorate and effectively emasculated civic society from performing its democratic right to inform and educate voters on electoral matters and to monitor and observe all aspects of the electoral process itself. The laws also further compromised the independence of the Electoral Supervisory Commission and combined with an already flawed constitutional framework to ensure that the election was conducted without even meeting minimum democratic standards of transparency and fairness.

Legal and regulatory framework

The framework was characterised by the following:

- The establishment of a partisan judiciary created by forced resignations.
- Regulations limiting the accompanying of ballot boxes to counting centres by electoral officials, monitors, party agents (excluding independent domestic observers) compromised the transparency of the electoral process.
- The enactment of the oppressive Public Order and Security Act (POSA) curtailed all civil and political rights to freedom of expression and assembly and prevented opposition parties from campaigning freely. Whilst Robert Mugabe held about 50 rallies countrywide during the official election campaign period, the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai managed less than 10 rallies. Many other MDC rallies were banned by the police or were called off as a result of the threat of violence. The Act also curtailed free movement of the public and NGO civic educators. The power of the police to ban meetings was used to frustrate voter education programmes by civic society. The General Laws Amendment Act restricted voter education to the ESC and political parties, denying the electorate the opportunity to receive independent education. This Act also restricted election monitoring to civil servants contrary to the election norms and standards adopted by SADC countries (including Zimbabwe), which recommend that independent monitors from civil society monitor the conduct of the polling and counting processes.
- As a result, the Act prevented civic organisations from playing their traditional role of providing election monitors under the supervision of the ESC. Instead, their personnel were reduced to the function of independent local observers subject to the invitation of the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. In this way, the crucial task of independent observation of the electoral process became an arbitrary activity, and only a paltry 420 local observers were invited at the last minute (out of a total of the 12 500 names submitted by ZESN members and affiliates). This made a mockery of the exercise to measure the transparency and fairness of the voting process effectively.

The media

The state media grossly abused their public mandate to provide equitable coverage of contesting political candidates in a national election. The national public broadcasting corporation, ZBC, denied the main opposition MDC airtime to present its policies either on radio or television.

For example, the findings of the Media Monitoring Project (Zimbabwe), MMPZ revealed that out of a total of 14 hours and 41 minutes and 30 seconds that ZBC television news bulletins devoted to the presidential election campaign (between 1 December 2001 and 8 March 2002), ZANU (PF)'s candidate was granted a total of 13 hours, 50 minutes and 30 seconds, a little more than 94%. This compares to the national broadcaster's television coverage of the opposition MDC and its candidate, of just 31 minutes and 30 seconds, a paltry 4%. But even this was subverted by ZBC, which used this time to attack, denigrate and discredit the MDC. Radio coverage followed a similar pattern.

The state press also provided unfettered coverage of the ZANU (PF) election campaign, which often invoked inflammatory, racist and violent language to discredit the opposition MDC.

This undisguised bias in favour of the ruling party in the state media ran contrary to democratic practice and deprived Zimbabweans of their fundamental right to be accurately informed, not to mention the opportunity to make informed decisions.

In addition, government passed laws that severely restricted the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and took action against local and international media organisations and their employees, further restricting the free flow of information. The climate of violence also prevented the privately owned press from disseminating their product in many areas around the country. Further, individuals found in possession of newspapers produced by the privately owned press were frequently assaulted, further restricting Zimbabwean citizens' right to freely access a diversity of information sources.

To some extent, the bias of the state press was mitigated by the presence of alternative independent sources of information in Zimbabwe's print media. But the de facto monopoly of the airwaves enjoyed by the ZBC invested it with a public responsibility to fairness and accuracy that it manifestly abused.

The Registrar-General's office and the Election Directorate

These institutions ran the election with partiality and this led to the following:



- The Registrar-General's office failed to obey a court ruling ordering local government elections in Harare and Chitungwiza to be held before the presidential election. As a result, dual (presidential and municipal) elections were staged in Harare and Chitungwiza and this contributed to a state of electoral confusion in the electorate and among official election personnel, especially in relation to who was qualified to vote. This was exacerbated by the failure of official electoral institutions to disseminate timely, accurate and adequate voter education/voter information material.
- The effectiveness of the High Court order extending polling in Harare and Chitungwiza to a third day was compromised by the delayed opening of polling stations and their prompt closure at 7:00 pm. This resulted in many people still queuing to vote being turned away by the police.
- The transparency of the electoral process was fatally flawed by the refusal of the Registrar-General's office to make public, at any stage, a consolidated voters' roll. This made it impossible for the public and political parties to inspect the roll and to raise objections, or even to assess the national electoral base. Such a fundamental failure in itself rendered the election open to abuse since it was impossible to identify voters or rectify the register.
- The Registrar-General and the Electoral Supervisory Commission failed to provide clear and adequate public information on all aspects of the electoral process, particularly on the location of polling stations. As a result, the public was not given sufficient notice to identify polling stations nearest to their homes and the opposition MDC was deprived of its right to deploy its election agents into the field in good time. This also affected the deployment of independent local observers and therefore gave rise to a situation where some polling stations opened without the presence of opposition party officials or observers.
- A discretionary and restrictive interpretation of the Citizenship Act by the Registrar-General provided for the possibility of disenfranchising many thousands of potential voters. Unknown numbers of voters were consequently struck off the voters' roll.
- Restriction of postal voting to members of the armed forces, diplomatic staff and electoral officials disenfranchised many thousands of Zimbabweans living abroad.
- A postal voting system that totally lacked transparency was used and it was unmonitored by independent observers and opposition election agents. It was also reported that the uniformed forces were obliged to vote under the supervision of their commanding officers.
- The secret registration of voters beyond the 'final' officially declared deadline of 27 January 2002 and the subsequent retrospective extension of the deadline to 3 March 2002.



- A total lack of transparency in the compilation and correction of the consolidated voters' roll and a total lack of any information about the nature of a supplementary voters' roll that was still being compiled right up to the opening of the polls.
- The printing of extra ballot papers and the refusal by the election authorities to provide any definitive figure for the number of ballots printed. The production of ballot papers and other voting materials was not open to verification by political parties, monitors and independent observers.
- Entry restrictions were imposed on observers and journalists at counting centres.
- There was no mechanism to ensure the independent verification of voting figures provided to the Election Directorate by the counting centres.

Polling stations

The following scenarios were observed with regards to polling stations:

- The reduction of polling stations in the urban areas, which are perceived to be strongholds of the opposition MDC.
- There was no information on the total number of polling stations or their location until two days before the election.
- Late announcement of major increases in rural polling stations and decreases in urban polling stations jeopardised the deployment plans of domestic observer groups and some opposition party election agents.
- Limited and inaccurate information about the number and location of mobile polling stations made it difficult for opposition election officials and domestic observers to identify where they were.
- The extremely slow pace of processing voters at urban polling stations, especially in Harare and Chitungwiza, resulted in high levels of frustration. This resulted in many incidences of disorder in the voting queues and added to the disruption of the voting process.
- The failure of some published polling stations to appear on election day and open the unannounced appearance of new polling stations.

The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC)

The ESC is the statutory body charged with monitoring and supervising elections in Zimbabwe. It is appointed by the President and reports only to the President and is therefore not an independent body.



Legislative amendments in the run-up to the election further compromised its independence by demanding that the institution only recruit its election staff, including monitors, from the civil service, which employs individuals who owe their jobs to government. This resulted in the erosion of the democratic process in a number of ways, amongst them the following:

- Changes to the legal and regulatory framework for monitoring, resulted in the militarisation of the ESC through the recruitment of monitors from the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Education. This also resulted in a total lack of transparency regarding the electoral process.
- Civic organisations were removed from their traditional role of providing the ESC with trained election monitors and their task was reduced to performing the passive and arbitrary role of providing independent domestic election observers. But even this function was compromised to the point of being incidental since accreditation depended upon approval by the Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, who 'invited' about 420 members from ZESN and its affiliates to become observers.

The futility of this role is better understood in light of the fact that there were about 5000 polling stations countrywide, including about 600 mobiles.

- Voter education material provided by the ESC was in all cases inadequate and insufficient, and in some cases late and confusing, especially for the tripartite elections.

Observers

The problems encountered were as follows:

- Invitations to domestic and international observer groups by government were selective and arbitrary.
- Local observers were denied access to polling stations as a result of being unaccredited.
- Most local observers deployed by ZESN and its members were harassed in the following ways:
 - Beatings.
 - Torture.
 - Arrest and detention.
 - Confiscation of their monitoring tools and/or identity cards.
- International observers were attacked (e.g. the South African Observer Mission was attacked in Chinhoyi).



Opposition polling agents

- A significant number of polling agents for the opposition MDC were attacked, abducted or detained whilst on their way to their polling stations and thus were not in the polling stations during voting, leading to fears of ballot rigging.
- Some MDC polling agents were beaten, detained and died during the election period.

Election results and the voters' roll

Noteworthy under this heading are the following issues:

- Election results were announced under a tense and suspicious atmosphere. The number of registered voters and those who were turned away were never given, and the numbers of spoiled ballots were not announced together with the constituency results. Furthermore, the figures provided by ZESN observers, the ESC and those announced by the Registrar-General did not tally. Results were not announced at counting centres but were communicated to, and announced by the Registrar-General from the National Election Command Centre.
- The official results of the Harare and Chitungwiza municipal elections, which were held over the same period as the presidential election, were announced much later. But even these appear to be subject to change as later announcements by the Registrar-General contain significant differences to the original 'final' figures.

Conclusion

The 2002 presidential election was characterised by the implementation of an unprecedented systematic, nationwide campaign of violence and intimidation aimed at terrorising the rural electorate and preventing the opposition MDC from mounting a serious public political challenge to the ruling party anywhere in the country. In order for this to succeed, the police were strictly confined to the selective application of the law. The resultant breakdown in the rule of law allowed state-sponsored paramilitary militias and other ruling party supporters to act with impunity, terrorising entire communities in many urban centres as well as among the rural population.

To complement this anarchic environment, the government introduced repressive and anti-democratic legislation that seriously undermined Zimbabweans' constitutional rights to their freedom of expression, assembly and association. Other legislation further compromised the independence of electoral institutions and processes and disenfranchised thousands of voters through a flawed registration process and bureaucratic obstruction.



This evidence clearly demonstrates that the 2002 presidential election failed to meet the basic norms and standards for the conduct of a free and fair election as established by the SADC Parliamentary Forum and adopted by all member countries.

Consequently, ZESN believes that the collective will of the Zimbabwean electorate was not allowed adequate expression and that the lack of transparency in the electoral process itself warrants an audit of the election results. Depending on the outcome of this exercise, ZESN also recommends that a fresh election be held after an agreed transitional period-during which constitutional and electoral reforms guaranteeing a free and fair election are put in place.

Recommendations

ZESN believes the following recommendations must be implemented as key requirements to ensure a return of peace and democracy to Zimbabwe:

- The restoration of the rule of law and its full and impartial application, including the prosecution of those responsible for political violence.
- An audit of the election results by an independent body agreed upon by all participating candidates and parties.
- If necessary, a fresh election should be held, but only after an agreed transitional period during which constitutional and electoral reforms guaranteeing free and fair elections are put in place.

This will require constitutional reform which will provide for the following:

- The establishment of an independent electoral commission which is free of executive control and responsible for the management, administration and supervision of elections.
- The repeal of all legislation that presently invests the authority of election management in other government institutions.
- The repeal of all legislation undermining fundamental constitutional rights, including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association and movement and the right to vote.



- Provisions ensuring equitable access to state-owned media for contesting political parties and fair and accurate coverage by the national public broadcaster.
- An end to ZBC's monopoly of the airwaves and its removal from state control. The repeal and redrafting of the Broadcasting Services Act to allow for a more progressive regulatory climate reflecting the right of Zimbabweans to invest in the broadcasting media.
- Electoral reforms to protect the right of residents to vote and ensure the impartial selection of professional election staff from civil society. It will also be necessary to establish a non-discriminatory postal ballot system.
- The simultaneous running of parliamentary and presidential elections.
- Access to state resources for all contesting parties.

Provisions for the following should also be made:

- The upkeep of an accurate and up-to-date voters' roll accessible to the public.
- Strict observance of voters' rights to electoral information by the timely and adequate dissemination of all relevant information.
- An election code of conduct for political parties, the media, observers and monitors.
- Accessible and adequate polling stations allocated to every province or constituency.
- The full participation of civic society in voter education, election monitoring, observation, lobbying and advocacy as guaranteed by law.
- Provision for state security agencies and electoral staff to conduct their duties impartially and professionally.
- The establishment of independent inquiry to investigate political violence and recommend a process of reconciliation and rehabilitation.
- The specific incorporation into law of SADC's norms and standards for free and fair elections.
- That the counting of ballot papers be conducted at each polling station.
- The use of international bodies and mechanisms to redress violations and mediate in restoring peace in Zimbabwe.



Methodology

This report is the account and analysis of events and information gathered before, during and after the 2002 presidential election held from 9-11 March 2002. The report was compiled by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a coalition of 35 civic society organisations formed to co-ordinate activities pertaining to elections (*see annexure 14 at the back of this report*).

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network was formed in 1998 by civic society organisations to enhance a democratic, transparent, free and fair electoral process and environment through co-ordinating activities of member organisations in the field of election monitoring, voter education, research and advocacy, media and communication.

In order to achieve its objective, members of the Network are grouped into taskforces, which implement activities all over the country with the secretariat facilitating all the work involved. ZESN focuses on the following activities:

- Voter education.
- Research and advocacy.
- Election monitoring and observation.
- Media and information.
- Networking and capacity building.

The Network's main task is to ensure that the election monitoring and observation methods, training, as well as voter education training methodology and materials are standardised among its members in order to ensure uniformity in terms of information dissemination to the electorate. The ZESN activities cover the whole nation, working through the existing 120 political constituencies.

Long-term monitoring

Recognising that election monitoring is a process not an event during the polling days, ZESN established long-term monitors to audit the political environment in Zimbabwe prior to the Presidential Election. (About 240) Long-term observers were deployed across the country and observed the pre-election period from November 2001 to 28 February 2002. The long-term monitors' reports assess the environment on a province-by-province basis looking at the following issues:



- Electoral process and irregularities.
- Political violence.

The information and assessment in the long-term monitoring report formed the basis of this report.

Sources of information

This report is based on observations of the electoral process prior to, during and after the Zimbabwe presidential elections in 2002, the mayoral elections in Chitungwiza, and the mayoral and council elections in Harare in the same year.

Information and data compiled to assess the 2002 Presidential Elections was gathered through the diverse member organisations, the ZESN taskforces, the long-term monitors, the accredited local election observers and 12 100 ZESN observers under a parallel observation process. During the days of polling, the information flow was organised and channelled through Provincial and National Command Centres. Command centres were set up in the provinces and the National Command Centre in Harare were the central clearing points for reports on the actual voting and counting process.

The other sources of information providers were the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Zimbabwe Peace Project, Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe, media reports and political analysts.



CHAPTER 1

Political and historical background

Regular, free and fair elections enable citizens to express their will by choosing their leaders and representatives in government. This is crucial in a democracy because the government derives its power from the mandate of its people. The government has legitimate power to govern if the people accept it and its governance is based on their mandate.

Prior to 1979, black Zimbabweans did not have the right to vote for representatives and the government of their choice or to stand for election. The nationalist movement for independence mobilised the African majority around the concept of 'one man, one vote'. Relenting to political pressure and the armed struggle, the white minority government held the first 'majority rule' elections in 1979 under the auspices of the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia administration. Thus, for the black majority, electoral politics essentially began in 1979.

Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has undergone significant political transformation. The current governing system is based on majority rule. The Executive President combines the functions of Chief-of-State and head-of-government. The legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, called the House of Assembly, which has 150 seats of which 120 are elected by popular vote every five years. The President directly appoints 12 seats, provincial governors occupy eight and ten are occupied by traditional chiefs who are elected by their peers. The Executive President appoints the Cabinet.

Since independence, Zimbabwe has remained *de jure* a multi-party state with the ruling ZANU (PF) party maintaining an overwhelming parliamentary majority in the 1990 and 1995 elections. However, in the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU (PF) dominance in parliament ended with the emergence of the MDC, which was established in 1999.

The 2002 election took place against the background of an electoral environment of alleged manipulation through the establishment of electoral authorities which are under the final control of the head of state. One major concern has always been with the voter's roll, which has never been a true reflection of the totality of the voting population at any one time. The problem of the voters' roll remains one of the most contentious and perennial problems of elections in Zimbabwe. The weak and divided state of the opposition also helped ZANU (PF) to stay in power, virtually unchallenged, well into the 1990s. For the voters, there were no other parties offering tangible goods and plausible policy alternatives. Examples abound of parties that were launched with a bang only to expire with a whimper.

After the first decade of independence, the honesty of ZANU (PF) leaders came under increasing scrutiny with the publicising of several major corruption scandals involving high-ranking members of the ruling party.



Under-performance of the economy caused by mismanagement and corruption, unfair terms of trade and indiscriminate servicing of foreign debt, soon began to show with the contraction of the manufacturing industry. This increased the levels of unemployment and, combined with reduced government expenditure on social services increased public disenchantment with the government - creating the environment for the emergence of opposition to the state.

Although there was no strong organised opposition to the state, dissenting voices began to speak from the academia, from the newly emerging free press and an increasingly fearless civil society. Non-governmental organisations, particularly those working in the field of human rights became more vocal in exposing the state's human rights abuses and the corruption eating away at the economy, and therefore at the social and economic rights of Zimbabweans. Predictably, the state adopted a defensive position at the signs that the proverbial honeymoon was over.

Opposition to the state and state suppression of this dissent grew from the early 1990's. In the late 1990s, the state reluctantly agreed to a constitutional reform process, the highlight of which was the referendum on a proposed constitution in February 2000. The 'NO' vote to the state's proposed constitution was the first real setback for ZANU (PF) and a clear sign that they could no longer take their political hegemony for granted.

The country soon erupted into an orgy of violence unlike any seen in Zimbabwe since the liberation struggle. The state harking back to the days when it had been most successful turned back to the rhetoric of land redistribution, which had won the liberation war, and the support of the rural people. In the battle for the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans, violence was used to suppress real and imagined dissent against the state. The majority of the violence was perpetrated by ruling party members and supporters although members of the opposition were also implicated in the violence.

The pre-2000 election period recorded the highest number of cases of political and election related violence since 1980. The 2000 election itself was characterised by a high voter turnout with the results showing clearly that urban voters voted overwhelmingly for the MDC and rural voters for the ZANU (PF). The ruling party won this election narrowly beating off a strong challenge from the MDC with 62 seats to 57 seats. The violence and harassment of the opposition continued until after the 2002 Presidential Election. The euphoria generated by the 'NO' vote in the constitutional referendum of February 2000 had created the impression in the minds of some of the citizens that democracy could prevail in Zimbabwe (as the referendum result was seen as a reflection of the will of the Zimbabwean people).

The violent situations prevailing in Zimbabwe after the 2000 election and the apparent lack of political will to tackle it raised concerns about the government's willingness to the creation and sustenance of a free and fair electoral environment. The promulgation of Clemency Order of 2000 political violence perpetrators sent the message that political violence and election related violence were acceptable.



Regional and international interests in the elections in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean 2002 Presidential Election was yet again a test on the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, imperialism juxtaposed to notions and principles of democracy, political power and interests. As late as August 2001, the Zimbabwean civic society was informing the world of the gross human violations and the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe. On 10 September 2001, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Committee, commented on the celebrated Abuja Agreement as follows:

We are most concerned that the Commonwealth meeting chose to focus upon land, instead of the lack of the rule of law as the major cause of the crisis, namely misrule, particularly since the Constitutional Referendum in February 2000. We strongly disagree with the conclusion that land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The Abuja meeting has perpetuated the myth that the crisis is due to land. Land reform is obviously a pressing need in Zimbabwe but the Zimbabwean Government has used this issue to deflect attention from the campaign of terror that it has conducted against its political opponents. (*Crisis in Zimbabwe Report, 2002*).

Manipulation of the West's past colonial ventures and, of course, its continued interests in Zimbabwe was used by Mugabe, together with the land issue, to win the support of not only Zimbabweans but the region as a whole. The politics of race and the demonisation of the main opposition party, MDC, as an imperialist agent and denunciation of Tony Blair Prime Minister of Britain became part of the ZANU (PF) election campaign. The deportation of EU Observer Mission leader, Pierre Schori, and the EU-imposed targeted sanctions on President Mugabe and senior government officials received wide public media coverage. The EU sanctions were seen to be grossly patronising by ZANU (PF) and the EU was accused of intruding into the internal affairs of Zimbabwe.

The local public owned paper portrayed the sanctions as confirmation of ZANU PF's campaign against European colonial hegemony. SADC countries' response to the crisis in Zimbabwe was based on South Africa President Thabo Mbeki's quiet diplomacy. The body decided to support President Mugabe's notions of sovereignty and imperialism without questioning the levels of violence and undemocratic practices in Zimbabwe.

Consequently, the Zimbabwe government received support not only in many regional meetings held within the region but also at the Commonwealth Summit held from 1-2 March 2002 in Australia. To criticise the Zimbabwe government was to appear to be supporting Western arrogance, racism and indifference to the plight of Africa's people. For Zimbabweans to criticise the government would result in unfavourable labelling as unpatriotic or worse, a spy for the West.



Economic and social context in the pre-election period

The United Nations estimated that about half a million of Zimbabwe's 12,5 million people were going hungry in the few months before elections. The electioneering was run amidst a food crisis for which there appears to be no solution. By early March 2002, the staple maize crop production and supply had dropped by nearly 50%. The economic problems in Zimbabwe were such that inflation was running at 117%, unemployment at a record 60%, over 80% of Zimbabwe's 12,5 million people living below the poverty line. The education and health systems had deteriorated and approximately 2000 Zimbabweans were dying each week from HIV/AIDS. The fast-track land redistribution programme continued with reports of fresh farm invasions and violence on the farms.

The foreign currency crisis remained with many companies closing down and many people losing their jobs. Foreign investment declined by 80%, industrial production had dropped dramatically as had field crops for export including wheat and maize- resulting in the need to import 40% of the country's needs. With the critical shortages of basic commodities and essentials, Zimbabweans went to the polls to cast their vote. Statistics of Zimbabwean economic refugees showed an increase.



CHAPTER 2

Legal and constitutional framework

Section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe, and that if any other law is inconsistent with it, that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. Thus, Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy and so must act in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The three arms of Government i.e. the Executive, Judiciary and Legislative are also under and subject to the Constitution, which recognises the concept of separation of powers.

The Constitution enshrines a Declaration of Rights, which provides for the basic freedoms of conscience, assembly, association, worship, expression and movement. Zimbabwe's electoral law is largely contained in the Constitution and the Electoral Act, which governs the conduct of elections. The Constitution provides for the term of the President as six years and sets out conditions under which the President shall hold office. Parliamentary elections are held at five-yearly intervals while the presidential elections are held every six years. Constitutional experts have questioned the wisdom of holding the two elections in different years. The prospect of a president of a party defeated in a general election continuing in office till his term expires could trigger a constitutional crisis.

The main act players in Zimbabwe's electoral system are:

- the Delimitation Commission.
- the Electoral Supervisory Commission.
- the Election Directorate.
- the Registrar-General of Elections.

The Delimitation Commission

It has the responsibility of determining the limits of the constituencies in Zimbabwe. Currently, Zimbabwe is divided into 120 constituencies, in accordance with Section 60 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

In dividing Zimbabwe into constituencies, the Commission takes into account firstly, the total number of registered voters and the total number of constituencies required and therefore the general average number of voters in every constituency. In respect of any area, the commission takes note of its physical features, the means of communication in the area, the geographical distribution of voters registered on the common roll and any community of interest between voters registered on the common roll who live in that area.



Please note: For the purposes of the 2002 Elections, the Delimitation Commission was not constituted and reliance was placed on the constituency boundaries delimited for the purposes of the 2000 parliamentary election, despite the fact that new voters were added onto the voters' roll.

The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC)

The ESC has the responsibility of supervising the registration of voters, the conduct of elections and it also considers any proposed Bill or Statutory Instrument which may be referred to it and which relates to Presidential, Parliamentary or Local Authority elections (Section 61 of the Constitution). Like the Delimitation Commission, the President appoints it.

The Election Directorate (ED)

The Election Directorate consists of a chairperson appointed by the President, the Registrar-General of Elections and at least two other members (but not more than ten) appointed by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. Traditionally, the Election Directorate has consisted of civil servants under the chairmanship of the Public Service Commission (PSC). The responsibilities of the Directorate are:

- to co-ordinate the activities of ministries and departments of government in regard to the delimitation of constituencies, the registration of voters, the conduct of polls and all other matters connected with elections.
- to give instructions and make recommendations to the Registrar-General in regard to the exercise of his functions under the Electoral Act, and other persons in the employment of the state (for the purpose of ensuring the efficient, proper, free and fair conduct of elections).
- to ensure that elections are generally conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly (Section 4 of the Electoral Act: Chapter 2:01).

The Registrar-General of Elections

The Registrar-General of Elections is a public servant whose office falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, he runs elections in accordance with the Electoral Act, which is administered not by the Minister of Home Affairs but by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

The Registrar-General of Elections is responsible for running the whole electoral process. This involves the following responsibilities:

- registration of voters.
- preparation of the voters' roll.

- presiding over the nomination court for the nomination of candidates.
- provision of ballot papers.
- setting up of polling stations.
- provision of electoral staff.
- declaration of election results.
- custody of election materials.

These extensive functions make the Registrar-General of Elections very central to the entire electoral process. At the same time, any weaknesses or limitations in the discharge of these functions have negative ripple effects on the rest of the electoral process (Sachikonye, 1999).

Other provisions in the Electoral Act enhance the centrality of the Registrar-General of Elections. Section 15(2) of the Electoral Act states that the Registrar General 'shall not be subject to the control of any person or authority other than the Election Directorate'. The Registrar-General is not subject to the control of the ESC, but shall have regard to any report or recommendation of the ESC. It is against the above background that Zimbabwe went to the presidential polls on 9 March and 10 March 2002.

There was, prior to the election, a lot of confusion surrounding the laws governing the conduct of elections. In January 2002, the Parliament of Zimbabwe passed the General Laws Amendment Act, which made a number of changes to the Electoral Act, but that Act was later set aside by the Supreme Court on 27 February 2002. This meant that the old law would apply. The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs subsequently gazetted new regulations on 5 March, which re-enacted substantially the provisions of the General Laws Amendment Act relating to elections.

The Presidential Temporary Powers were evoked for this purpose.

General Laws Amendment Act 2002

The stipulations of the General Laws Amendment were as follows:

Voter education -The Act gave the ESC monopoly on voter education, with a provision that the ESC could appoint and register persons who would assist it in providing voter education. Section 14 (c) 5 of the Act reads, 'No foreign contribution or donation for the purposes of voter education shall be made except for the Commission'. This provision made it impossible for NGOs to consider registering to provide voter education under the ESC. However, provisions in the Act *ultra vires* the Constitution. For instance, the ban on voter education infringes Section 20 of the Constitution.



Election observation and monitoring -The General Laws Amendment Act had the following implications on civic society monitoring of elections:

- It made members of Public Service the only persons qualified to be appointed election monitors. This meant that ordinary persons recruited and trained by civic organisations could not be appointed as monitors but only as observers.
- The Act expanded the list of persons qualified for accreditation as observers to cover both local and foreign persons. Among the locals who could be appointed, as observers were (eminent persons from within Zimbabwe and individuals representing local organisations. In both cases, the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs extends the invitation.

The power of an observer was substantially reduced compared to that of a monitor. According to this Act, an observer who detects an irregularity only has the right to inform a monitor, or the ESC or constituency registrar. An observer has no entitlement to inspect or follow any vehicle transporting ballot boxes and it is not mandatory that there be an observer at each polling station. The effect of this was not only to restrict the role of civil society in this election, but also left the final decision of whether they could observe the elections to the government.

The 27 February 2002 Supreme Court judgement proclaiming the General Laws Amendment Act unconstitutional did not change anything on the ground for civic society monitors because on 4 and 5 March 2002, the provisions of the General Laws Amendment Act were brought back under the Presidential Powers.

Postal voting system - The postal ballot system was modified. The government amended the law with the effect of restricting those voting from abroad to uniformed forces and Zimbabwe's diplomatic missions. All other Zimbabweans living abroad or away from their constituencies could not use postal voting and they were therefore disenfranchised.

Zimbabweans with permanent residence status in other countries were not allowed to vote unless they produced passports and proof, e.g. bills that they had lived in their constituencies for a continuous period of 12 months prior to the elections.

Removal of names from the voters' roll - The Registrar General was given the discretion to make amendments to the voters' roll after registration and inspection, and during the election. This included the removal of names from the roll. The Amendment permitted the election officials to make corrections on wrongly spelt names without referring the case to the magistrate, as was the case before.

The Public Order and Security Act 2002

This Act is modelled along the lines of the Law and Order Maintenance Act of 1960. The Act criminalised criticism of the President, making it a serious offence to engender hostility towards, or cause hatred, contempt or ridicule of the President; whether in person or in respect of his office.

The Act also gives considerable power to the Police Force. The Act makes it an offence to engender feelings of hostility towards an officer or the police force and an offence to expose it to contempt, ridicule or disesteem. Section 24 (5) of the Act obliges any organiser of a meeting to give at least four days of written notice of the holding of the gathering to the regulating authority. During the 2002 election, the police were given the power to prohibit public meetings and demonstrations if they thought that these would cause public disorder and they also had the power to disperse whatever meetings or demonstrations they considered illegal.

The Act has a provision that makes it an offence for anyone inside or outside Zimbabwe to publish or communicate a statement which may lead to 'inciting or promoting public disorder or public violence or endangering public safety'. The Act was unprecedented and curtailed the freedom of movement, speech, expression and association guaranteed under the Constitution.

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill (Act)

The Minister of Information and Publicity presented the bill in parliament in November 2001. Under the proposed legislation, foreign journalists were barred from working in the country. The Bill made it clear that all media professionals will have to be granted authorisation by a special commission to be set up by Government, which will also impose a code of conduct. In addition, the Bill would make it illegal to rewrite a story published by another mass media service without permission from the owner.

The Bill introduced a new regime of licensing journalists and made acts of terrorism punishable with life imprisonment or the death penalty. Under this Bill, it will also be an offence to deliberately spread information aimed to discredit a person, cause alarm or despondency and conceal, falsify or fabricate information presented under the use of authentic reports. Unlike the other Bills that were gazetted, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy remained a Bill during the election period. This was due to the major criticism some of its provisions received (these provisions were labelled ill-conceived, badly drafted and dangerously threatening to the people's fundamental rights).

The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act

The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act was made law on 6 July 2001. It outlawed dual citizenship. People who migrated from neighbouring countries and became naturalised Zimbabweans, were asked to re-apply for Zimbabwean citizenship or lose it permanently. Their children who were born in Zimbabwe were also stripped of their citizenship as well and asked to renounce a 'claim' to their parent's country of birth's citizenship. Over one third Zimbabweans, mostly of Malawi, Mozambican and Zambian descent, were affected by the amendments. The Act was largely seen to be targeting whites who were seen to be supporters of the opposition. More than 3 000 whites in Bulawayo alone and in many other places, did not cast their ballot in the elections because of the citizenship issue.

Amongst the affected was the former Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister Sir Garfield Todd who was advised that he had ceased to be a citizen of Zimbabwe and therefore could not vote.

Funding of political parties

The Political Parties (Finance) Act prescribed funding for all political parties which won a minimum of 15 seats in parliament. In the 1995 Parliamentary General Election, ZANU (PF) won 117 of the 120 seats and was therefore the only party eligible under the Act to receive funds from the state. In 1999, a Supreme Court judgement ruled that thresholds for access to funding should be lowered to a minimum of 5% of the total valid votes in an election contest. Thus, parties which receive at least 5 percent in an election will receive funding and, the greater the number of votes received, the higher the funding. MDC benefited from the fund after the 2000 general elections.

In 2001, an amendment to the political parties (Finance) Act made it illegal to receive foreign funding for political parties contesting the elections. This again was seen as being targeted at the MDC, which has more international support than the ruling party.



CHAPTER 3

Pre-election period

Voter registration and inspection of the voters' roll

The registration process began on 15 October 2001 and ended on 13 December 2001. The process was extended to 27 January 2002. A notice from the Registrar General extended it again from 2 March to 3 March 2002. Reports from observers pointed to registration of voters taking place up to the days of polling.

The voters' roll was opened for public inspection initially for the period from 19 November to 9 December 2001 but was eventually extended by a week to 19 December 2001. After 19 December 2001, the registration process was done without much publicity. The MDC challenged in court the deadline for registration and the restrictive proof of residency requirements demanded by the Registrar-General for one to register. The proof of residency could be any of the following:

- In the case of rural and farm dwellers, confirmation by the village head or farm owner, vouching for the residence status of the person seeking registration.
- In the case of urban dwellers, any of the following documents:
 - a) certificate of occupation/title deeds;
 - b) lodger's permit/card issued before 19 November 2001;
 - c) Rates/water bills in the applicant's name,;
 - d) Electricity statements in the applicant's name or credit bills/statements showing the physical address of the applicant.

As a result of the demand for the various forms of proof of residency, confusion ensued and the Minister of Home Affairs later made a statement in parliament to the effect that there was no need for proof of residency for one to be registered as a voter. A High Court order confirmed this position following an MDC application. However, *The Herald* of 7 December 2001 quoted the Registrar-General as saying that his office would continue to demand the evidence in terms of Sections 19 and 20 of the Electoral Act, arguing that he was empowered by the Act to seek or require proof of residency from applicants who wanted to be registered as voters.

The application of the Citizenship Act of Zimbabwe [Chapter 4:01] also caused confusion during the registration exercise. All those who had dual citizenship were required to renounce one of them and given a deadline of 6 January 2002 for that purpose. Those who renounced their Zimbabwean citizenship were not allowed to vote as they had been struck off the voter's roll.

Of great concern was the confusion and secrecy surrounding the voter registration exercise. This was because of the numerous changes to the laws governing the elections and uncertainty about whether those who were still registering even just before the elections would appear on the voters roll in time for the elections.



Following amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act, the Registrar-General sent out notices of objection to all those people who had renounced their Zimbabwean citizenship, advising them that they would not be able to vote. Affected persons successfully challenged this in the High Court so that they could exercise their right to vote. The High Court ruling was to the effect that, among other things, the Registrar General shall restore to the voters' roll of any constituency:

- all voters who on or before 18 January 2002 were on that roll or were eligible but were refused to be on that roll, who may have lost or renounced their citizenship of Zimbabwe but who, since 1985, had been regarded by a written law to be permanently resident in Zimbabwe and that the Registrar General shall make adequate and reasonable administrative arrangements for all voters registered on the common roll who would not be in their constituencies on the polling days to exercise their right to vote.

Apart from lack of transparency in voter registration deadlines, and inspection, the legal wrangles which ensued during the pre-election period added to the confusion. A lot of voters were disenfranchised for lack of knowledge of updated information on the whole electoral process. Indeed, ZESN received a number of reports and complaints filed by potential voters who felt that they had been disenfranchised.

A summary of grievances showed, among other things, that:

- The electorate was generally ill-informed on who was eligible to vote, especially those who were affected by the amended Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act.
- Some young voters still dependent or living with their parents were turned away when they tried to register as voters because they did not have proof of residence.
- There was a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing and/or a clear lack of communication between the Registrar-General's office and the registration officers on the ground. For instance, the requirements for registration as voters were not applied consistently through the country, such as the production of proof of residence, which disenfranchised a whole spectrum of people. Furthermore, it provided an uneven playing field for potential voters because in some cases, registration without proof of residence was subject to the leniency of the registration officers.
- The Registrar-General was not clear on who was considered as a permanent resident since the amendment of the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act.
- The omission of names from the voter's roll, including the names of those who had voted in the 2000 parliamentary elections and those who had since registered.



The voter registration exercise was haphazard at best, with no clear set and systematic standards.

A large number of the electorate continued to register but they did not know if they would be placed on the roll and vote.

Human rights situation

Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives' and the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of governments, which 'shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by "universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures (*African Charter on Human and People's Rights*).

The prevailing human rights situation since the 2000 parliamentary elections and, more specifically, in the last three months before the presidential elections was not conducive to the realisation of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Although the freedoms of speech, expression, assembly and association are enshrined in the Constitution, the protection of these rights was not guaranteed by the State. It is vital for voters to obtain accurate and impartial information in order to decide whom to vote for. However, the importance of free media has not been very much respected in Zimbabwe, where the Government largely controls the print and electronic media.

The incumbent government attracted severe criticism from both international and domestic observers on the issues of illegal detentions, allegations of torture, extortion and abuse of detainees, deportation, 'disappearances', illegal seizures of white-owned land, restrictions on freedom of assembly, speech and association, attacks on the independent press and independent judiciary, harassment of opposition activists by members of the army, war veterans and youth acting with the acquiescence of the government.

The application of the rule of law remained extremely poor and deteriorated further following the President's refusal to comply with court orders regarding the government's fast-track land reform programme. A Clemency Order issued by the President on 6 October 2000 granted unconditional amnesty for violations committed in the turbulent run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary elections, including torture. This was an unofficial sanction of the political violence. Other areas of concern included the following:

- The erosion of the independence of the judiciary over the last two years and the tendency to disregard court decisions that are not favourable to government.
- The apparent selective application of the law by the police, mostly in favour of the ruling party.
- The breakdown of the rule of law.



Voter education

Voter education is one of the cornerstones of free and fair elections. It cannot be overemphasised that the process of voter education has to be non-partisan in order for it to adequately serve its purpose. Voter and civic education are essential parts of empowering the electorate to vote knowledgeably. The information that needs to be conveyed to the electorate includes the following:

- Amendments to electoral laws and procedures.
- How and where to register as a voter.
- How to make a complaint about the voter's roll.
- What an election is meant to do and who is standing for the elections.
- What each constituency boundaries are.
- Where to vote.
- How to vote.
- That one's vote is one's secret.

The government restricted voter education by NGOs unless they were selected by the ESC to do so under the General Laws Amendment Act. The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs said that the reason for this was that the situation had been discovered to be undesirable, considering the fact that most non-governmental organisations were allegedly partial, foreign-funded and loyal to their funders (*The Herald, 7 November 2001*).

It appears there was confusion surrounding the issue. For instance, media reports quoted the chairman of the Electoral Supervisory Commission as saying that non-governmental organisations could still continue with their voter education campaigns. Undoubtedly, the numerous changes to the electoral laws and subsequent court challenges made it difficult for ZESN to engage in a comprehensive voter education drive. Nevertheless, ZESN materials were initially examined and considered good by the ESC.

Although voter education and training of the trainers' workshops were held in several provinces, the tense political climate proved to be an impediment. In Mashonaland West, East and Central, for example, workshops to train observers and public meetings had to be cancelled, and instead moved to Harare. 'War veterans' queried what ZESN was doing and where ZESN was able to hold workshops, the local traditional leadership had to be consulted first.




Due to the tense political atmosphere, the emphasis of ZESN voter and civic education had to be moved from public meetings to decentralised information dissemination of materials, documents and flyers. Different organisations with localised structures such as the churches were also used to disseminate voter education material. Another limitation to public meetings for the purpose of carrying out voter education was that the Public Order and Security Act requires that the police are notified four days in advance of any public meetings.

Political violence

Zimbabwe's political environment was one in which the opposition was unable to undertake any meaningful campaign in the rural areas due to massive intimidation and physical violence. There were specific areas that were off limits to the opposition. It was not possible for the opposition to campaign in Mount Darwin North and South, Guruve and Shamva in Mashonaland Central Province, Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe in Mashonaland East Province, Mashonaland West Province and Midlands Province.

Cumulative totals of Political Violence from 1 January 2002 - 14 April 2002



Sources: HR Forum legal statements, CFU reports and newspaper reports, Amani Trust Medical Assessment.

The bulk of the violence was allegedly perpetrated by ZANU (PF) youth militia who maintained their terror campaign, relentlessly mounting attacks in the high density suburbs of Harare and Bulawayo and abducting people in other areas and torturing them in bases that they had established around the country.

Contrary to police reports stating that 14 persons had died as a result of political violence, the Human Rights NGO Forum recorded 48 reported murders.



Provincial reports of violence

The ZESN long-term monitors in all the provinces reported many incidents where campaigning for the opposition was impeded at every instance. One of the reports observed the following:

'The 2002 Presidential Election is tough that the ruling party is afraid of losing. Even the army officers are being diverted from their duties and being used as a campaign team.'

The number of known militia bases were located as follows in the Provinces: Mashonaland Central (40); Matebeleland (29); Mashonaland West (23); Masvingo (13); Bulawayo (13); Mashonaland East (9); Chitungwiza (9) and Harare (5). In Masvingo, the party militia was camped at vice-president Muzenda's Paradise Park Motel.

Below is a list of some of the incidents of violence around the country as reported by ZESN observers in the run up to the elections.

Harare Province - There were few reports of violence in the affluent suburbs but reports of political violence appeared to be confined to the high-density areas. Like in other parts of the country, people were forced to buy ZANU (PF) party cards at exorbitant prices and were also forced to attend ZANU PF rallies. The usual threats of a return to war in the event of ZANU (PF) losing the election were prevalent. In Mbare, ZANU (PF) youths attacked the house of MDC ward chairperson Mrs Saidi and destroyed property. As with other similar cases, no arrests were made. At Siyaso in Mbare, Ally Manyengwa was attacked by a number of people in a Nissan Truck. On 6 February 2002, ZANU (PF) youths and MDC youths clashed at Stodart Hall in Mbare. There were running battles all over Mbare, resulting in 16 houses being attacked and four houses petrol bombed. In fact, clashes between ZANU (PF) and MDC youths were prevalent in the Mbare area. Two ZESN voter educators were beaten in Cranborne near the military camp and a docket was filed at Braeside Police station.

Manicaland Province - Considerable levels of political intolerance, violence and intimidation were experienced. The Makoni constituency emerged as one of the most politically volatile areas in the province and Makoni Member of Parliament, Didymus Mutasa, was specifically implicated in many monitors' reports for being responsible for the upsurge of violence in Makoni District. He was accused of operating above the law with his militia. He allegedly said many inflammatory and inciting statements one of them being 'if you want war, then vote the MDC'.

Mashonaland East Province - The situation in Mashonaland East was tense and generally not conducive for campaigning especially for the opposition. Only ZANU (PF) could carry out its campaign activities while supporters of the opposition were beaten. Even failure to attend ZANU PF political meetings attracted reprisals.

On 20 February 2002, people in Dombotombo high-density suburb were forced to attend a ZANU (PF) rally. Independent newspapers perceived to be in support of the opposition, such as *The Daily News*, were banned in several parts of Mashonaland East. In Marondera, the newspaper could hardly be found on the streets, as newspaper vendors found with the newspaper were harassed. People seen around the streets with copies of independent newspapers were thoroughly beaten. This robbed the populace of Marondera of an alternative view of the events unfolding in Zimbabwe.

ZANU (PF) supporters in the province repeatedly labelled teachers and headmasters MDC sympathisers. A number of teachers were forced to leave rural areas for urban areas. A case in point is that of a headmaster at Chakadini Secondary School who was beaten by ZANU (PF) supporters for allegedly being an MDC sympathiser. He subsequently went on leave.

Masvingo Province - Violence and intimidation were rampant in most areas of the province. Suspected ZANU (PF) youths mounted illegal roadblocks throughout the province and requested travellers to produce ZANU (PF) party cards. Failure to do so resulted in reprisals. Villagers were forced to attend party meetings at night while suspected opposition officials were assaulted. There were reports of liberation war veterans going about recruiting youths for national service at the Border Gezi Training Centre.

On graduation, the youth allegedly embarked on terror campaigns against supporters of the opposition. Voters were also lured to support ZANU (PF) party through various other strategies, such as the donation of fertiliser to villages and the launching of a number of projects ahead of the election, which amounted to vote buying. The ruling party also tasked chiefs and headman with the responsibility of ensuring that their people attended ZANU PF rallies, whereas, traditionally they are supposed to be non-partisan.

Midlands Province - There was widespread intimidation and assault of people perceived to be opposition supporters by ZANU (PF) youths and war veterans. People were forced to buy ZANU (PF) membership cards, usually at exorbitant prices. In Kwekwe, ZANU (PF) cards were being sold for as much as \$200 while in Mkoba people were being forced to buy cards for as much as \$150, the cards normally cost \$80. Failure to buy ZANU (PF) cards was construed as support for the opposition. Fourteen ZESN observers from Gokwe were detained for the whole night and their IDs confiscated by ZANU (PF) youths in Gweru whilst on their way to an observers' training workshop.

Campaign Period

It was one of the bloodiest electioneering periods Zimbabwe has experienced since 1980 and was more violent than the 2000 general elections. It was a period fraught with political violence, intimidation, assaults, deaths, abductions and torture, rape and sexual harassment, gross violations of civic and political rights fear, confusion and uncertainty.



In the background to all this electioneering, critical food shortages of basic commodities hit Zimbabwe, coupled with a devastating drought that worsened the national crisis.

The long-term monitors reported the following disturbing patterns that occurred in the provinces during the campaign period:

- Freedoms of speech, movement and association particularly for the opposition supporters were severely curtailed. In many areas, the ruling party had the freedom to assemble, campaign and put on party T-shirts. In the provinces, the ZANU (PF) party cards were the passport for travelling, government aid, and required when shopping for maize grain or mealie meal.
- Many voters in the provinces ran the risk of being disenfranchised because they had to seek refuge elsewhere.
- The threat of war featured strongly as a ZANU (PF) campaign strategy.
- Only the state-owned newspapers, which reported in favour of the ruling party, were allowed unlimited circulation in the provinces, while independent newspapers were barred.
- ZANU (PF) supporters, war veterans, uniformed forces and youths from the Border Gezi National Youth Service embarked on a door-to-door movement to coerce people to buy ZANU (PF) cards.
- People were forced to attend ZANU (PF) meetings during the evenings.

Partiality of security forces


In a veiled reference to opposition candidates on 9 January, 2002, the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces together with the Commander of the Army, the Commander of the Air Force, the Commissioner of Police, the Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation and the Commissioner of Prisons stated that they would not accept a political leader, even if democratically elected, who did not have a history of participating in the liberation struggle. The threat was strongly condemned by civic society, and it had a negative impact on the elections as it induced fear in the electorate and violated the whole principle of one's right to vote freely.

The police ignored court orders to enforce the law and applied the law selectively - they harassed members of the opposition, civil society and minorities. Instead of carrying out their constitutional duty of protecting citizens, they committed gross human rights violations against the populace and did not provide protection to many victims of political violence. Some of the police officers were accused of participating in the looting and invasion of the commercial farms (*The Daily News*, 2 April 2002).

Misuse of Government resources for campaigning purposes

As in the previous elections, the ruling party used government resources including vehicles, air force helicopters, civil servants, public media, government offices and funds for campaign purposes.

The Presidential Election Campaign television coverage of Candidates



Source: *Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)*

Media in the pre-election period

It is widely accepted that a free, fair, democratic and transparent electoral process allows for the freedom of speech for the candidates, the media and others. Equal access to the public controlled media is a necessity that must be granted to enable the electorate to make informed and unbiased choices.

After the elections, dates were announced, ZBC gazetted that it would officially open its airwaves for use by campaigning parties equally. However, statistics provided by the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) are to the contrary.

The independent print media was subjected to public accusations and labelling as opposition supporters faced threats including, arrests, harassment, intimidation and bombings of printing press premises and offices of *The Daily News*. The ZANU (PF) supporters also stopped circulation of *The Daily News* in numerous rural areas of Zimbabwe and urban areas in Mashonaland East, West and Central Provinces. Street vendors selling any independent papers were harassed and intimidated.

Given that in an ideal election, the public media plays a critical role in facilitating communication between the contesting candidates and the electorate, the human rights abuses highlighted above had grave implications on the freeness and fairness of the elections.

What occurred in the Zimbabwean pre-election context is best summarised by the SADC parliamentary forum's statement that states that,
in the majority of SADC countries, the state owned media is controlled by Government. This often causes imbalance in the playing field between the stakeholders mainly the ruling party and opposition parties. It contributes to lack of transparency through selective reporting.

Virtually no access was given to the opposition parties in the state media and public media was turned into an instrument of political propaganda in a campaign characterised by highly misleading reports to vilify the opposition and glorify the ruling party.

The Role of Zimbabwe civil society

Civil society is the totality of social institutions and associations (both formal and informal) that are not strictly production-related outside governmental structures. Once capacity of civil society is strengthened, this changes the balance of power in society. A dense civil society is important for democracy because it establishes a counterweight to state power. This was demonstrated in Zimbabwe (mainly in 1997 to 2000), when an organised and empowered civil society emerged to challenge the ruling class under the constitutional reform process. It was through the demand for constitutional reform that Zimbabweans clearly began to show their discontent with the ruling party when they rejected the government's draft constitution. Civil society went further to organise together and participated in the 2000 general election by providing voter education and election monitoring.

In 2002, legislation was promulgated to change civil society's role not only in voter education but also in election monitoring.

Although the voter education programme was implemented, the tense political climate proved to be an impediment. In all Mashonaland Provinces, for example, workshops to train observers and public meetings had to be cancelled and instead moved to Harare. Where ZESN managed to hold workshops, local traditional leadership, had to be consulted first. As stated earlier, different organisations with localised structures were used to disseminate voter education material. It has also been already noted that another limitation was, of course, the notorious POSA which requires that the police are notified in advance of any public meetings. On numerous occasions, the police sent letters to ZESN secretariat requesting it not to hold some of its public meetings.

However, in spite of all these impediments, the ZESN membership resolved to continue with its voter education as the regulations were, in any case, unconstitutional.

Monitors, domestic and international observers

The issue of election monitors and observers proved to be controversial. There was lack of transparency on the part of the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the ESC on their selection criteria of local monitors and observers.



ZESN observers were not accredited until about two days before the elections and, worse still, they only accredited about 420 out of the 12 500 names that ZESN had submitted to them. This made the deployment of observers difficult. Some international observers were excluded from the invitation list despite having previously observed local elections in the past. Those from the EU pulled out in protest.

The government had earlier fast-tracked a General Laws Amendment Act, which among other regulations, amended the Electoral Act to stipulate that the ESC, which is responsible for administering the election, shall appoint, accredit and deploy at each polling station members of the Public Service to act as monitors. This raised doubts as to the impartiality of the whole process, as civil servants were now monitoring themselves. Civic organisations were to be invited to the elections as observers.

The Government did apply provisions of this law and published names of 70 organisations in the local papers inviting names of observers for the 2002 election. ZESN sent over 12 500 names from its member organisations to the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs as advertised for in the invitations.

Ninety-six (96) hours before the elections, the fate of the local monitors who had already received extensive training was still unknown. Two days before the elections, government contacted those organisations that had applied to be registered as domestic observers. About 420 people were accredited from the submitted list of 12 500 names from ZESN. On average, three people were accredited from each organisation. Other organisations perceived to be anti-ZANU(PF) were denied accreditation and ZANU (PF) aligned groups received large numbers of accredited observers, the majority of whom had never observed any election before nor had they received training in election observation. The government handpicked names of the local observers and any persons perceived to be sympathetic to MDC did not receive accreditation.

This action by the government received condemnation and ZESN decided to carry out a parallel observation process. In accordance with its deployment plan, local observers were deployed country wide to observe the elections 100 metres away from the polling stations and assess as much as they could during the polling days. The government also invited individual countries and international and regional organisations as observers but some European countries and the United States of America organisations were excluded from their invitations as government viewed them to be sympathetic to opposition parties. Of particular note was the expulsion from Zimbabwe of Pierre Schori who came as head of the EU delegation observer team. His expulsion resulted in the rest of the EU countries pulling their observers out.

It is interesting to note that warmly received and invited observers had no prior experience of sending observer missions and were mostly from countries with histories of undemocratic and fraudulent elections.

This did not present a good picture of the government as it behaved like it had something to hide. Election observers and monitors do not influence the outcome of an election but only enhance transparency. They also help build confidence within the electorate in the voting process.



Gender and the 2002 elections

Political space has shrunk considerably for women in Zimbabwe. In the 2000 elections, only 13 women won parliamentary seats (compared to 22 seats in 1995).

As we approached March 2002 polls, it was clear that the elections had no space for women and women's interests albeit, women being the majority voters. Women had to overcome many barriers so they could enjoy the equal and universal suffrage.

International and regional instruments

Zimbabwe has ratified or acceded to the following international human rights conventions relevant to the consideration of gender in relation to free and fair elections:

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
- Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
- The Government of Zimbabwe is, by acceding to the CEDAW, bound to guarantee equal participation of women in the political and public life of Zimbabwe and, in particular, shall ensure that women are on equal terms with men as far as this right is concerned.

Zimbabwe, like all countries that have acceded to CEDAW, has been scrutinised by a UN Committee and this committee has stated that the negative attitude towards women and discriminating customary laws and practices continue to contribute to the slow pace in advancing the status of women in politics.

At regional level, Zimbabwe has ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and Zimbabwe is also a party to the Declaration on Gender Equality signed by all SADC heads of state. In these conventions, Zimbabwe has committed to placing gender firmly on the political agenda and ensuring the equal representation of women and men in the decision making structures.

The situation at national level

At the national level, Section 23 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe allows discrimination on any grounds in the areas of family law, marriage, divorce, inheritance and customary law. Although the government has ratified CEDAW, it has not yet been domesticated into Zimbabwean laws.

Against this background, the following characterised the electoral process in Zimbabwe.

Voters' roll - In February, the Registrar-General was given new powers under amendments to S34 of the Electoral Act to alter the voters' roll at any time without directly informing the voters concerned of his intention and giving them the right of protest and/ or appeal. Its powers were extended to correcting any error or omission or to any change on the original name or address of the voter. The Registrar-General did indeed exercise his powers and altered married women's surnames to their husbands' without notifying them or seeking their consent, potentially disenfranchising women who were still using their maiden names on their identity documents.

Proof of residency requirement - The proof of residency demanded by the amendment to the Electoral Act disenfranchised many impoverished homeless Zimbabweans. The majority of women in Zimbabwe are in unregistered marital unions and therefore could not provide proof of residency in their own names.

In addition:

- Many are lodgers with no lease agreement and they were again discriminated against, as they could not provide the proof required.
- Many women are economically dependent on their husbands, partners or parents and they were turned away from the voter registration because they were unable to produce proof of residency, as they had no accounts in their names, telephone bills and/or rate bills.
- In the rural areas, confirmation of residence status was left to the village head who is a patriarchal head and had sole discretion to refuse the registration of women if he so wished, especially if the woman or woman's husband was seen as supporting an opposition political party.
- The evicted farm workers, the bulk of whom are women were of no fixed abode and therefore could not meet the proof of residency requirement.
- The proof of residency requirement, coupled with deprivation of the postal vote, affected thousands of women living outside Zimbabwe for economic survival.

Amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act - The effect of the amendment affected many women of foreign origin married to Zimbabwean men and those of migrant parenthood from neighbouring countries such as Malawi and Mozambique who were asked to renounce foreign citizenship of these countries in order for them to be eligible voters. Many were unable to do this because they had to pay money to the embassies for their papers to be handled. Others did not have the requisite documents as descendants of migrant workers, with no documents. The information of the amendments was never disseminated to the rural populace and this meant that many of the women would only find out that they could not vote at the polling station on polling day.



Electoral law and the Constitution - No particular attention has ever been given to engendering the electoral laws of Zimbabwe, especially since the Constitution allows discrimination under customary and family law. With the patriarchal system, a woman in Zimbabwean can be told how to vote by a male relation in their family.

Voter education - The voter education provided by the ESC paid no attention to the issues of women. Though in the past civic society tried to engender the voter education, this too is still inadequate.

Political violence - The electoral process was characterised by politically motivated violence and intimidation. The publicised reports concentrated on the men as perpetrators and women as victims. However those producing the reports are still to do a gendered analysis (in terms of statistics of women affected, geographical distribution and age).

Reports of sexual torture were given, and between 1-16 February 2002, the Human Rights NGO forum reported that three women were raped. These are the reported cases and with the nighttime 're-education' sessions and youth militia camps in the rural areas, the unreported cases obviously exceed the three and this is critical in view of the reality of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Internal displacements - Many women fled their homes as the violence escalated in the pre-election period and they are currently housed in shelters around the country. The effect of this is that they could not go back home and vote. The brave women who remained in their homes after their husbands had fled continued to be intimidated and harassed and are vulnerable to sexual torture and rape.

Political parties and women's issues - The two main political parties managed to make the issue of women's rights a non-political/campaign issue. Each political party made mention of women's rights in their manifestos but this was never alluded to during the campaigning period.

Poverty and other gender issues

The majority of the poor in Zimbabwe (especially those living in rural areas) are women. Their lot in life meant they were manipulated and intimidated into voting through the dissemination of wrong information, i.e. that their vote was not secret, voting for the opposition would lead to war, etc. They were manipulated into buying the ruling party cards via threats of their not receiving food aid, agricultural seeds and implements and via threats against the safety of their family and property.

Election officials - The election organs in Zimbabwe are male-dominated and headed by men. Women were a third of the number of officials running the election. Only one ESC member is a woman. As in 2000 elections, ZESN created space for women to monitor the elections. However, due to legislative amendments, ZESN overwhelmingly put its energy into lobbying for change in the laws but, unfortunately, did not put into place mechanisms for producing a gendered questionnaire and a gender checklist.



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The polling process - The location of polling stations at business centres was not conducive for women. However, some attention was paid to pregnant and old women. Extension of voting hours in Harare and Chitungwiza did not benefit some women as they left the line for household chores.

Candidates - Despite the fact that women are the majority of voters comprising 52% of the population, there was no female presidential candidate. In the 2002 elections, no woman contested as a presidential candidate. Following the 2000 Parliamentary elections, the number of elected women Members of Parliament fell from 22 to 13.

There is need to mainstream gender into the electoral organs and processes. It is also necessary to investigate cases of women abuse and bring the perpetrators to justice. Women should lobby for a gender checklist and mainstreaming of gender sensitive electoral process in Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER 5

The Media

On 25 March 2001, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (at its Plenary Assembly in Windhoek, Namibia) adopted a number of recommendations designed to strengthen the integrity and transparency of the democratic electoral practice in the region. The document containing these recommendations, Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region includes a number of provisions relating to Press freedom and access to the public media.

Principally, the Forum calls on governments to

‘...take the emergence of private media as a healthy development in the institutionalisation of the democratic process and the conduct of elections, and should therefore refrain from taking decisions and actions that thwart a strong private media.’

It also declared that: ‘Opposition parties should be given equal opportunity and agreed-upon time and space on the state owned media to put their announcements, broadcasts and advertisements.’

However, instead of implementing these clauses, the Zimbabwean authorities have passed laws and taken actions that demonstrably inhibit the practice of these recommendations.

Despite the efforts of civic society to encourage the ESC to adopt and enforce an ‘equitable code of practice’ for the media during elections, the institution has not implemented the recommendations from civic organisations and observer missions submitted to the ESC during the parliamentary election campaign in the year 2000. The government too, has failed to reform the Electoral Act in a way that would entrench the recommendations of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and the Act notoriously remains silent about media conduct during an election.

Ironically, the only piece of legislation that appears to provide some equity to competing political parties appears in the controversial Broadcasting Services Act, which requires all broadcasters to give ‘reasonably equal coverage’ to all parties contesting in an election.

However, the findings of the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) demonstrate that the service provided by the national public broadcasting authority, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) during the campaign period flagrantly ignored this condition.

In addition, the multitude of laws introduced by government before and during the election campaign period included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which among its other repressive provisions, contains a ban on any critical media coverage of the security forces and particularly of the incumbent president, who was, of course, a candidate in this presidential election.



These vague and sweeping powers, together with the harsh penalties for violating them, added to an already hostile and intimidating media climate in the election period.

Despite several last-minute amendments to the Electoral Act, none of these dealt with regulations governing the activities of journalists, compounding existing confusion over media workers' plans for covering the election without falling foul of the law.

Clarity over the rules governing journalists' access to polling stations, other electoral centres and to voters, was only provided by the Registrar - General, Tobaiwa Mudede, as polling stations opened on 9 March 2002. These included the requirement that presiding officers should allow journalists to enter polling stations. However, the regulations also included restrictions preventing journalists from photographing voters casting their ballots or seeking exit poll samples, as well as asking how potential voters intended to vote.

Abuse of state media

The findings of the Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ) reveal that the ZBC grossly abused its public mandate to provide equitable coverage of contesting political candidates in a national election.

ZBC television carried a total of 407 election campaign stories in its news bulletins monitored between 1 December 2001 and 8 March 2002, the day before the polls opened. Of these, 345 (85%) favoured ZANU(PF)'s presidential candidate. Only 38 (or 9%) covered MDC activities, but virtually all of them were used to discredit the opposition party and its candidate. The 24 (6%) other reports gave publicity to the three other candidates contesting the election, none of which held a rally.

Preliminary findings reveal radio followed the same pattern

Radio Zimbabwe, ZBC's most popular station carried a total of 275 campaign-related stories in the news bulletins monitored. A total of 237 of them (86%) were promotional stories in favour of ZANU PF, while 20 (7.3%) were all negative stories about the opposition MDC. The other 18 stories were for two of the other three presidential hopefuls.

Statistics for Radio 3FM reflected almost exactly the same percentage coverage of the two main presidential candidates. Notably, both stations ignored the independent candidate, Wilson Kumbula.

However, the most damning statistics to emerge from MMPZ's work was the fact that out of 14 hours and 41 minutes and 30 seconds in total of ZBC television news bulletins devoted to the presidential election campaign, ZANU (PF)'s candidate was granted a total of 13 hours and 50 minutes and 30 seconds, a little more than 94%.



This compared to the national broadcaster's television coverage of the opposition MDC and its candidate, of just 31 minutes and 30 seconds, a paltry 4%. But even this was subverted by ZBC, which used the time to attack, denigrate and discredit the MDC. All other contesting presidential candidates were granted a total of 19 minutes and 30 seconds, or about 2% of the total news airtime devoted to presidential campaign coverage.

Never before in the life of the Media Monitoring Project has ZBC television's coverage been so grossly biased.

Political advertising

Although there was no orthodox political advertising promoting the presidential candidates on ZBC throughout the campaign, ZBC television filled the continuity breaks between its main evening news bulletins and throughout its programming with images and music promoting land reforms and peasant farming that supported ZANU (PF)'s main campaign policy. This footage, dubbed 'Reflections', constituted subliminal political advertising in favour of ZANU (PF) candidate and, together with images from the Minister of Information's musical video, *Hondo yeMinda* (War for the Land), dominated the continuity sections of prime time television viewing.

The airing of these images constituted a crude and reprehensible attempt by the broadcasting corporation's authorities to indoctrinate television audiences with (ZANU PF) propaganda. ZBC television also flighted hours of one-sided prime-time current affairs programmes promoting government's land reforms and repeats of 'liberation' documentaries aimed at reinforcing the ruling party's claim that Zimbabwe's sovereignty was still under threat.

ZBC coverage of political violence

ZBC grossly distorted the intensity and extent of the nation-wide campaign of politically motivated violence and intimidation visited upon Zimbabwe's population. Official police statistics stated that 14 deaths due to political violence had occurred between 1 January 2002 and 3 March 2002. The Human Rights NGO Forum reported 31 killings up to 28 February 2002. However, ZBC television only reported six deaths, five of them allegedly ruling party supporters. Radio 3FM aired four reports of politically motivated killings. All victims were reported to be ZANU (PF) supporters.

Radio Zimbabwe carried five reports. Two of the victims were reported to be ZANU (PF) and the political affiliation of the other three was not stated. Although the police were reported on television as saying there had been at least 250 cases of politically-motivated violence in the first 25 days of February alone, ZTV reported just 25 (or 10%) of them. Radio 3FM reported 32 (13%) and Radio Zimbabwe, which enjoys by far the biggest national audience of all stations, reported 15 incidents, representing just 6% of the official police figures.



By any standard, such an appalling disparity suggests that ZBC deliberately suppressed the truth about the nature and extent of politically motivated violence in this election campaign period. Indeed, the emphasis in virtually all its reports on political violence focused on blaming the opposition for conducting a nation-wide 'terror campaign', a claim that directly contradicted the documented findings of the Human Rights NGO Forum and of the reports in the privately owned press. In addition, much of the evidence for ZBC's claims relied on unsubstantiated sources or on the police statements, which were themselves subject to suspicion.

Unequal coverage of candidates

This flagrant and undisguised bias in favour of the ruling party on all ZBC stations deprived Zimbabweans of their fundamental rights to be accurately informed and of the opportunity to make informed decisions. Such extreme levels of distortion in the coverage of this election campaign again demonstrate that the national public broadcasting corporation clearly became a propaganda tool of the ruling party.

As a result, there is a clear need for the authorities to put an immediate end to ZBC's anti-constitutional, unethical and discriminatory broadcasting activities, to enact legislation that will remove the corporation's oppressive *de facto* monopoly over the electronic media and place it under the full control of a truly independent broadcasting regulatory authority free from the tyrannical control of the Zimbabwe government.

Campaign coverage

Press coverage of the election campaign and of the polling days remained polarised with the privately owned press criticising changes to all manner of legislation, thus undermining Zimbabweans' fundamental constitutional rights, including the electoral process, the disenfranchisement of thousands of potential voters and the total lack of transparency in the mechanics and conduct of the election process itself.

These gave rise to stories predicting the possibility of electoral fraud. In addition, the private press reported government harassment of the MDC's leadership and the increasingly intense, systematic nation-wide intimidation of the population by alleged supporters of the ruling party. Not surprisingly, the privately owned press connected these elements and interpreted them rationally as a concerted effort by government to ensure the re-election of the ruling party's candidate.

The public press, on the other hand, represented by the Zimpapers' stable of newspapers, covered the introduction of repressive legislation without question, relying on official government announcements and additional government voices (particularly those of the Ministers of Information and of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs) to defend them.

These papers also persistently reported official allegations of a variety of ‘conspiracies’ against government, allegedly perpetrated by the opposition, without providing evidence to support them. These were then used to reinforce entirely propagandist articles echoing entirely unsupported allegations by the ruling party and its candidate that the opposition MDC was a puppet of white racists and Western neo-colonial imperialist interests, most particularly Britain, who were using the party to overthrow the ‘authentic’ government. The state press, led by its flagship publication, *The Herald*, provided unfettered coverage of the ZANU (PF) election campaign, which often invoked inflammatory, racist and violent language in the party’s efforts to discredit the MDC and convince the electorate of the authenticity of its allegations.

Press coverage of Political Violence

This extended to the public press’ coverage of politically motivated violence, which, more than once, ‘convicted’ MDC officials and supporters of being responsible for politically motivated murders before any conviction had been secured in a court of law. A prime example of this was the murder in Bulawayo of the war veteran Cain Nkala, whose killers have still not been convicted. The extensive publicity given to this incident by the state media together with the assistance of damning police statements enabled government officials, including the President, to describe the MDC as a ‘terrorist’ organisation bent on the violent overthrow of the government. Henceforth it became easy for the state media to ascribe any political violence to the MDC’s ‘terror campaign’ without bothering to substantiate the claim itself. It therefore became impossible to separate fact from fiction in the state media’s coverage of violence.

While it is true that coverage of politically motivated violence in the privately owned press was heavily biased in that they reported a far higher number of incidents in which MDC supporters, activists and ordinary civilians were victims, the reports were usually better sourced than the state media, quoting eye-witnesses, victims, and even police confirmation on occasion, despite the public declaration by senior officers that they would refuse to cooperate with the privately owned newspapers:

Even so, none of the media provided a true picture of the extent of the violence, according to official police figures mentioned earlier in this report, although the commercial press provided a more accurate reflection of the number of incidents recorded. MMPZ’s findings reveal that the private and public print media reported the loss of 22 lives to politically motivated violence between 1 January 2002 and 3 March 2002. This compares to 31 reported by the Human Rights Forum up to the end of February 2002.

The public press recorded seven deaths. Five were alleged to be ZANU (PF) supporters, while one was said to be a member of the MDC, and the other was unattributed. The private press recorded 16 deaths. Fifteen were alleged to be MDC supporters and one was said to be a ZANU (PF) supporter.



Only one death of an alleged ZANU (PF) supporter in Budiro was reported in both Zimpapers and the private press.

A total of 156 incidents of political violence were recorded in the first 25 days of February 2002 in all sections of the print media. The public press carried 51 incidents of political violence. MDC was blamed in 47 incidents and four were not attributed. The private press carried 106 incidents in which ZANU (PF) was blamed 91 times, 14 were blamed on war veterans, the CIO, the army and the National Youths Service, and one on MDC supporters.

Both sections of the print media reported one incident of political violence in which MDC legislators were arrested. The private press reported that they were arrested for trying to hold a campaign rally, while the public media reported that the legislators were arrested for carrying weapons. Print monitors were unable to establish whether any other incidents of violence were duplicated in the public and private print media. This was due to the fact that the public press relied more heavily on police statements providing insufficient evidence to be able to compare incidents in the privately owned press, whose reports tended to rely more on the evidence of eyewitnesses and the victims themselves. While the police have been used as sources in the privately owned press, they have rarely been used as the primary source, presumably because senior police officers have publicly stated that they will not co-operate with the private press.

In any case, duplication would bring the figure for the number of incidents of politically motivated violence reported in all the local mainstream print media even lower than the 156 cases reported. It can be demonstrated therefore, that all sections of the press seriously under-reported the occurrence of politically motivated violence when compared with Police Commissioner, Chihuri's official statement that there were 250 cases of political violence in the first 25 days of February.

While the privately owned press can be said to have provided a more accurate picture of the situation on the ground (according to police statistics), they only managed to cover 42% of the number of incidents recorded by the police. However, in the case of the public press (*chiefly The Herald and The Sunday Mail*), which enjoy unfettered access to police information, it is apparent that they have utterly failed in their duty to provide their readers with a remotely accurate figure of the violence occurring in the country, reporting barely one-fifth (20%) of the number of incidences reported to the police.

This failure by the state-owned media to fulfil their public mandate by providing their audiences with a truthful and accurate reflection of the real situation regarding the occurrence of political violence in Zimbabwe is cause for concern. Considering that the state media have unrestricted access to government authorities, including the police, this extreme distortion of the truth reinforces the impression that the public media are deliberately suppressing the true nature of the intensity and extent of the role political violence has played in this presidential election campaign.



Freedom of the press

Reports in the private press and from human rights groups also clearly suggest a systematic assault on the public's right to information.

During the election campaign, and even before it formally started, ZANU (PF) officials and supporters assaulted and terrorised delivery van drivers, vendors and readers of privately owned newspapers in several areas around the country, thus effectively establishing "no go areas" for the private press. The police have appeared inactive in putting an end to this reprehensible practice, which appears to have been most effective in the three Mashonaland provinces and in some parts of the Midlands.

A number of stories have been published of vendors and readers alike being assaulted for being in possession of a privately owned newspaper. To date, even the security forces, including the police, are reported to be heavily discouraged from reading privately owned newspapers.

The worst incident of an assault of this nature occurred in Mashonaland Central on 5 February 2002, when a Mount Darwin schoolteacher, Shepherd Ngundu, was accused of being an MDC supporter because he was found in possession of a copy of *The Daily News* and was subsequently beaten to death with chains and bars.

According to the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA, Zimbabwe Chapter) many journalists were unable to access polling stations in the rural and peri-urban areas, despite the proclamation by the Registrar-General's office. Journalists from the *Voice of the People* short wave radio station were denied accreditation. The question of journalists' access to polling stations was left to the discretion of police officers to determine. This resulted in many journalists being unnecessarily threatened and refused access.

The simple process of interviewing the electorate was made impossible by police officers that accused journalists of causing mayhem and confusion at polling stations. The Presiding Officers in most polling stations 'gave' the police free rein in dealing with journalists. In addition, restrictive and arbitrary accreditation practices imposed by the authorities prevented many local and foreign journalists from being officially accredited, including local Zimbabwean journalists working for the short wave radio station, *Voice of the People*. (Produced by MMPZ)

Polling days - how the voting process unfolded

Please note: The quantity and quality of data gathered fall short of what was expected due to the last minute decision by the government of Zimbabwe to deny accreditation (and thus entry into the polling and counting centres) to more than 12000 trained ZESN observers. Those who eventually documented their observations mostly did so from a 100-metre distance from the polling station and at a very high risk to their personal safety. Several observers ended up being harassed, arrested, beaten up or tortured and thus some report forms never made it to the data entry room.

In spite of the above, summary reports were generated from the data entered to give a picture of the voting and counting process countrywide. Below is a brief narrative summary of the findings.

Location and accessibility of polling stations

Polling began on, 9 March, 2002, with nearly all polling stations generally opening at the stipulated time of 7:00 am. However, some designated polling stations failed to open in time. Cherutombo Primary School in Marondera opened after an unjustified three-hour delay despite the fact that potential voters had formed a queue. There are a number of polling stations that totally failed to open but reasons for which have not been proffered to date. Such polling stations were Allan Wilson Boys High School in Harare, Tsiga School in Mutoko, Mutare Boys' High School, Mary Mount Teachers' College and Meikles Park in Mutare Central constituency. In some rural constituencies, undesignated polling stations were found to be operational. Examples of these are Muponda in Mutasa constituency and Mutambara Primary School in Chimanimani.

In rural constituencies, the general indication was that polling stations were easily accessible to people intending to vote. This was due to the fact that for the presidential election, unlike in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the government decided to reduce the number of polling stations in urban areas and made a substantial increase of polling stations and mobile polling stations in rural areas (*see Annexure 11 - Statistical Analysis of Polling Stations*). This resulted in a conspicuous under-utilisation of voting facilities in instances of low voter turnout in such areas, e.g. at Hombwe School in Mashonaland West in Chinhoyi only 271 people had cast their votes by 4. 45 pm on the first day of polling.

In rural constituencies, long queues were not a common sight as was the case with urban centres where the deliberate reduction of the number of polling stations by the government was deemed to be a ploy calculated to disenfranchise urban voters, who are generally believed to be sympathetic to the opposition political parties.

In urban areas, especially in Harare, Chitungwiza and Bulawayo where voter turnout was as high as in all constituencies, voting queues stretched for a kilometre or more on the first day of polling.



This engendered disillusionment in the potential voters resulting in some deciding not to vote after all. At Glen-View Primary School in Harare, queues formed at 4.00 am and polling began at 7:00 am and continued until 19:00 p.m. In some instances where facilities were supposed to be for tripartite elections, potential voters were baffled at seeing only facilities for presidential polls, e.g at Churu Farm Ward 1 for instance.

However, some segments of the electorate could not be deterred from their intention to cast the ballot and they braved long hours in the queues, some of which threatened to be unruly. At one polling station in Harare, the presence of riot police was sought after the atmosphere had become potentially menacing. The long queues and the fact that a big percentage of people had not been able to cast their ballots by the end of the two days necessitated an extension of the number of voting days by one day, which the Registrar-General selectively interpreted to apply to Harare and Chitungwiza only.

After a successful application by the MDC to the High Court, the government granted an extension of polling by one day. Despite the High Court order, polling stations did not re-open on time due to bureaucratic snags that demanded that polling officers wait for an order from their various agencies to open the polling stations. The polling stations that had already opened in compliance with the order closed in the early hours of the morning, presumably in anticipation of an instruction to re-open. Polling resumed afterwards around 11:00.am after potential voters had already formed queues. At exactly 1900 hrs (7pm), the polling stations closed despite the fact that there were still people waiting their turn to vote in long queues. Thus, the extension to the third day was irrelevant and ineffective.

The electorate generally received the location of polling stations at clinics, schools, shopping centres and social clubs well. However, there are isolated reports which indicate that locations of some polling stations in places such as police stations worked to the psychological disadvantage of voters, e.g. at Waverley Police Station, reports were to the effect that voters did not cast their ballot in a relaxed environment due to the heavy police presence. At Chirozva School, which was a polling station, there was a base for ZANU (PF) youths that unleashed terror and gross harassment to the voters and displayed the utmost disregard for electoral laws.

Local observers

The fact that most of the observers posted to various polling stations were not allowed access into the polling stations played a disastrous blow on the reporting system that the observation programme was mainly designed to cater for. The hostility shown to the ZESN observers was so blatant that some were even barred from the 100-metre radius that they are legally allowed to observe from. The majority of observers, especially in politically volatile provinces like Mashonaland Central, East and Mashonaland West at St Anne's Goto and Hwedza Centre, ended up observing from a 200-metre radius (*see Annexure 13 on Incidents against ZESN observers*).

an arrogant refusal to recognise the said observers as a legitimate and important component of the electoral process cut across the whole spectre of observation be it parallel or otherwise. As such, in most instances accredited observers received the same intolerant and fierce opposition from the polling officials. In Makoni East, at Denza Primary school the police confiscated observation forms from the observers. The reasons afforded for ostracising the observers was because they belonged to the opposition. In Mashonaland West, one observer took refuge in a mountain after the police officers at the polling station branded him an MDC activist and persecuted him. In Mutare, there were widespread arrests of the observers - whose charges and offences have not been made clear to date. Some observers were detained for a period amounting to 72 hours without the offences, which they were purported to have committed being disclosed to them. Some were later charged with contravention of the Public Order and Security Act, a draconian act of law fast tracked in Parliament just before elections to facilitate for arrests of dissenting voices and sectors of society during election time.

Due to the reasons mentioned so far, most observers could not adequately execute their functions, which was only possible had they been allowed to be inside the polling stations. The detail provided by the few observers afforded the opportunity to be inside the polling stations is mostly scant. Vital information which is very crucial for purposes of ensuring a free and fair election such as whether ballot boxes were empty before polling started, whether ballot papers were adequate and up to the required standard, whether ballot boxes were sealed at the closing of polling each day and reopened in good order was mostly not available.

Polling atmosphere and irregularities

A total of 564 reports were received from the 10 provinces highlighting incidents occurring on election day. Cases of bribery and voter impersonation did not feature prominently as they comprised about 2% of reported incidents around the country. However, reports also showed that large numbers of voters were turned away from voting especially in Harare (11%). There were reports of unregistered youths casting votes in some areas and reports of inadequate voting materials was received from Gokwe.

There were also reports of temporary closures of polling stations but with no reasonable explanation given, e.g. Mt Pleasant District office in Harare North on Day one of polling. It is interesting to note on the results that Harare North, a largely low population density area had more votes cast than in the high-density areas of Mabvuku, Zengeza and Mufakose. Questions arise as to what was taking place during the temporary closure. At Mutare Junior School, an extra copy of the voters' roll was with the presiding officer in a separate room (and he was seen receiving telephone calls and some eligible voters into the room).



Processing of voters

In most constituencies, reports indicate that there was relative calm during polling periods except for a few minor incidences of disquiet created by members of ZANU (PF) who endeavoured to sloganeer at the polling stations an anomaly the polling officials would either ignore or rectify swiftly. However, in urban areas, the presiding officers seemed unfamiliar with the task which they were meant to execute which led to the suggestion that untrained personnel were deployed in urban constituencies or that the officers deliberately under-performed to frustrate voters.

It was also notable that in rural areas, the government appointed monitors seemed keener in monitoring local observers instead of monitoring polling officers and the polling process. As stated earlier, voters in urban constituencies could not exercise their voting rights within time. There were reports to the effect that polling officers in some constituencies in Harare were not undertaking their voting roles with the requisite speed for instance there were reports that at one polling station in Harare, only 7 people were being processed in an hour. These unnecessary and unjustified delays, compounded with the effect of the reduction of polling stations in urban areas created a potentially chaotic atmosphere that had the voters not exercised restraint, the situation would have degenerated into mass unrest. In most urban areas, polling was extended further than the stipulated time to cater for the huge numbers of people who had failed to vote within the initially planned time.

In some constituencies, there were reports of a large number of voters who were turned away because their names were not found in the voters' roll. At a polling station in Chinhoyi, one person who was turned away had a receipt which indicated that she had actually registered to vote.

In Harare, there were numerous arrests of people who were purported to have intended to vote twice. At Halingbury Primary School, about 38 people were arrested for the same offence and about 300 were held at Harare Central Police Station under circumstances of gross human rights violations. The people who were arrested at Halingbury Primary School vouched that they did not intend to vote twice but they could have picked up the traces of the indelible ink from the narrow gate that everyone passed through including those who had already voted. They were released at the end of the polling. However, these people were not charged until the time of release. It was the generally prevailing belief that the arrests were a deliberate attempt to lessen the number of urban voters to further an interest by the ruling party through the coercive apparatus of the state.

In most urban areas, it was observed that not all parties had election agents at the polling station. It was only ZANU(PF) that had agents at every polling station. The MDC had the second highest number of polling agents available at polling stations. The unavailability of opposition party agents can be attributed to the following factors:



- ZANU (PF) supporters had waylaid other parties' agents on their way to the polling stations and had severely assaulted some. The police force in conjunction with members of the national army and graduands of the Border Gezi Training Centre had arrested and assaulted polling agents of opposition political parties e.g. in Honde Valley in Mutasa constituency where party agents of the opposition MDC were arrested and detained at Ruda Police Station by members of the national army. The opposition Member of Parliament for the constituency, Evelyn Masaiti was also arrested and severely assaulted by the soldiers.
- Some names were not on the presiding officers' registers of accredited party agents

During the polling days, some political parties were noticed flouting electoral laws but the presiding officers did not take any action. An example of this was the ferrying of people to polling stations. ZANU (PF) was observed bussing people at Zuze in Makoni and the MDC was also noted doing the same at Clearwater in the Chipinge North constituency. At Glendale, ZANU (PF) flouted the 100-metre radius rule by campaigning and canvassing for support within the prohibited area. When the anomaly was brought to the attention of the presiding officers by the election observer, the presiding officer indicated that he was not interested in taking action because observers were only entitled to observe and should not tell him what to do. Some chiefs in some areas showed their partisanship even in the polling station. Chief Nyamuga enquired from voters whom they had voted for and threatened to remove those who had voted for the opposition from his Sengwe area. He threatened that if drought relief was made available, he will reward those who voted for ZANU (PF) by giving them the food aid.

In Harare, at Shiriyedenga Primary School, the youths tried to prevent people without ZANU (PF) membership cards from voting. The voters condemned this and a period of commotion ensued at the polling station.

The supplementary voters roll that was compiled by the Registrar-General was only made available in areas where the ruling party had a stronghold and this was mainly in rural areas.

Mobile polling stations

There were many more mobile polling stations than in previous elections and these were not adequately monitored. In some cases, the times for starting and finishing voting were changed without adequate publicity and this resulted in the confusion of many potential voters.

Tripartite elections

It was the general observation that voters were confused on how to undertake tripartite voting. There was not enough voter education to equip the people with the relevant knowledge on how to conduct such elections.



The diagram produced by the ESC, which had been circulated earlier and had information on how to vote (applicable to Harare and Chitungwiza residents) was very complicated to comprehend, even for the literate. The result was that some voters having exercised their mayoral and council vote in one municipal ward or constituency were disqualified from voting for the presidential vote in another ward in the same constituency that they would have been specifically told to vote in. As a result, people kept being told to vote from one place to the other. The general feeling was that the confusion about the location of the polling stations and slow processing of voters as far as tripartite elections were concerned was deliberately orchestrated so as to minimise the number of voters for the presidential poll.

Provincial breakdown of observers' reports

The observers' reports point to a generally uniform experience as the observers attempted to carry out their observation duties and were hindered by the fact that they were not accredited. Most of the information recorded by observers came from observing 100 metres away or from friendly officials amongst those who were inside the polling station. The observers faced hostility from most quarters including party agents of and supporters of the MDC and ZANU (PF) although the harassment was harsher from the latter. Observers were also harassed and attacked by polling officials, ESC monitors, youth militia and members of the police force. Several observers were detained in police cells for a number of days and there are reports of observers being detained in ZANU (PF) torture camps for several days. A number of observers have also reported cases of sexual assault by groups of hostile youth and one observer alleges rape at the hands of a teacher with whom she had taken refuge.

All provinces report occasional problems with some ink detectors that suffered from battery failure and on a few occasions, the fact that ballot paper ran out. In both cases, voting had to stop until the problem had been rectified. There were instances when voters wore or displayed a candidate's party or personal insignia. The most severe action recorded in this instance is brief detention and questioning. Most were simply ejected from the polling station with a severe reprimand. Observers also noted that some unfortunate would-be voters across the country shook hands with those who had already voted or came into contact with areas which a voter had touched after voting and were thus unable to vote.

Bulawayo Province - According to the observers, ZANU (PF) set up tables outside polling stations where they were writing down the names of the people who had voted. Observers also note that ZANU (PF) supporters were in some instances allowed free reign as they moved in and out of polling stations at will. The treatment from polling officials was not uniform. Some presiding officers and police officers allowed unaccredited observers into the polling station and only began to remove them when word came from the election command centres upon which they then became hostile. It was generally quiet with some reports of youths harassing voters. Several arrests were made for various crimes, including drunkenness and disrupting the voting process.



One prospective voter was arrested for wearing a National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) T-shirt to the polling station. Although voter turnout was high on the first day, there are no reports that at any one point it became unmanageable and it was lower on the second day.

Harare-Chitungwiza Province - The most notable feature of the election in Harare was that the voter turnout was clearly higher than had been anticipated and planned for and this resulted in potentially explosive scenes at most polling stations throughout the entire voting period. Many voters began queuing in the early hours of the morning on all three days of voting. There was heavy police presence at most polling stations. The police used force in certain instances to control the crowds. On the first day, the polling officers were extremely slow in processing the voters with most voters queuing for many hours. Although the voting process had become faster by the second day, polling officials were still unable to cope with the number of voters who spilled over into the third day when the prevailing confusion was exacerbated by the fact that most polling stations only opened around midday. At exactly 19:00 polling stations closed when many people were still in the line to vote. It appears that part of the confusion was created by the fact that voters were essentially voting in three elections for the president, the mayor and ward councillor. In some instances voters who had gone to the wrong ward polling stations in the right constituency chose to vote for the President only rather than spend more time in the queue.

By the second day, any unaccredited observers remaining in the polling stations were ejected only to spend the rest of the election observing from a distance.

Manicaland Province - Voting in this province was generally peaceful and orderly with no reports of major incidences on the first day of voting. At several polling stations, supporters of ZANU (PF) were observed to be telling people in queues how to vote or harassing voters who had come out of the polling station and wanting to find out whom they had voted for. There was a problem with people who came to vote without IDs and it would appear that voters did not always have the correct information on where and how to vote. The police detained several observers for varying lengths of time. There were reports of instances where one party's supporters had defaced the voting guide in the voting booth in support of their party. Kraal heads were also involved in shepherding their kraal members to the polling stations and noting down those who had voted. In one instance, the police confiscated the sheet of paper and tore it up but took no further action.

Mashonaland Central Province - This province was particularly troublesome, especially for the observers who faced a great deal of hostility from groups of youth militia which had been deployed in the area. Many observers report that they had to take shelter in the bush after being attacked by the youths.



From the first day, unaccredited observers were not allowed into the polling station and remained around the polling station at their own peril, as they had no guarantee of support from the police. In certain instances, the ESC monitors assisted the police and polling agents in ejecting observers from the polling stations and the environs of polling stations.

There were groups of youth militia observed in and around the polling stations interrogating those deemed to be strangers in the locality.

Mashonaland East Province - Although most of the observers were not able to enter the polling stations, they were able to observe that the situation was generally peaceful during the two days when polling took place. The voter turnout was generally high on the first day but was lessening by the second day of voting. Several observers noted that some voters travelled from the urban areas where they lived to vote in the rural areas. Observers recorded incidents where the situation became tense when supporters of one candidate began to chant slogans resulting in some instances in altercations between rival supporters. Observers also found local residents to be uncomfortable and uncooperative in answering their questions. Although most voters knew what they were doing, there were some that lacked basic information including where to go and what to do when they got there. They were reported incidents of the ink detecting machines out of order in UMP during the voting process.

Matabeleland South Province - Polling stations generally opened on time but in one polling station, the ink detector broke down at 7.10 am until 7.42 am and this caused delays in the voting process. When the machine was reported to be functioning, voters complained that it was faulty for it wrongly detected the voters as having already voted, thereby wrongfully denying them their chance to vote. A large number of people who were turned away were wearing clothes with party insignia. Accessibility to the polling stations was not difficult due to the increased number of polling stations and mobiles in outlying areas.

At most polling stations, the constituency registrars responsible for some polling stations never visited the said polling stations and generally the duties that they were supposed to perform were not attended to.

In the polling stations that the constituency registrar visited, reports were to the effect that they executed their functions satisfactorily and that they were mostly helpful. At one polling station, the constituency registrar changed the name of the polling station without the knowledge of the observers and some party agents, e.g. an agent of the MDC. This kind of treatment, which was selectively applied to agents of the opposition political parties, was observed in nearly every other aspect of the electoral process. Of notable clarity was the way that complaints against ZANU (PF) supporters were handled. Polling officials were on record known to turn a blind eye and find an excuse to cover up the ineptitude. For instance, when a report was given that there were ZANU (PF) supporters campaigning within the prohibited 100 metre radius the polling official replied that he could not do anything about the anomaly because it was happening outside the polling station.

An election monitor had to be excused from his duties at one polling station because he was inebriated. This was a cause for concern since by virtue of his conduct the quality of the monitoring process became questionable.

Masvingo Province - Polling generally began at the stipulated time in most polling stations. However, in one polling station, there were delays posed by the ink detector, which went out for one and half hours and could only be fixed when another battery was procured. On the second day of voting there was shortage of ballot papers at one polling station and this severely crippled the polling process.

The constituency registrar visited polling stations dismissing unaccredited party agents. At one polling station, one woman married to a war veteran assumed the duties of the presiding officer and the presiding officer took no action. The presiding officer at one polling station totally ignored the reports brought by an observer because he was not accredited. As in many other provinces, the observers who were not accredited were not allowed in the polling station but were to observe from a distance of 100 metres from the station.

The people who were sent away were wearing campaign material and these people were supporters of the ruling party who wantonly engaged in whatever action illegal or otherwise with the knowledge that there was no form of reproach that could be visited upon them, e.g. at one polling station a ZANU (PF) youth barred voters from entering the polling station without a justifiable reason.

Mashonaland West Province - At one polling station, the constituency registrar passed through and did not endeavour to do any of the prescribed functions. The element of partisanship was more conspicuous in this province more than anywhere else. The polling officers were at their most uncooperative and arrogant in this province and a greater degree of intolerance was exhibited towards the observers more than in any other province in the country.

There was nothing of significance which was reported other than the above.

Midlands Province - In the Midlands province, a polling station, Zvishavane-Marian School in Buchwa opened late at 10.57 am on the first day of polling. There was no plausible explanation proffered for the delay even though hints that the polling officers were missing some of the required voting material circulated. In rural areas, many voters voted under the supervision of their headman and those who voted paid a fee of \$80 - the purpose of which was not apparent.

At Chemakudo Polling Station, there were ZANU (PF) information fliers indicating the part where people were supposed to place their vote. The fliers were placed right in the polling booth. The polling officers seemed to be unperturbed by this development.

At Bonda school, there was a polling station which was not designated where two queues were formed, one queue being for the elderly and another for the youth. This was also true with polling at Mapedza Primary School.



The significance of such a polling system was not readily realised by everybody at hand.

There was gross intimidation and harassment of voters in Gokwe North. Helicopters were noted flying over the area for no apparent reason and ZANU (PF) supporters and their sympathisers had cleared party agents for the opposition out of the polling station. Observers experienced the most hostile attitudes from the polling officers but this could be attributed to the fact that it had been noticed that the observers were being ferried in MDC party cars. Some perceived MDC supporters were forced to pretend they were illiterate and by requesting the polling officials to vote for ZANU (PF) on their behalf 'proved' their support for the ruling party.

Matabeleland North Province - Voting was generally peaceful but all the other discrepancies that were inherent in the other provinces, e.g. the harassment of voters by supporters of the ruling party, the discrimination of local observers against domestic observers and the general impatience and intolerance of polling officers towards the local observers and opposition party agents were noted.

Logistically, there were hiccups in the electoral process as in the other provinces. The ink detector broke down in most polling stations and the people in the queues had to endure long delays while this was being rectified.

There were no other major incidences of electoral anomalies in the province.



CHAPTER 7

Registered voters, vote counting and results

Registered voters

Probe Market Research Analysis of the Compilation of the Voters' Roll.

Probe Market Research, an affiliate of Gallup International Poll Group, undertook a study of the voters roll using a sample of 1 675 potential voters.

The study was done with no copies of the death register and the supplementary voters' roll, as these were not accessible to any interested voters or opposition political parties. The study established the following:

- 98 % of registered voters interviewed expressed an intention to vote.
- 39% were unregistered voters because of lack of IDs.
- Names of 40% of those interviewed appeared in the constituencies where they were registered.
- 50% physically checked their names on the voters' roll and appeared at the correct addresses.
- 22% changed addresses, 2% had moved out of the country and 5% were deceased.
- 2% of those interviewed who believed they were on the voters' roll were not on the voters' roll.

According to the study, a 100% voter registration would be 3.6 million and not the 5,6 million names on the voters roll. Furthermore, the final figure of 5 612 272 registered voters is an inflated increase. The Probe Market Research study referred to the 1997 study which pointed to a 12 million population size for Zimbabwe, with an average family size of 6 children and showed that over 50% of the population is under 16 years of age while 60% is under 18 thereby leaving only 4.8 million potential voters. Against the HIV/AIDS pandemic and economic migration from Zimbabwe, the total figure is likely to be lower.

According to the study, the official figure of registered voters appears substantially high and points to the need to audit the voters' roll in order to discount the effect of such factors as double entries and failure to remove names of those deceased and people who have changed addresses from the voters' roll.

The voters' roll was not readily available to various stakeholders to enable them to cross check the number of registered voters with the actual number of people who voted. There was also a perception of lack of transparency in the manner in which the voters' register was being produced.

For instance, while the majority of people knew that the voter registration exercise had ended on 27 December 2002, it was later discovered that some selected individuals were being registered. This prompted the Registrar-General to issue a special gazette in retrospect to the effect that the voter registration had closed on 3 March 2002. This fuelled speculations that the voters' register was being doctored. This was further compounded by the variation of figures of registered voters which appeared in *The Herald* on 13 February 2002 and 11 March 2002 respectively.



Figures Of Total Registered Voters Per Province

NUMBER	PROVINCE	REGISTERED VOTERS BY 13 FEBRUARY 2002*	REGISTERED VOTERS BY 11 MARCH 2002*	VARIATIONS (-/+)
1	HARARE	888,663	882,176	-6487
2	BULAWAYO	368,454	363,028	-5426
3	MATEBELELAND NORTH	338,144	338,186	+42
4	MATEBELELAND SOUTH	341,506	343,996	+2490
5	MASHONALAND CENTRAL	456,278	480,072	+23,794
6	MASHONALAND WEST	554,949	572,677	+17,728
7	MASHONALAND EAST	576,363	589,185	12,822
8	MANICALAND	622,616	658,694	+36,078
9	MASVINGO	631,534	655,122	+23,588
10	MIDLANDS	700,543	724,659	+24116
TOTALS		5479050	5607795	128745

* Source: The Herald

The offices of the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and the Registrar General could not give the reasons for the reduction of the number of voters instead of an increase in the Harare and Bulawayo Provinces. However, the public largely perceived the reduction as deliberate since the two provinces were known potential strongholds of the opposition.

Comparison Of Registered Voters 1995 - 2002

Province	1995 Registered voters	2000 Registered voters	13/02/02 Registered voters	11/03/02 Registered voters	Variance between 2000 and 11/03/02
Harare	804 398	839 235	888 663	882 176	42 941
Bulawayo	350 526	375 743	368 454	363 028	-12 717
Matabeleland North	289 781	327 740	338 144	338 186	10 446
Matabeleland South	294 615	331 623	341 506	343 996	12 373
Mashonaland Central	370 979	441 552	456 278	480 072	38 520
Mashonaland West	516 487	530 364	554 949	572 677	42 313
Mashonaland East	484 248	535 106	576 363	589 185	54 079
Manicaland	554 945	612 253	622 616	658 694	46 441
Masvingo	558 608	612 306	631 534	655 122	42 816
Midlands	597 702	682 882	700 543	724 659	41 777

* Source: Delimitation Reports

It is interesting that the number of voters registered in 2002 for Bulawayo shows a reduction from 2000. In the Mashonaland provinces, there was a substantial increase of the registered voters. From the above figures, it would seem that voter numbers in some provinces increased substantially from 1995 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2002 compared to others, e.g. in the Midlands and Mashonaland Central Provinces.



Election results and counting

The summary of the declared results for the 2002 presidential elections is as follows:

Robert Mugabe	1 685 212
Morgan Tsvangirai	1 258 401
Wilson Kumbula	31 368
Shakespeare Maya	11 906
Abel Siwela	11 871

Vote counting in nearly all constituencies began on Tuesday 12 March 2002. In most constituencies, with the exception of Harare and Chitungwiza, ballot boxes were transferred to counting centres on Monday 11 March 2002. In a number of constituencies, counting started in the absence of polling agents from the opposition parties. In some instances where the agents managed to evade ZANU (PF) youths and the national service militias, they were denied the entry into counting centres or chased away by ruling party youths. An example of these types of anomalies allegedly occurred at Mhangura counting centre where Minister Mombeshora, in the company of ZANU (PF) militia known as 'Top Six' chased away opposition party agents and election observers from the centre. In counting centres where observers managed to be present, the final tally of results was not announced by the constituency registrars as is normally the practice. Instead, the results were faxed to the Registrar-General in Harare quietly.

In Harare, the Registrar-General took an average of four hours to announce the results that would have been faxed to him. An example is the Hwange East constituency where counting was finished at 8.30 pm and the results were faxed to the National Command Centre and only announced at midnight. The same treatment of vote counting also happened in the Mazowe East constituency.

There was an unexplained and unprecedented delay in the counting in Harare and Chitungwiza mayoral and council elections. It took two days after the counting of the presidential vote to have the Harare and Chitungwiza council and mayoral vote counting to be finished and announced. However, at the time of writing this report, almost a month after the elections, the results for the Harare and Chitungwiza elections have not yet been publicised.

Almost 99% of the reports on the post-voting period confirm that the verification of ballots and the counting were conducted according to laid down procedures. An outstanding feature about the counting process, however, was that the total result per candidate was not announced in almost all counting centres countrywide but was sent directly to the National Election Directorate Command Centre in Harare where it was announced to the nation via radio and television. This meant that observers on the ground had no figures with which to verify the authenticity of the publicly announced figure. The few who managed to get the figure at the counting centre did so by using creative means.

The following table summarises some observations pointing to the need for the election results to be audited, in order to allay the suspicions of inflating the election results.



Irregularities which affected the results

CONSTITUENCY	POLLING STATION	REMARKS
Hurungwe West	Chisape School Kura Primary School	MDC seal not permitted on the ballot box Missing ballot books 0015201-0015300
Mutare West	Rwizi Primary School	MDC polling agents assaulted and beaten, polling station closed-no ZESN observers.
Mutare North	Chief Hall Mutare	Missing ballot books serial number 401-500 and 501-600
Goromonzi	Rusike Primary School Chibvute Primary School	Seal removed Seal removed
Hurungwe	Tavay (Mobile 20)	Day 1 not at Dixie, Day 2 not at Goodhope as advertised
Guruve North	Gulliver	Polling station not listed, voters screened by headman, no MDC agent and observers.
Seke Shamva	2 Simukayi Primary School Samanyanga Secondary School Mobile 5 (Musambanyama)	Seal removed on police instructions Seal broken by President's office staff. Seal broken
Shurugwi	Mobile 3	600 ballot papers missing (6 books)

Comparison of Official Results Announced on Two Separate Occasions by the Registrar-General.

CANDIDATE	Press Conference on 10 April 2002	Video Cassette 13 March 2002
Robert Mugabe	1 681 212	1 685 212
Morgan Tsvangirai	1 262 403	1 258 401
Wilson Kumbula	31 368	31 368
Shakespeare Maya	11 906	11 906
Paul Siwela	11 871	11 871
Spoilt Papers	48 131	-
TOTAL VOTES CAST	3046891	2 998 758

Source: *The Daily News*, 11 April 2002

The above figures are at variance with the videotape as announced on 13 March 2002. Moreover, the total figures from the video cassette do not include spoilt papers as the actual grand total adds to 2 998 758.

Disparities between ESC and Registrar-General Results

There were variations in some constituency figures given by the ESC (Although voting was still ongoing, when the ESC released its figures) to MDC officials and the ones announced by the Registrar-General though the grand figures were the same. What is noteworthy is the reduction in final figures per constituency announced for some areas as compared to when voting was still taking place.



Disparities between ESC and Registrar-General Results

PROVINCE	ESC Figures	Election Directorate and Registrar-General	Variance ESC - ED - RG	Comment
Bulawayo	169 501	162 616	6 885	MDC stronghold
Harare				
Chitungwiza	439 656	412935	26 721	MDC stronghold
Mashonaland Central	304 677	300 613	4 064	ZANU (PF) stronghold
Mashonaland East	361 357	349 565	11 792	ZANU(PF) stronghold
Mashonaland West	316 140	322 641	601	ZANU(PF) stronghold
Masvingo	400 525	372 095	28 430	Variable
Midlands	342 772	418 024	75 252	ZANU (PF) stronghold
Matabeleland South	167 849	162 179	5 670	MDC stronghold
Matabeleland North	192 268	175 935	16 333	MDC stronghold
Manicaland	330 960	353 954	22 994	Variable

Sources: MDC Election Report and The Daily News

A sample of counting centre figures (from four provinces) has been compiled in the next table. They show the ballots scored by the ZANU-(PF) and the MDC candidates. The figures are arranged in two columns per candidate, with one column showing the total announced by the Election Directorate (shown as ED) and another the total recorded by the ZESN observer present in the counting centre. These figures show interesting disparities.

Comparison of results: ZESN results versus The Election Directorate's results

Province	CONSTITUENCY	MUGABE (ED)	MUGABE (ZESN)	TSVANGIRAI (ED)	TSVANGIRAI (ZESN)
Harare	Glenview	2079	2 709	16527	16 527
	Highfield	3187	3 153	14919	14 880
	Mufakose	7761	3 561	12101	16 700
Bulawayo	Nkulumane	4917	3 137	18602	14 000
Mashonaland East	Murewa South	16913	16 616	5180	5 192

As noted above, the figures from Glenview, Highfield, Mufakose, Nkulumane, and Murewa South show differences in the case of both candidates. The most glaring difference is in Mufakose where the figure for Mugabe (ED compared to ZESN) is higher by 4200 votes while Tsvangirai's is reduced by 4599 votes. Nkulumane has a similar glaring disparity in that 4602 reduces Tsvangirai's result while 1780 increases Mugabe's.



It would be premature to draw conclusions about the counting and the results from the few examples highlighted above due to the small size of the sample. What is clear, though, is that there is cause for concern about the accuracy and authenticity of the final results released by the Election Directorate. If from the examples given, anomalies can be identified, it is possible that more anomalies could be uncovered from a larger sample.

ZESN calls for an audit of the election results as these disparities affect the legitimacy of the election outcome.



CHAPTER 8

The post-election period

World-wide condemnation of the election result characterised the end of the controversial Zimbabwe presidential elections of 2002. The violence, political intolerance, intimidation and killings by ZANU (PF) supporters, the war veterans and the youth militia continued even after the disputed ZANU (PF) victory.

Internal assessment of the poll

The immediate assessment within Zimbabwe was, of course, divided depending on who was talking.

Civil Society - Almost all the groups within Zimbabwe unanimously declared the elections neither free nor fair. All the organisations cited not only the violence but also the gross irregularities and human rights violations as reasons to dispute the election results.

The Women's Coalition and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition went beyond proclaiming the election not free and fair and rejected the outcome of the 2002 Presidential Elections. The National Constitutional Assembly in its statement questioned the legitimacy of the president and unequivocally said it was due to a flawed constitutional framework that enables the ruling party to rig the process.

Political Parties - President Mugabe's main rival Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC rejected the election result and called Mr Mugabe's win illegitimate. He further said, 'We have been cheated of the right to freely and democratically elect the president of their /our choice'

Zanu (PF) celebrated President Mugabe's victory and he was inaugurated as President on 17 March 2002. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo said, 'It is a wonderful result for Zimbabwe and Africans, a reaffirmation of African dignity and independence in the face of attempts by the lies of Tony Blair to recolonise us.'

Regional and international assessment

The Commonwealth Observer Group along with the Norwegian, Ghana and SADC Parliamentary Forum observer teams, strongly condemned the election saying it was held in a climate of fear and was therefore not free and fair.

Observers from Nigeria, South Africa and the Namibian government called the elections free and fair. The OAU reported that in general, the elections were transparent, credible, free and fair.

However, it was the Commonwealth Observer Group's assessment which led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for a year on 19 March 2002. A troika comprising the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, South African President Thabo Mbeki and Australian Prime Minister John Howard made the recommendation after consideration of the Commonwealth Observer Mission's report. The report noted the following:



- High level of politically motivated violence and intimidation.
- ZANU(PF)'s paramilitary youth group largely responsible for intimidation.
- Restrictions on independent local observers.
- Lack of transparency in the registration process.
- Polling stations reduced in urban areas.
- Many were unable to vote in Harare and Chitungwiza because the process was very slow.
- Limitations on freedom of speech and movement hampered opposition campaign.

Political Violence and the General Situation in the Country - As Zimbabweans awaited the election results, the security forces were put on high alert and police set up roadblocks on the main roads to the capital, Harare, and soldiers and police officers were placed in strategic MDC /strongholds around the country. A day after the election results, a young security guard was killed at a farm outside Marondera by a group of war veterans living at the farm. A white farmer was grievously assaulted. The violence, intimidation and harassment re-surfaced after only two days of respite. Acts of retribution by ZANU (PF) continue to occur on a day-to-day basis as predicted.

As part of a nation-wide exercise to punish those who voted for Morgan Tsvangirai, members of the army allegedly beat three MDC supporters to death in Chipinge South on 16 March 2002. In Norton, another post-election victim was a white farmer who was killed by those occupying the farm. Reports of ZANU PF supporters going on rampage in the tourist town of Victoria Falls were recorded and published in *The Daily News*, the independent daily in Zimbabwe. The general atmosphere in the country was tense and the cloud of fear was evident. In Bulawayo, on 13 March 2002, *The Daily News* was destroyed wherever it was seen and vendors were harassed by the ruling party supporters.

Selective punishment and lack of protection of citizens by the police continues in the post-election period.

Continued implementation of draconian legislation

Zimbabweans witnessed the implementation of the dreaded Public Order Security Act (POSA) on a day-to-day basis. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) had their General Council Meeting disrupted by the police on 14 March 2002. POSA was used to render their meeting illegal (and declared political). In response to this interference, the ZCTU called for a mass stay away by all the workers from 20 to 22 March 2002. The strike was declared illegal by the police and received mixed reaction from the public.



Many workers turned up for work (in fear of retribution or confusion as to what was really expected of them during those three days) and few shops that were closed in the first few hours of the morning on 20 March 2002 (when the stay away was supposed to start) were re-opened).

The NCA called for a demonstration on 6 April 2002 to press for a new constitution. This demonstration was declared illegal under POSA. It resulted in over 400 arrests of NCA activists and beatings of the same.

International pressure

The pressure on Zanu PF is to establish a government of national unity with its main rival, the MDC. In his inaugural speech, President Mugabe seemed to be on a path of national reconciliation but it remains to be seen what will happen in Zimbabwe regarding this issue, as the leader of the main opposition party and Mugabe's real rival, Morgan Tsvangirai and two of his top officials have been formally charged with high treason for allegedly plotting to assassinate the President.

The MDC said it is gathering evidence to prove that the election was rigged and will then decide on whether to take the matter to court or resolve it politically. It eventually filed a court challenge against the results on 12 April 2002.

It is uncertain what the future holds for Zimbabwe. Although most Zimbabweans now discuss politics more freely than in the past and whilst a significant number of Zimbabweans have expressed concern at the election result, there are no indications of how and where this discontent will be channelled.



CHAPTER 9

Analysis, conclusions and recommendations

Norms And Standards For Free And Fair Elections

The SADC Parliamentary Forum, (SADC PF) created in terms of Article 10(6) of the SADC Treaty, made recommendations for elections, individual rights, and fostering transparency and integrity in the electoral process. These recommendations are contained in its Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, which were adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly on 25 March 2001 in Windhoek, Namibia. In its effort to promote plural, multi-party democracy, the Parliamentary Forum's immediate objective is to determine the openness, freeness and fairness of elections held in the SADC region.

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network adopted the Parliamentary Forum's electoral principles for assessing the acceptability, the freeness, fairness and legitimacy of Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential elections.

REGISTRATION AND THE VOTERS' ROLL

SADC PF Recommendation: There should be provisions and practical arrangements for continuous voter registration and an updated voters' register must be made available to all stakeholders in the elections (SADC-PF Recommendations)

The registration exercise was poorly publicised and the registration period too short to capture a substantial portion of eligible voters, especially young voters. The Registrar-General was held in contempt of court for disregarding a High Court order not to close the registration of voters until the constitutionality of the registration process had been challenged.

- The voter registration deadline kept on being postponed and it was never publicised to all but only to the ZANU (PF) supporters. Registration of voters continued up to polling day.
- No copy of the supplementary voters' roll was given to an NGO or contesting political party.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION

SADC PF Recommendation: The sanctity of the freedom of association and expression should be protected and strictly observed to ensure the unimpeded freedom to campaign throughout the country, including reasonable safeguards at political meetings, rallies, polling stations and party premises. Relevant laws and a mutually agreed upon code of conduct should be signed by all stakeholders.

- The opposition and civil organisations were denied the right to assemble and demonstrate. The passing of the Public Order and Security Act (2002) further eroded these rights.



- The ruling party and its supporters closed off many rural areas to the opposition, whose freedom to campaign openly by holding rallies was severely restricted through threats of violence and intimidation and by restrictions imposed by the police. Most rural areas were 'no-go areas' for NGOs who wanted to conduct civic and voter education.
- The opposition party's premises were burnt down in Bulawayo and their premises in Harare raided by the police. A grenade was thrown into another of their Harare premises.

THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES

SADC PF Recommendation: All Government Security Forces should act impartially and professionally and should be able to provide reasonable safeguards at political meetings, rallies and polling stations and party premises

- The Commissioner of Police declared his loyalty to the ruling party and refused to do his constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law without fear or favour.
- The Police Commissioner, Augustine Chihuri declared his loyalty to Zanu (PF) and allegedly fired and demoted any police officer perceived to be supporting the opposition.
- The police ignored court orders to enforce the law, they applied the law selectively, and they harassed members of the opposition, civil society, minorities and other defenceless groups, such as farm workers. Since the referendum on the Constitution, held in February 2000, the police have not brought anyone to justice for the murders of more than 91 members of the opposition, even after a court ordered the police to take action against known perpetrators.
- The youth militia was involved in organised violence across the country based on 120 camps. Youth militia were obstructing opposition supporters from travelling freely to attend meetings as they set up roadblocks and demanded Zanu (PF) party cards as well as confiscated IDs of perceived opposition supporters.
- War veterans continue to break the law with impunity including murder, assault, rape, arson, pillage and other acts of political violence and intimidation without fear of prosecution and in complicity with ruling party supporters, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) the police and the state media. Many ruling party supporters, incarcerated for political violence, were pardoned by presidential decree in 2000.
- The armed forces were implicated in murder, assault, beatings, destruction of property and other human rights abuses to further the political agenda of the ruling party.



- In a veiled reference to the opposition MDC presidential candidate, the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, together with the Commander of the Army, the Commander of the Air Force, the Commissioner of Police, the Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation and the Commissioner of Prisons, stated that they would not accept a political leader (even if he was democratically elected) of whom they did not approve.
- The Zanu (PF) supporters and war veterans embarked on a purge of suspected opposition MDC supporters in the civil service post election era in Bindura. Retribution of MDC supporters intensified after the election in most rural constituencies and an estimated 20 000 fled their homes.
- Distribution of food aid in some parts of Zimbabwe was being done along party lines, i.e. your political affiliation determined if you would get food aid or not.

ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

SADC PF Recommendation: Complete independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission should be reaffirmed in the constitution, with the commissioners selected by a panel of judges in consultation with all stakeholders. It should be required by law to provide for an adequate, competent, integrity and non-partisanship secretariat instead of having staff seconded from ministries and departments of government. Thus it will also need its own budget directly voted for by Parliament and not get allocation from a Ministry or a Government Department.

- The ESC has been rendered useless in Zimbabwe as it only supervises and does not run the elections. Election administration and management is split among many organs, which compromises co-ordination and the quality of the decision-making process.
- The election process is not managed, administered and controlled by the ESC, but by the Registrar-General.
- The impartiality of the Commission is compromised because the President, a contestant in the elections, appoints (and can remove) members of the Commission and prescribes the tenure and conditions under which they hold office. Furthermore, the Commission reports to the President through his party or on his behalf contests in virtually all elections taking place in Zimbabwe.
- One of the ESC members is the ruling party's Central Committee member.
- Other organs which run the elections: Delimitation Commission, Election Directorate and Registrar-General are perceived to be partial.
- The Commission does not control an independent budget as it receives funds allocated under the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.



- Retired army personnel run the ESC.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

SADC-PF Recommendation: The role of civil society, mainly in election monitoring and civic education, should be recognised by the government.

- The government has recently amended the Electoral Act, which now prevents civil society from independently monitoring elections and conducting voter education.
- The Government must recognise the right and need for civic organisations to promote civic awareness, educate voters and monitor elections.

THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS

SADC PF Recommendation: All stakeholders including the government and political parties should recognise that observers are important for fostering transparency, integrity and in institutionalising the democratic process in the conduct of elections.

- In terms of the definition to 'observe' under the amended Electoral Act, the government will only be required to accredit invited members of the international community, including SADC, to observe the actual polling and counting at elections.
- The amendments to the Electoral Act require election observers from SADC countries to wait for a formal invitation from the Commission or the Minister and hence registration for voting in the 2002 elections started before the invitation was extended to any other group.
- The government must recognise that international election observers are part of the process of institutionalising multi-party democracy and that they, like SADC observers, should be allowed to observe the entire electoral process, especially the pre-election period, including voter education.
- SADC Parliamentary Observer Missions should be able to observe the pre-election (including voter registration and the post-election period whenever they are held in any SADC Country without waiting for an official invitation
- The government invited election observers from the countries it deemed 'friendly' as these were expected to endorse the electoral process and the election results and most of the countries that were invited do not have a history of democratic and transparent electoral process.
- The SADC Parliamentary Forum did not get an early invitation to enable them to monitor and observe the pre-election environment. This renders them ineffective in assessing the pre-election environment.
- There must be a mutually agreed code of conduct for election monitors and observers.



FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC MEDIA

SADC PF Recommendation: Governments should take the emergence of private media as a healthy development in the institutionalisation of the democratic process and the conduct of elections, and should therefore refrain from taking decisions and actions that thwart a strong private media.

- The government passed the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill, which places severe restrictions on the freedom of expression of the private local media during the run-up to the presidential elections.
- The Broadcasting Services Act was passed despite certain provisions being declared unconstitutional by the Parliamentary Legal Committee.
- The government-appointed Broadcasting Authority did not issue new broadcasting licences before the presidential elections, thereby preventing independent radio and television stations from transmitting from within Zimbabwe despite an earlier Supreme Court ruling granting broadcasters the constitutional right of freedom of expression. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Commercialisation Bill further lengthens the period in which new broadcasters can enter the broadcasting arena.
- Editors and journalists working for local and international independent newspapers have been threatened, tortured, deported and detained illegally.
- Other local journalists were not accredited.
- Newly set up private radio stations, Voice of the People and SW Africa were condemned.
- Initiatives for community radio stations were thwarted.

ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC MEDIA

SADC-PF Recommendation: Opposition parties should be given equal opportunity and agreed upon time and space on the state-owned and controlled media to place their announcements, campaign programmes and advertisements.

- There was little access given to the opposition parties and candidates in the state media.
- The public media was turned into an instrument of political propaganda in a campaign characterised by reports vilifying the opposition and glorifying the ruling party.
- No code of conduct was put in place for the media.



HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE

SADC-PF recommendation: The right to vote should be accepted as a birth right in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Therefore, eligible individuals should have the right to non-discriminatory voter registration and nomination procedures. This right should be enshrined in the constitution of a country

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and key indicators to democratic tradition were not embraced in the 2002 presidential election due to the following reasons:

- Universality calls for non-discriminatory measures in all aspects of the electoral process. This process was grossly violated in the Zimbabwean 2002 elections, with an ineffective and impartial and discriminatory registration procedure marring the whole process.
- Equality requires that one's vote should be given equal weight with everyone else's. This was not the case in the 2002 elections. No equal and effective access was given to polling stations as they were substantially reduced in the urban areas.
- Fairness demands a level playing field for all contestants in the process and the dissemination of all information to all stakeholders. This principle was violated in the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe.
- Secrecy can only be assured if the voter casts the vote alone and with the knowledge that only he or she will ever know whom they voted for. This was highly compromised where ZANU (PF) supporters were writing a Register of people who had voted. The traditional leaders would go with their own villagers and hence influence the voting patterns. Perceived supporters of the opposition were told that on polling day, they should pretend to be illiterate in order to be assisted on polling day and thus divulge to someone else who they wanted to vote for.
- Most citizens in rural areas cast their votes in fear and amidst rampant incidences of intimidation. Rights of expression, association and assembly which are all fundamental freedoms were not upheld in the entire election process.
- Many people who were born in Zimbabwe, but whose parents were born elsewhere, were denied the right to vote due to amendments of the Zimbabwe Citizenship Act.
- An amendment to the Electoral Act allowed the Registrar-General to change the original name or address of any voter at any time without the knowledge of that voter, raising fears of vote rigging.



- The Electoral Act was amended to allow diplomatic personnel and the armed forces to use a postal vote, a right that was denied to many ordinary citizens living outside Zimbabwe.
- The amended Electoral Act, which authorises the Registrar-General to demand that voters furnish proof of residence, an unnecessary requirement for presidential elections, disenfranchised many young people.
- Many Zimbabweans wishing to cast their vote in the presidential election were turned away at polling stations without any official reason being given.

MULTI-PARTYISM

SADC-PF Recommendation: the concept of pluralism and multiparty democracy and politics should be enshrined in the constitution as the preferred form of political development and the basis of good governance. All stakeholders should commit themselves to pluralism, multiparty democracy and politics as a condition for participating in the political process of the country.

The observations point to lack of political commitment to a multi-party system as evidenced by the lack of tolerance of divergent political views in Zimbabwe. Hate speech, character assassination from the ZANU (PF) leadership characterised campaign methods being used and adverts in the public media. The election campaign was reduced to personality issues.

MISUSE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES AND FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

SADC-PF Recommendations: Where the government supports political parties with taxpayers' money, an agreed upon formula must be used and adhered to in allocating funds to the contesting parties such as Zimbabwe's formula of allocating funds according to the percentage of the total votes received in the last election. There must be accountability in the use of public funds

The ruling party used government facilities for campaigning including state security forces, public media, helicopters, and vehicles from parastatals such as ZESA.

The 2002 Political Party Finance Act amendment made it illegal for political parties to receive foreign donations. As such, ZANU (PF) had an unfair advantage over other contesting parties. In some cases, it was difficult to differentiate between party and government functions.

TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

SADC PF Recommendations: The process should be such that it is open enough to allow the public, political parties and candidates to be informed on a timely basis about developments concerning electoral matters. Electoral rules should apply fairly to all political parties and candidates. Electoral Authorities should deal openly and on equal terms with all political parties.



The Zimbabwean standards and experience in conducting elections gained over the years deteriorated during the 2002 presidential elections. Voter registration was shrouded in secrecy in terms of dates of closure of registration. Discriminatory registration and restrictive proof of residency barred many eligible voters from participating. Relevant voting information like the identity and location of polling stations and a final voters' roll, were not accessible to the electorate. There was poor preparation for the tripartite elections and the mechanisms of where, when and how to vote in the dual and tripartite elections were not adequately covered.

There was no delimitation of constituencies for this election despite new voters being added on the voters' roll. Vote buying was rampant during the campaigning period with the ruling party using land redistribution lists, lists of allocated stands, advertisements of salary and allowances increments for traditional leaders, army and civil servants to lure voters. Some of the increments were reversed for some sectors after the election. The postal voting was not done in a transparent way as it excluded many Zimbabweans, thus depriving them of a chance to exercise their right to vote.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

SADC PF- Recommendation: The courts should be strengthened in terms of human and financial resources. All electable positions should be the subject of judicial review and all cases emanating from electoral petitions should be subject to electoral review.

The promulgation and selective application of certain laws is a big problem for Zimbabweans. As such, the ruling ZANU (PF) had an unfair influence over the judiciary in the 2002 elections as the party's leader could use his executive presidential powers to usurp and reintroduce draconian legislation set aside by the courts. This shows that the principle of separation of powers was undermined (since ideally the judiciary, legislature and executive should operate as separate entities and should have no influence on one another).

POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS

SADC-PF Recommendation: The culture of accepting results and consensus building should be cultivated and encouraged in candidates, political parties and members of the public especially when election observers have certified the election results free and fair. It is also important to institutionalise conflict management, mediation and resolution structures.

Retribution for opposition supporters and sympathisers and purging of the civil service occurred in the period. Violence seems to be on the increase despite the ZANU (PF) - MDC talks. If there is not enough political will put into the talks and enough fostering of the spirit behind them, the polarisation of Zimbabwean society will continue and will definitely worsen. There are no conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. There is also little consensus on the major national issues and the way forward in Zimbabwe.



It is the view of ZESN that the government's conduct during the 2002 elections violated almost all of the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards on the following grounds:

- Voter registration was discriminatory and not transparent.
- Voter education was disrupted and there was insufficient time for the ESC to conduct voter education after the legislation empowering it to do so was promulgated.
- The fast-tracking of legislation meant that there was insufficient time for the ESC to train its 22 000 monitors, all of whom were civil servants.
- It is inappropriate for civil servants to monitor elections. This task should have remained with civil society.
- There were disturbing episodes of violence even during the polling days. For instance, opposition polling agents and ZESN observers were harassed and prevented from carrying out their work.
- There was questionable data on the rural and urban figures, which stated that there was a higher voter turnout in the rural areas than in the urban centres.

Final recommendations

In view of ZESN's assessment that the elections were not free and fair, ZESN recommends the following be implemented to usher back democracy and peace to Zimbabwe:

1. The restoration of the rule of law
2. An audit of the election results by an independent body agreed upon by all participating candidates and parties
3. After the findings ZESN recommends that the Election re-run should only be held after an agreed transitional period during which constitutional and electoral reforms conducive for a free and fair election are put in place.
4. Electoral reforms: Setting up an Independent Electoral Commission with the role of running, administering and managing the elections. This requires a constitutional reform process that will lead to:
 - i) An independent and autonomous electoral commission that administers and manages the elections in Zimbabwe and is overallly responsible for handling all aspects related to elections.



- i) Respect and the observation of civil and political rights i.e. right to assembly, association, movement and campaigning. Effectively this means the repealing of the fast-tracked legislation i.e. POSA, Access to Information Act, and Electoral Amendments.
 - iii) The provision of equal access to the state - owned media for contesting political parties.
 - iv) The liberalisation of the media and air waves
 - v) To develop an acceptable postal voting system, under which all Zimbabweans living outside are able to vote.
 - vi) The establishment of an electoral tribunal that deals with election cases and appeals.
 - vii) The state to ensure that all persons qualified to vote has an opportunity to exercise their right to vote.
 - viii) The simultaneous running of the parliamentary and presidential elections
 - ix) Access to state resources by all contesting parties.
5. An accurate and updated voters roll must be made accessible to the electorate.
 6.
 - (I) Voter Registration must be well publicised and should be an ongoing exercise that continues until at least one month before any election.
 - (II) The voter's right to voting information must be strictly observed by the timely and adequate dissemination of election dates, procedures of voting and location of polling stations.
 7. There must be a code of conduct for political parties, media, observers and monitors.
 8. Accessible and adequate polling stations in every province/constituency.
 9. Administration of elections to be done by professionals, and non-partisan officials.
 10. Allow and recognise the role of NGO's in voter education, election monitoring, observation, lobbying and advocacy.
 11. Non selective application of justice and the arrests of the alleged perpetrators of political violence.
 12. State security agencies and electoral officials to be impartial and professional in the execution of their duties.
 13. The setting up of an independent body to investigate the political violence and that should lead to a reconciliation and rehabilitation process.



14. Incorporation and domestication of the SADC principles and norms for free and fair elections.
15. Counting of ballot papers should be done at each polling station
16. Use of international bodies and mechanisms to redress the violations and mediate in restoring peace in Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

The 2002 presidential election was characterised by violence, intimidation, the draconian legislation, the disenfranchising of voters through the flawed registration process, the partiality of the election administrative machinery and the breakdown of the rule of law and the disputed election results. It is from the foregoing observations that ZESN declares that the 2002 elections violated the SADC norms and standards and as a result the will of the Zimbabwean electorate was not expressed in a transparent, free and fair environment.

As a result of the above assessment, ZESN recommends that a re-run of the presidential elections should be done after an agreed transitional period, during which constitutional and electoral reforms conducive for a free and fair election are put in place.



Annexures

Annexure 1

VOTING PATTERN AGAINST REGISTERED VOTERS BY PROVINCE

NO	PROVINCE	REGISTERED VOTERS*	VALID VOTES CAST**	VALID VOTES CAST %
1	HARARE	882176	412,935	47%
2	BULAWAYO	363028	162,616	45%
3	MATEBELELAND NORTH	338186	175,935	52%
4	MATEBELELAND SOUTH	343996	162,179	47%
5	MASHONALAND CENTRAL	480072	300,613	63%
6	MASHONALAND WEST	572677	322,641	56%
7	MASHONALAND EAST	589185	349,565	59%
8	MANICALAND	658694	353,954	54%
9	MASVINGO	655122	372,095	57%
10	MIDLANDS	724659	418,024	58%
TOTALS		5607795	3030557	54%

*Source: *The Herald* 11 March 2002

**Source: *The Herald* 13 March 2002

Annexure 2


TOTAL VOTES RECEIVED BY EACH CANDIDATE

NO	NAME OF CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTES RECEIVED	%AGAINST VOTES CAST
1	MR. ROBERT MUGABE	ZANU-PF	1,685,212	56.20%
2	MR. MORGAN TSVANGIRAI	MDC	1,258,401	41.96%
3	MR. WILSON KUMBULA	INDEPENDENT	31,368	1.05%
4	DR. SHAKESPEARE MAYA	NAGG	11,906	0.40%
5	MR. PAUL SIWELA	INDEPENDENT	11,871	0.40%
TOTALS			2,998,758	100%

NOTE: These are the results as announced by the Registrar General, Tobaiwa Mudede

Annexure 3


RESULTS BY PARTY



NOTE: These are the results as announced by the Registrar General, Tobaiwa Mudede

Annexure 4

RESULTS BY CANDIDATES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VOTES



Annexure 5



Annexures

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	HARARE PROVINCE											BULAWAYO PROVINCE										
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD. Votes	% papers spoilt	% Poll	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD. Votes	% papers spoilt	% Poll		
BUDIRO	4082	20749	40	17	7	88	24895	53424	0.35	46,60												
CHITUNGWIZA	6855	16901	50	25	20	154	23851	52573	0.65	45,37												
DZIVARASEKWA	7385	18046	27	26	166	166	25650	55750	0.65	46,01												
GLEN NORAH	3907	19021	43	20	14	110	23005	50677	0.48	45,40												
GLEN VIEW	2709	16527	23	10	3	85	19272	49015	0.44	39,32												
HARARE CENTRAL	4292	13880	31	18	11	74	18232	39140	0.41	46,58												
HARARE EAST	5828	16717	64	23	23	179	22655	46035	0.79	49,21												
HARARE NORTH	5696	19525	62	7	22	117	25312	52178	0.46	48,51												
HARARE SOUTH	6219	13646	29	22	11	106	19927	38441	0.53	51,84												
HATFIELD	9502	15354	54	32	27	318	24969	48166	1.27	51,84												
HIGHFIELD	3187	14919	38	16	13	107	18173	41794	0.59	43,48												
KAMBUZUMA	3299	15469	38	23	6	78	18835	36692	0.41	51,33												
KUWADZANA	5047	18263	23	28	7	72	23368	45862	0.31	50,95												
MABVUKU	5066	17039	64	35	32	236	22236	48267	1.06	46,07												
MBARE EAST	5192	11353	49	26	17	236	16637	38640	1.42	43,06												
MBARE WEST	3342	14382	34	19	9	107	17786	38815	0.60	45,82												
MUFAKOSE	7661	12101	51	17	21	237	19851	40022	1.19	49,60												
ST. MARYS	6546	20094	78	38	22	220	26778	57777	0.82	46,35												
ZENGEZA	5580	15846	35	28	14	118	21503	45447	0.55	47,31												
Total	101395	309832	833	430	445	2808	412935	878715	0.68	46.99												
LOBENGULA MAGWEGWE	2896	15364	44	21	32	57	18357	44027	0.31	41,69												
BULAWAYO NORTH EAST	3794	18669	44	23	37	117	22567	46998	0.52	48,02												
BULAWAYO SOUTH	4666	18624	35	37	34	53	23396	48169	0.23	48,57												
MAKUKOBA	3027	13176	72	21	28	6	16324	38558	0.04	42,34												
NKULUMANE	4917	18602	45	25	34	97	23623	49879	0.41	47,36												
PELENDABA	3376	15485	49	23	60	83	18993	45346	0.44	41,88												
PUMULA LUVEVE	4015	17970	66	27	51	127	22129	49812	0.57	44,43												
MPOPOMA	3137	14000	47	17	26	90	17227	39001	0.52	44,17												
Total	29828	131890	402	194	302	630	162616	361790	0.39	41.11												

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD, Votes	% Papers Spoilt	% Poll
CHIRUMANZU	16791	6578	418	124	125	604	24036	50098	2.51	47.98
GOKWE NORTH	23663	7131	380	157	214	786	31545	47238	2.49	66.78
GOKWE EAST	24773	7830	279	105	124	782	33111	49478	2.36	66.92
GOKWE SOUTH	17398	5744	415	160	54	594	23771	40506	2.50	58.69
GOKWE CENTRAL	17777	9281	378	124	107	395	27667	44647	1.43	61.97
GOKWE WEST	22044	6713	582	166	129	774	29634	47007	2.61	63.04
MBERENGWA EAST	24672	3128	312	76	98	469	28286	41838	1.66	67.61
MBERENGWA WEST	21182	4395	403	101	135	496	26216	51129	1.89	51.27
SHURUGWI	19724	7950	318	120	98	392	28210	43621	1.39	64.67
ZVISHAVANE	15910	10815	246	92	74	340	27137	49312	1.25	55.03
GWERU URBAN	5570	13332	61	40	23	115	19026	50236	0.60	37.87
GWERU RURAL	9608	10401	247	75	123	411	20454	46636	2.01	43.86
MKOKA	5448	16129	41	26	14	131	21658	46111	0.62	45.89
KWEKWE	9917	17061	90	57	35	141	27160	41922	0.52	64.79
SILOBELA	9191	15980	178	81	102	276	25532	39714	1.08	64.29
ZHOMBE	15112	8887	336	123	123	353	24581	42307	1.44	58.10
Total	258780	151355	4684	1627	1578	7059	418024	731800	1.69	57.05

MANICALAND PROVINCE

BUHERA NORTH	16248	12897	403	123	156	419	29827	52447	1.40	56.87
BUHERA SOUTH	15531	12720	836	255	255	574	29597	50480	1.94	58.63
CHIMANIMANI	15859	12750	351	136	111	433	29207	51252	1.48	56.99
CHIPINGE NORTH	9198	12940	310	160	147	397	22755	52809	1.74	56.99
CHIPINGE SOUTH	69426	18336	791	229	313	761	26643	54896	2.86	56.99
MAKONI EAST	10230	7000	269	77	68	350	18494	37988	1.89	56.99
MAKONI NORTH	18352	4750	378	107	91	575	23723	42794	2.42	56.99
MAKONI WEST	13590	8511	380	133	117	412	22731	44713	1.81	56.99
MUTARE CENTRAL	5294	21290	48	23	21	124	26682	50603	0.46	56.99
MUTARE NORTH	7580	12940	120	47	50	497	25737	46163	1.93	56.99
MUTARE SOUTH	9673	5742	297	100	94	358	18906	38363	1.89	56.99

PROPERTY OF
ZIMBABWEAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
100, UNIVERSITY ROAD, HARARE



TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	MANICALAND PROVINCE										T/RGD. Votes	% Papers Spoilt	% Poll
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes						
MUTARE WEST	13788	7724	568	142	109	474	22331	43203	2.12	51.69			
MUTASA	10832	12923	272	103	111	503	24241	44855	2.07	54.04			
NYANGA	19418	12781	507	197	177	616	33080	56853	1.86	58.19			
Total	172547	172225	5530	1832	1820	6493	353954	667419	1.83	53.03			
MASHONALAND WEST													
CHEGUTU	16083	11493	172	118	98	363	27964	55557	1.30	50.33			
CHINHOI	11432	8477	78	44	22	191	20053	39044	0.95	51.36			
HURUNGWE EAST	19455	4635	273	114	96	538	24573	45318	2.19	54.22			
HURUNGWE WEST	24057	6218	427	155	172	650	31029	53930	2.09	57.54			
KADOMA CENTRAL	9345	14446	97	53	37	181	23978	43597	0.75	55.00			
KADOMA EAST	18771	3123	198	32	43	324	22167	37961	1.46	58.39			
KADOMA WEST	21481	5656	145	76	52	462	27410	39720	1.69	69.01			
KARIBA	22240	9718	372	179	180	739	32689	58945	2.26	55.46			
MAKONDE	20421	2662	226	108	99	494	23516	44488	2.10	52.86			
MHONDORO	17681	10628	195	92	60	326	28656	50497	1.14	56.83			
ZVIMBA NORTH	21509	4755	229	117	88	572	26698	50497	2.14	52.87			
ZVIMBA SOUTH	27846	5687	224	79	72	687	33908	59277	2.03	57.20			
TOTAL	230321	87498	2636	1167	1019	5527	322641	578831	1.71	55.74			
MASHONALAND EAST													
CHIKOMBA	23450	7035	426	121	112	351	31144	48898	1.13	63.69			
GOROMONZI	20158	9608	284	132	109	548	30291	57123	1.80	53.15			
HWEDZA	21436	7282	382	157	130	476	29387	53939	1.62	54.48			
MARONDERA EAST	15719	11667	187	61	51	275	27685	51012	0.99	54.27			
MARONDERA WEST	16591	4891	259	82	78	391	21901	40604	1.79	53.94			
MUDZI	33838	4226	488	225	244	946	39021	62854	2.42	62.08			
MUREHWA NORTH	16616	5102	317	123	94	340	22252	43446	1.53	51.22			
MUREHWA SOUTH	16913	5180	399	143	127	481	22762	42500	2.11	53.90			
MUTOKO SOUTH	27339	2120	201	94	82	413	29836	40907	1.38				

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

MASHONALAND EAST										
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD. Votes	% Papers Spolt	% Poll
MUTOKO NORTH	22357	3748	314	101	83	549	26603	43446	2.06	61.23
SEKE	14667	12551	218	90	67	443	27593	52784	1.61	52.28
UMP	37341	3197	297	130	125	591	41090	56734	1.44	72.43
TOTAL	266425	76607	3772	1459	1302	5804	349565	594247	1.66	58.82
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE										
MAZOWE WEST	16471	6219	184	76	64	419	23014	51129	1.82	45.01
MAZOWE EAST	18404	7683	322	101	28	431	26538	46709	1.62	56.82
BINDURA	19932	11279	291	105	93	404	31700	58556	1.27	54.14
MOUNT DARWIN SOUTH	29680	2205	292	135	125	578	32437	47710	1.78	67.99
MOUNT DARWIN NORTH	29238	2144	362	171	157	652	32072	48428	2.03	66.23
GURUVE NORTH	28517	2700	291	140	111	439	31759	48504	1.38	65.48
GURUVE SOUTH	30651	2646	243	87	64	244	33691	42886	0.72	78.56
SHAMVA	25863	4277	294	105	99	427	30638	52582	1.39	58.27
RUSHINGA	26669	2523	220	108	126	409	29646	41847	1.38	70.84
MUZARABANI	25260	3463	248	100	47	417	29118	47147	1.43	61.76
TOTAL	250685	45139	2747	1128	914	4420	300613	485498	1.47	61.92
MASVINGO PROVINCE										
BIKITA EAST	16171	6211	464	152	187	523	23185	38595	2.26	60.07
BIKITA WEST	16930	8742	552	168	1	518	26542	43642	1.95	60.82
CHIREZI NORTH	20718	8665	285	121	100	483	29889	55216	1.62	54.13
CHIREZI SOUTH	19437	6389	375	194	214	680	26609	50498	2.56	52.69
CHIVI NORTH	17683	5638	409	75	116	483	23921	41157	2.02	58.12
CHIVI SOUTH	17190	4987	90	57	35	374	22359	42540	1.67	52.56
GUTU NORTH	22524	8934	430	104	130	432	32122	55702	1.34	57.67
GUTU SOUTH	17594	10845	550	208	154	508	29351	52460	1.73	55.95
MASVINGO CENTRAL	9757	15471	261	101	73	297	25663	47247	1.16	54.32
MASVINGO NORTH	13035	9333	264	87	80	300	22799	41184	1.32	55.36
MASVINGO SOUTH	13317	5526	549	170	145	563	19707	37463	2.86	52.60
MWENEZI	29019	3554	479	158	147	819	33357	56774	2.46	58.75

Annexure 5



Annexures

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	MASVINGO PROVINCE										T/RGD, Votes	% Papers Spoilt	% Poll
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes						
ZAKA EAST	21529	5941	400	207	168	504	28245			48545	1.78	58.18	
ZAKA WEST	19699	7800	546	160	141	600	28346			51576	2.12	54.96	
TOTAL	254603	108036	5654	1962	1840	7084	372095			662599	1.90	56.16	
MATEBELELAND NORTH PROVINCE													
HWANGE WEST	4712	14736	146	53	75	281	19722			40943	1.42	48.17	
TSHOLOTSHO	10838	10089	420	147	246	516	21740			22256	2.36	97.68	
BINGA	5351	26886	386	213	419	1630	33255			54094	4.90	61.48	
LUPANE	7778	14524	497	199	252	612	23250			47607	2.63	48.84	
HWANGE EAST	4610	15950	222	73	145	727	21000			42335	3.46	49.60	
NKAYI	11552	15616	268	395	215	395	28046			53228	1.41	52.69	
BUBI-UMGUZA	16433	11970	279	104	136	418	28922			56535	1.45	51.16	
TOTAL	61274	109771	2218	1184	1488	4579	175935			316998	2.60	55.50	
MATEBELELAND SOUTH PROVINCE													
BEITBRIDGE	16448	6844	386	170	182	779	24030			48511	3.24	49.54	
BULILIMANGWE NORTH	7647	11730	507	175	224	559	20283			51895	2.76	39.08	
BULILIMANGWE SOUTH	6625	11994	317	134	42	420	19112			43485	2.20	43.95	
GWANDA NORTH	5867	12610	200	55	91	262	18823			37927	1.39	49.63	
GWANDA SOUTH	12070	6774	295	93	77	734	19309			38157	3.80	50.60	
INSIZA	9089	10579	295	95	117	363	20175			41134	1.80	49.05	
MATOBO	9740	12565	412	105	166	449	22988			48768	1.95	47.14	
UMZINGWANE	5883	11226	199	72	79	213	17459			35770	1.22	48.81	
TOTAL	73369	84322	2611	899	978	3779	162179			345647	2.33	46.92	

Source: The Herald 13 March 2002

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

	BULAWAYO PROVINCE									
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF	
Lobengula - Magwegwe	17041	2197	15364	2896	18260	-1677	699	-9.18	3.83	
Bulawayo North East	21100	2864	18669	3794	22463	-2431	930	-10.82	4.14	
Bulawayo South	20781	3193	18624	4666	23290	-2157	1473	-9.26	6.32	
Makokoba	12901	2196	13176	3027	16203	275	831	1.70	5.13	
Nkulumane	20380	3644	18602	4917	23519	-1778	1273	-7.56	5.41	
Pelandaba	16462	2696	15485	3376	18861	-977	680	-5.18	3.61	
Pumula - Luveve	18901	3020	17970	4015	21985	-931	995	-4.23	4.53	
Mpopoma	14813	2540	14000	3137	17137	-813	597	-4.74	3.48	
Sub total	142379	22350	131890	29828	161718	-10489	7478	-6.49	4.62	
HARARE PROVINCE										
Budiriro	21058	4410	20749	4082	24831	-309	-328	-1.24	-1.32	
Chitungwiza	15480	6056	16901	6855	23756	1421	799	5.98	3.36	
Dzivarasekwa	18516	6084	18046	7385	25431	-470	1301	-1.85	5.12	
Glen Norah	17866	3517	19021	3907	22928	1155	390	5.04	1.70	
Glen View	16470	3443	16527	2709	19236	57	-734	0.30	-3.82	
Harare Central	14207	3620	13880	4292	18172	-327	672	-1.80	3.70	
Harare East	18129	4391	16717	5828	22545	-1412	1437	-6.26	6.37	
Harare North	18976	4852	19525	5696	25221	549	844	2.18	3.35	
Harare South	12430	4730	13646	6219	19865	1216	1489	6.12	7.50	
Hatfield	11740	5413	15354	9502	24856	3614	4089	14.54	16.45	
Highfields	12616	3234	14919	3187	18106	2303	-47	12.72	-0.26	
Kambuzuma	13722	2542	15469	3299	18768	1747	757	9.31	4.03	
Kuwadzana	15691	4349	18263	5047	23310	2572	698	11.03	2.99	
Mabvuku	17495	5572	17039	5066	22105	-456	-506	-2.06	-2.29	
Mbare East	10754	4265	11353	5192	16545	599	927	3.62	5.660	
Mbare West	13118	122	14382	3342	17724	1264	3220	7.13	18.17	
Mufakose	15233	3965	12101	7661	19762	-3132	-3696	-15.85	18.70	
St Mary's	17740	6135	20094	6546	26638	2354	411	8.84	1.54	
Zengeza	14814	5330	15846	5580	21426	1032	250	4.82	1.17	
Sub total	296055	82030	309832	101395	411227	13777	19365	3.35	4.71	

Annexure 6

Annexures

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

MANICALAND PROVINCE									
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	% DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Buhera North	10316	12850	12897	16248	29145	2581	3398	8.86	11.66
Buhera South	7821	14016	12720	15531	28251	4899	1515	17.34	5.36
Chimanimani	11410	8072	12750	15859	28609	1340	7787	4.68	27.22
Chipinge North	9283	3728	12940	9198	22138	3657	5470	16.52	24.71
Chipinge South	3283	4086	18356	6954	25310	15073	2868	59.55	11.33
Makoni East	7391	7509	7850	10230	18080	459	2721	2.54	15.05
Makoni North	3357	14835	4795	18352	23147	1438	3517	6.21	15.19
Makoni West	7356	11138	8511	13590	22101	1155	2452	5.23	11.09
Mutare Central	1770	3091	21296	5294	26590	3590	2203	13.50	8.29
Mutare North	15500	5564	17940	7580	25520	2440	2016	9.56	7.90
Mutare South	7273	6673	8742	9673	18415	1469	3000	7.98	16.29
Mutare West	5818	11498	7724	13788	21512	1906	2290	8.86	10.65
Mutasa	9278	5281	12923	10832	23755	3645	5551	15.34	23.37
Nyanga	10016	8891	12781	19418	32199	2765	10527	8.59	32.69
Sub Total	125808	117232	172225	172547	344772	46417	55315	13.46	16.04
MASHONALAND EAST									
Chikomba	6776	13417	7035	23450	30485	259	10033	0.85	32.91
Goromonzi	9489	14459	9608	20158	29838	119	5699	0.40	19.15
Marondera East	10629	10692	11667	15719	27386	1038	5027	3.79	18.36
Marondera West	4570	11221	4891	16591	21482	321	5370	1.49	25.00
Mudzi	2371	27149	4226	33838	38064	1855	6689	4.87	17.57
Murehwa North	4104	13694	5102	16616	21718	998	2922	4.60	13.45
Murehwa South	4426	13895	5180	16913	22093	754	3018	3.41	13.66
Mutoko North	2447	17374	3748	22357	26105	2571	4983	9.85	11.99
Mutoko South	1177	19228	2120	27339	29459	8111	943	-1.11	33.83
Seke	10821	9236	12551	14667	27218	1730	5431	6.36	19.11
Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	2128	27748	3197	37341	40538	1069	9593	2.64	23.69
Wedza	6049	18044	7282	21436	28718	1233	3392	4.29	14.91
Sub Total	64987	196157	76607	266425	343032	11620	70268	3.76	20.47

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

	MASHONALAND WEST									
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF	
Chegutu	10412	12169	11493	16083	27576	1081	3914	3.92	14.19	
Chinhoyi	7602	8176	8477	11432	19909	875	3256	4.39	16.35	
Hurungwe East	4345	14814	4635	19455	24090	320	464	1.33	1.93	
Hurungwe West	4532	18991	6218	24057	30275	1686	9243	5.57	30.53	
Kadoma Central	5666	12049	14446	9345	23791	8780	-2704	36.90	11.37	
Kadoma East	3362	11678	3123	18771	21894	-239	7093	-1.09	32.40	
Kadoma West	4581	11758	5656	21481	27137	1075	9723	3.96	35.83	
Kariba	7332	15048	9718	22240	32020	2386	7192	7.47	22.46	
Makonde	3294	13066	2662	20421	23083	-632	7355	-2.74	31.86	
Mhondoro	10783	9118	10628	17681	28309	-155	8563	-0.55	30.25	
Zvimba North	5872	16175	4755	21509	26264	-1117	5334	-4.25	20.31	
Zvimba South	4689	16508	5687	27846	33533	998	11338	2.98	33.81	
Sub Total	72440	159550	87498	230321	317819	15058	70771	4.74	22.27	
	MASHONALAND CENTRAL									
Bindura	11257	13328	11279	19932	31211	22	6604	0.07	21.16	
Guruve North	2370	20513	2700	28517	31217	330	8004	1.06	25.64	
Guruve South	3239	19988	2646	30651	33297	-593	10663	-1.78	32.02	
Shamva	5621	19460	4277	25863	30140	-1344	6403	-4.46	21.24	
Mazowe East	7473	18824	7683	18404	26087	210	-420	0.80	-1.61	
Mazowe West	7085	14024	6219	16471	22690	-866	2447	-3.82	10.78	
Rushinga	2483	20027	2523	26669	29192	40	6642	0.14	22.75	
Mt Darwin North	2037	20629	2144	29238	31382	107	8609	0.34	27.43	
Mt Darwin South	2295	22733	2205	29680	31885	-90	6947	-0.28	21.79	
Muzarabani	3727	19441	3463	25260	28723	-264	5819	-0.92	20.26	
Sub Total	47587	188967	45139	250685	295824	-2448	61718	-0.83	20.86	

Annexure 6

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)



Annexures

MASVINGO

	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Chivi South	4312	12056	4987	17190	22177	675	5134	3.04	23.15
Chivi North	3938	10947	5638	17683	23321	1700	6736	7.29	28.88
Bikita East	5015	7047	6211	16171	22382	1196	9124	5.34	40.76
Bikita West	7726	7445	8742	16930	25672	1016	9485	3.96	36.95
Mwenezi	1881	22676	3554	29019	32573	1673	6343	5.14	19.47
Chiredzi North	8675	10154	8665	20718	29383	-10	10564	-0.03	35.95
Chiredzi South	6414	11611	6389	19437	25826	-25	7826	-0.10	30.30
Gutu North	8179	14867	8934	22524	31458	755	7657	2.40	24.34
Gutu South	6606	11434	10845	17594	28439	4239	6160	14.91	21.66
Masvingo Central	12417	8023	15471	9757	25228	3054	1734	12.1	6.87
Masvingo North	7224	8146	9333	13035	22368	2109	4889	9.43	21.86
Masvingo South	5444	14954	5526	13317	18843	82	-1637	0.44	-8.69
Zaka East	6778	12730	5941	21529	27470	-837	8799	-3.05	32.03
Zaka West	7444	10928	7800	19699	27499	356	8771	1.29	31.90
SUB TOTAL	92053	163018	108036	254603	362639	15983	91585	4.41	25.26

MATEBELELAND NORTH

Binga	19894	2675	26886	5351	32237	6992	2676	21.69	8.30
Bubi-Umguza	12837	6645	11970	16433	28403	-867	9788	-3.05	34.44
Hwange East	15271	3617	15950	4610	20560	679	993	3.30	4.83
Hwange West	15132	2445	14736	4712	19448	-396	2267	-2.04	11.66
Lupane	14439	3300	14524	7778	22302	85	4478	0.38	20.08
Nkayi	15601	5746	15616	11552	27168	15	5806	0.06	21.37
Tsholotsho	12318	5634	10089	10838	20927	-2229	5204	-10.65	24.87
Sub Total	105492	30062	109771	61274	171045	4279	31212	2.50	18.25

MATEBELELAND SOUTH

Beitbridge	7686	12988	6844	16448	23292	-842	3460	-3.61	14.14
Buliimangwe South	11761	5617	11994	6625	18619	227	-2054	1.22	
Buliimangwe North	11767	8679	11730	7647	19377	-37	-1032	-0.20	
Gwanda North	13039	4358	12610	5867	18477	-429	1509	-2.11	


COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

	MATEBELELAND SOUTH								
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Gwanda South	9913	7944	6774	12070	18844	-3139	4126	-16.66	21.90
Insiza	12049	5304	10579	9089	19668	-1470	3785	-7.47	19.24
Matobo	14701	6419	12565	9740	22305	-2136	3321	-9.58	14.89
Umzingwane	12878	2887	11226	5883	17109	-1652	2996	-9.66	17.51
Sub Total	93794	54196	84322	73369	157691	-9472	19173	-6.04	10.27
MIDLANDS									
Kwekwe	15388	8352	17061	9917	26978	1673	1565	6.20	5.80
Silobela	15985	5848	15980	9191	25171	-5	3343	-0.02	13.28
Mkoba	14587	4840	16129	5448	21577	1542	608	7.15	2.82
Gweru Urban	12172	3877	13332	5570	18902	1160	1693	6.14	8.96
Gweru Rural	10190	6889	10401	9608	20009	211	2719	1.05	13.59
Chirumhanzu	5185	10708	6578	16791	23369	1393	6083	5.96	26.03
Gokwe Central	5987	11082	9281	17777	27058	3294	6695	12.17	24.74
Gokwe East	3674	17088	7830	24773	32603	4156	7685	12.75	23.57
Gokwe North	3967	15923	7131	23663	30794	3164	7740	10.27	25.13
Gokwe South	3615	12644	5744	17398	23142	2129	4754	9.20	20.54
Gokwe West	3240	14596	6713	22044	28757	3473	7448	12.08	25.90
Mberengwa East	3113	23595	3128	24672	27800	15	1077	0.05	3.87
Mberengwa West	3889	18315	4395	21182	25577	506	2867	1.97	11.21
Shurugwi	6524	14891	7950	19724	27674	1426	4833	5.15	17.46
Zvishavane	10373	13971	10815	15910	26725	442	1939	1.65	7.26
Zhombe	8165	10757	8887	15112	23999	722	4355	3.01	18.15
Sub Total	126058	193736	151355	258780	410135	25297	65044	6.17	15.95
Total	1166653	1207298	1281801	1699229	2981030	115148	491931	3.74	16.44

Key: Negative(-) means a decrease from the number of people who voted for that party in 2000 and those who voted for it in 2002.

NB: The percentage difference has been worked out using the total number of people who voted in 2002.


Annexure 7

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF VOTE COMPARISON PER PARTY BETWEEN 2000 AND 2002 FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)**KEY**

1. MDC 2000
2. ZANU PF 2000
3. MDC 2002
4. ZANU PF 2002




Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY


- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002

Annexure 7

**KEY**

1. MDC 2000
2. ZANU PF 2000
3. MDC 2002
4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002

Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002

Annexure 8

PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS

Year	Total votes	Registered voters	Vote/Reg	VAP	Vote /VAP	Invalid	F H	Population
2002	556 261	5 288 804	48.3%	6 392 195	40.0%	5.4%	11	13 047 482
1995	1 485 660	4 822 289	30.8%	5 718 500	26.0%	5.5%	10	11 437 000
1990	2 235 425	N/A	N/A	4 590 810	48.7%	N/A	10	9 369 000
1985	2 972 146	N/A	N/A	3 938 130	75.5%	1.5%	10	8 379 000
1980	2 702 275	N/A	N/A	3 213 000	84.1%	N/A	7	7 140 000
1979	1 852 772	2 900 000	63.1%	3 118 500	59.4%	3.6%	9	6 930 000

Annexure 9

PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

Zimbabwe Year	Total votes	Africa	Vote/Reg	VAP	Vote /VAP	Invalid	F H	Population
1996	1 557 558	4 822 289	32.3%	5 839 000	26.7%	3.0%	10	11 678 000
1990	2 587 204	N/A	N/A	4 590 810	56.4%	5.7%	10	9 369 000

SOURCE: IDEA's Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report 2002.

KEY: 1. Vote Registration - number of votes divided by number of names on voter,s register
Expressed as a %.

VAP - a number of votes divided by the Voting Age Population figure, expressed as a %

Vote/VAP - number of votes divided by the voting Age Population figure expressed as a %

Invalid - invalid voted

FH - Freedom House - indicate levels of freedom in a political system.

Population - total population as described under voting age population.

WHOSE CONSTITUENCY IN 2000 AND 2002

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		Differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
	Lobengula - Magwegwe	2896	15364	2197	17041	699	-1677	MDC
Bulawayo North East	3794	18669	2864	21100	930	-2431	MDC	MDC
Bulawayo South	4666	18624	3193	20781	1473	-2157	MDC	MDC
Mkokoba	3027	13176	2196	12901	831	275	MDC	MDC
Nkulumane	4917	18602	3644	20380	1273	-1778	MDC	MDC
Pelendaba	3376	15485	2696	16462	680	-9787	MDC	MDC
Pumula-Luveve	4015	17970	3020	18901	995	-931	MDC	MDC
Mpopoma	3137	14000	2540	14813	597	-813	MDC	MDC
Highfield	3187	14919	3234	12616	-47	-2303	MDC	MDC
Budiriro	4082	20749	4410	21058	-328	-309	MDC	MDC
Chitungwiza	6855	16901	6056	15480	799	1421	MDC	MDC
Dzivarasekwa	7385	18046	6084	18516	1301	-470	MDC	MDC
Glen Norah	3907	19021	3517	17866	390	1155	MDC	MDC
GlenView	2709	16527	3443	16470	734	57	MDC	MDC
Harare Central	4292	13880	3620	14207	672	-327	MDC	MDC
Harare East	5828	16717	4391	18129	1437	-1412	MDC	MDC
Harare North	5696	19525	4852	18976	844	549	MDC	MDC
Harare South	6219	13646	4730	12430	1489	1216	MDC	MDC
Hatfield	9502	15354	5413	11740	4089	3614	MDC	MDC
Kambuzuma	3299	15469	2542	13722	757	1747	MDC	MDC
Kuwadzana	5047	18263	4349	15691	698	2572	MDC	MDC
Mabvuku	5066	17039	5572	17495	-506	-456	MDC	MDC
Mbare East	5192	11353	4265	10754	927	599	MDC	MDC
Mbare West	3342	14382	122	13118	3220	1264	MDC	MDC
Mufakose	7661	12101	3965	15233	3696	-3132	MDC	MDC
St Mary's	6546	20094	6135	17740	411	2354	MDC	MDC
Zengeza	5580	15846	5330	14814	250	1032	MDC	MDC
Buhera North	16248	12897	12850	10316	3398	2581	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Buhera South	15531	12720	14016	7821	1515	4899	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chimanimani	5859	12750	8072	11410	7787	1340	ZANU PF	MDC

WHOSE CONSTITUENCY IN 2000 AND 2002

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
	Chipinge North	9198	12940	3728	9283	5470	3657	MDC
Chipinge South	6954	18356	4086	3283	2868	15073	MDC	ZANU NDONGA
Makoni East	10230	7850	7509	7391	2721	459	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Makoni North	18352	4795	14835	3357	3517	1438	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Makoni West	13590	8511	11138	7356	2452	1155	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutare Central	5294	21296	3091	17706	2203	3590	MDC	MDC
Mutare North	7580	17940	5564	15500	2016	2440	MDC	MDC
Mutare South	9673	8742	6673	7273	3000	1469	ZANU PF	MDC
Mutare West	13788	7724	11498	5818	2290	1906	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutasa	10832	12923	5281	9278	5551	3645	MDC	MDC
Nyanga	19418	12781	8891	10016	10527	2765	ZANU PF	MDC
Chikomba	23450	7035	13417	6776	10033	259	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Goromonzi	20158	9608	14459	9489	5699	119	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Marondera East	15719	11667	10692	10629	5027	1038	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Marondera West	16591	4891	11221	4570	5370	321	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mudzi	33838	4226	27149	2371	6689	1855	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Murehwa North	16616	5102	13694	4104	2922	998	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Murehwa South	16913	5180	13895	4426	3018	754	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutoko North	22357	3748	17374	2447	4983	2571	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutoko South	27339	2120	19228	1177	8111	943	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Seke	14667	12551	9236	10821	5431	1730	ZANU PF	MDC
Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	37341	3197	27748	2128	9593	-1069	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Wedza	21436	7282	18044	6049	3392	1233	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chegutu	16083	11493	12169	10412	3914	1081	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chinhoyi	11432	8477	8176	7602	3256	875	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Hurungwe West	24057	6218	18991	4532	5066	1903	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Hurungwe East	19455	4635	14814	4315	4641	420	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Kadoma Central	9345	14446	12049	5666	-2704	8780	MDC	ZANU PF
Kadoma East	18771	3123	11678	3362	7093	-239	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Kadoma West	21481	5656	11758	4581	9723	1075	ZANU PF	ZANU PF

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
Kariba	22240	9718	15048	7332	7192	2386	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Makonde	20421	2662	13066	3294	7353	-632	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mhondoro	17681	10628	9118	10783	8563	-155	ZANU PF	MDC
Zvimba North	21509	4755	16175	5872	5334	-1117	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zvimba South	27846	5687	16508	4689	11306	998	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Bindura	19932	11279	13328	11257	6604	22	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Guruve North	28517	2700	20513	2370	8004	330	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Guruve South	30651	2646	19988	3239	663	-593	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Shamva	25863	4277	19460	5621	6403	-1344	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mazowe East	18404	7683	18824	7473	-420	210	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mazowe West	16471	6219	14024	7085	2447	-866	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Rushinga	26669	2523	20027	2483	6642	40	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mt Darwin North	29238	2144	20629	2037	8609	107	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mt Darwin South	29680	2205	22733	2295	6947	-90	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Muzarabani	25260	3463	19441	3727	5819	-264	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chivi South	17190	4987	12056	4312	5134	675	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Chivi North	17683	5638	10947	3938	6736	1700	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Bikita East	16171	6211	7047	5015	9124	1196	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Bikita West	16930	8742	7445	7726	9485	1016	ZANU PF	MDC
Mwenezi	29019	3554	22676	1881	6343	1673	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Chiredzi North	20718	8665	10154	8675	9570	-10	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chiredzi South	19437	6389	11611	6414	10564	-25	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gutu North	22524	8934	14867	8179	7657	755	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gutu South	17594	10845	11434	6606	6160	4239	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Masvingo Central	9757	15471	8023	12417	1734	3054	MDC	MDC
Masvingo North	13035	9333	8146	7224	4889	2109	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Masvingo South	13317	5526	14954	5444	-1637	82	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zaka East	21529	5941	12730	6778	8799	-837	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zaka West	19699	7800	10928	7444	8771	356	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Binga	5351	26886	2675	19894	2676	6992	MDC	MDC
Bubi-Umguza	16433	11970	6645	12837	9788	-920	ZANU PF	MDC



Annexure 10

WHOSE CONSTITUENCY IN 2000 AND 2002

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
Hwange East	4610	15950	3617	15271	993	679	MDC	MDC
Hwange West	4712	14736	2445	15132	2267	-396	MDC	MDC
Lupane	7778	14524	3300	14439	4478	85	MDC	MDC
Nkayi	11552	15616	5746	15601	5806	15	MDC	MDC
Tsholotsho	10838	10089	5634	12318	5204	-2229	ZANU PF	MDC
Beit-Bridge	16448	6844	12988	7686	3460	-842	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Bulilimangwe South	6625	11994	5617	11761	2054	227	MDC	MDC
Bulilimangwe North	7647	11730	8679	11767	-1032	-37	MDC	MDC
Gwanda North	5867	12610	4358	13039	1509	-429	MDC	MDC
Gwanda South	12070	6774	7944	9913	4126	-3139	ZANU PF	MDC
Insiza	9089	10579	5304	12049	3785	-1470	MDC	MDC
Matobo	9740	12565	6419	14701	3321	-2186	MDC	MDC
Umzingwane	5883	11226	2887	12878	2996	-1652	MDC	MDC
Kwekwe	9917	17061	8352	15388	1565	1673	MDC	MDC
Silobela	9191	15980	5848	15985	3271	-5	MDC	MDC
Mkoba	5448	16129	4840	14587	608	1542	MDC	MDC
Gweru Urban	5570	13332	3877	12172	1693	1160	MDC	MDC
Gweru Rural	9608	10401	6889	10190	2719	211	MDC	MDC
Churumhanzi	16791	6578	10708	5185	6083	1393	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe Central	17777	9281	11082	5987	6695	3294	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe East	24773	7830	17088	3674	7685	4156	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe North	23663	7131	15923	3967	7740	3164	ZANU PF	ZANUPF
Gokwe South	17398	5744	12644	3615	4754	2129	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe West	22044	6713	14956	3240	7088	3490	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mberengwa East	24672	3128	23595	3113	1077	15	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mberengwa West	21182	4395	18315	3889	2867	506	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Shurugwi	19724	7950	14891	6524	4833	1426	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zvishavane	15910	10815	13971	10373	1939	442	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zhombe	15112	8887	10757	8165	4355	722	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
							MDC Total	50
							ZANU PF TOTAL	70

Annexure 11

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLLING STATIONS

HARARE PROVINCE

	Fixed Polling Stations		Mobile Polling Stations		Difference		% Difference	
	2002	2000	2002	2000	Fixed	Mobile	Fixed	Mobile
Chitungwiza	9	13	0	0	-4	0	-30.8	0
Dzivarasekwa	9	13	0	0	-4	0	-30.8	0
Glen Norah	8	14	0	0	-6	0	-42.9	0
Glen View	7	9	0	0	-2	0	-22.22	0
Harare Central	10	16	0	0	-6	0	-37.50	0
Harare East	11	22	0	0	-11	0	-50.0	0
Harare North	9	17	0	0	-8	0	-47.1	0
Harare South	13	18	0	0	-5	0	-27.8	0
Highfield	6	8	0	0	-2	0	-25.0	0
Hatfield	9	12	0	0	-3	0	-25.0	0
Kambuzuma	7	9	0	0	-2	0	-22.2	0
Kuwadzana	7	9	0	0	-2	0	-22.2	0
Mabvuku	8	11	0	0	-3	0	-27.3	0
Mbare East	12	14	0	0	-2	0	-14.3	0
Mbare West	8	10	0	0	-2	0	-20.0	0
Mufakose	9	13	0	0	-4	0	-30.8	0
St. Mary's	11	13	0	0	-2	0	-15.4	0
Zengeza	7	12	0	0	-5	0	-41.7	0
Budiriro	7	11	0	0	-4	0	-36.4	0
TOTAL	167	244	0	0	-77	0	-30.0	0

BULAWAYO PROVINCE

Bulawayo North	22	30	1	1	-8	0	-26.7	0
Bulawayo South	15	22	0	0	-7	0	-31.8	0
Lobengula	11	14	0	0	-3	0	-21.4	0
Nkulumane	15	18	0	0	-3	0	-16.7	0
Mpumalanga Luveve	21	27	0	0	-6	0	-22.2	0
Pelandaba	13	17	0	0	-4	0	-23.5	0
Mpopoma	14	15	0	0	-1	0	-6.7	0
Makokoba	13	17	0	0	-4	0	-23.5	0
TOTAL	124	160	1	1	-36	0	-21.6	0

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

Chirumhanzu	59	34	5	5	25	0	73.5	-100.0
Gokwe North	62	36	0	2	26	-2	72.2	-100.0
Gokwe East	52	35	0	5	17	-5	48.6	0
Gokwe Central	52	40	0	0	12	0	30.0	-100.0
Gokwe West	59	37	0	3	22	-3	59.5	-100.0
Gokwe South	58	40	0	0	18	0	45.0	0
Gweru Urban	10	24	0	0	-14	0	-58.3	0
Gweru Rural	59	34	6	6	25	0	73.5	0
Mkoba	12	19	0	0	-7	0	-36.8	0

Annexure 11

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLLING STATIONS

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

	Fixed Polling Stations		Mobile Polling Stations		Difference		% Difference	
	2002	2000	2002	2000	Fixed	Mobile	Fixed	Mobile
Kwekwe	15	28	22	0	-13	2	-46.4	0
Mberengwa East	55	35	3	5	20	-2	57.1	-40.0
Mberengwa West	62	35	6	5	27	-1	77.1	20.0
Shurugwi	49	35	6	5	14	1	40.0	20.0
Silobela	39	40	5	0	-1	5	-2.5	0
Zhombe	47	50	3	0	7	3	17.5	0
Zvishavane	47	31	3	5	16	-2	51.6	-40.0
TOTAL	737	543	39	41	194	-2	3.4	-21.3

MASHONALAND WEST PROVINCE

Chegutu	23	32	23	8	-9	15	-28.1	187.5
Chinhoyi	25	24	3	6	1	-3	4.2	-50.0
Hurungwe West	34	34	16	7	0	9	0	128.6
Hurungwe East	36	36	15	4	0	11	0	275.0
Kadoma Central	13	19	0	2	-6	-2	-31.6	-100.0
Kadoma East	35	41	16	2	-6	14	-14.6	700.0
Kadoma West	51	38	2	4	13	-2	34.2	-50.0
Kariba	24	27	15	11	-3	4	-11.1	36.4
Makonde	47	34	11	6	13	5	38.2	83.3
Mhondoro	34	39	12	3	-5	9	-12.8	300.0
Zvimba North	39	34	9	5	5	4	14.7	80.0
Zvimba South	39	35	7	5	4	2	11.4	40.0
TOTAL	400	393	129	63	7	66	0.4	135.9

MASVINGO PROVINCE

Bikita East	40	23	2	1	17	1	73.9	100.0
Bikita West	48	21	0	1	27	-1	128.6	-100
Chiredzi North	34	29	11	5	5	6	17.2	120.0
Chiredzi South	42	38	3	2	4	1	10.5	50.0
Chivi North	41	30	0	0	11	0	36.7	0
Chivi South	41	32	0	0	9	0	28.1	0
Gutu North	39	38	13	6	1	7	2.6	116.7
Gutu South	47	43	4	3	4	1	9.3	33.3
Masvingo Central	29	25	2	3	4	-1	16.0	-33.3
Masvingo North	40	38	12	4	2	8	5.3	200
Masvingo South	44	38	0	0	6	5	15.8	0
Mwenezi	43	35	8	5	8	3	22.9	0
Zaka East	44	38	0	0	6	5	15.8	0
Zaka West	46	40	1	1	6	2	15.0	200
TOTAL	578	463	57	31	115	33	29.7	49.0



Annexure 11


STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLLING STATIONS

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE

	Fixed Polling Stations		Mobile Polling Stations		Difference		% Difference	
	2002	2000	2002	2000	Fixed	Mobile	Fixed	Mobile
Bindura	29	30	16	8	-1	8	-3.3	100.0
Guruve North	52	32	0	3	20	-3	62.5	-100.0
Guruve South	47	37	0	8	10	-8	27.0	-100.0
Mazoe East	37	34	3	2	3	1	8.8	50.0
Mazoe West	31	31	40	7	0	7	0	100.0
Mt Darwin North	35	34	3	1	1	2	2.9	200.0
Mt Darwin South	41	33	4	6	8	-2	24.2	-33.3
Shamva	39	35	6	5	4	1	11.4	20.0
Rushinga	51	35	5	5	16	0	45.7	0
Muzarabani	41	35	4	5	6	-1	17.1	-20.0
Total	403	336	55	50	67	5	19.6	21.7
MATEBELELAND NORTH								
Hwange West	40	35	10	5	5	5	14.3	100.0
Hwange East	53	35	5	5	18	0	51.4	0
Tsholotsho	50	38	10	2	12	0	31.6	0
Binga	42	32	8	8	10	0	31.3	0
Lupane	41	33	10	7	8	3	24.2	42.9
Nkayi	44	34	20	10	10	10	29.4	100
Bubi-Umguza	58	37	6	3	21	3	56.8	100.0
Total	328	244	69	40	84	21	34.1	49.0
MATEBELELAND SOUTH								
Beitbridge	42	35	8	5	7	3	20.0	60.0
Bulilimangwe N.	36	24	14	17	12	-3	50	-17.6
Bulilimangwe S.	45	30	5	9	15	-4	50	-44.4
Gwanda North	44	38	6	3	6	3	15.8	100.0
Gwanda South	46	37	4	3	9	1	24.3	33.3
Insiza	34	30	16	10	4	6	13.3	60.0
Matobo	41	37	9	3	4	6	10.8	200.0
Umzingwane	43	34	4	6	9	-2	26.5	-33.3
Total	331	265	66	56	66	10	26.3	44.7

Annexure 12

DEATHS RESULTANT FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1 JANUARY 2002 - 25 MARCH 2002



SOURCE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM

DEATHS RESULTANT FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1 JANUARY 2002 - 25 MARCH 2002

DECEASED DUE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE

NAME	POLITICAL AFFILIATION	DATE OF DEATH	PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY
MR BHEBHE NEWMAN	MDC	01-Feb-02	MAT NORTH	NKAYI
CHITEHWE	ZNLWVA	01-Jan-02	HARARE	HATFIELD
CHATUNGA RICHARD	MDC	20-Jan-02	MASVINGO	BIKITA EAST
DUBE NQOBIZITA	MDC	01-Mar-02	BULAWAYO	NKULUMANE
FORD TERRY	UNKNOWN	18-Mar-02	MASH WEST	MHONDORO
GATSI ERNEST	MDC	19-Mar-02	MASH CENTRAL	GURUVE NORTH
GWAZE TAFIRENYIKA	MDC	12-Mar-02	MASH EAST	
KATSAMUDANGA TICHAONA	MDC	05-Feb-02	HARAREHARARE	NQRTH
KUMALO KHAPE	MDC	06-Feb-02	MASH WEST	MHONDORO
KUVHEYA LAWRENCE	MDC	Mar-02	MASH EAST	CHIKOMBA
MAHUNI FUNNY	UNKNOWN	13-Mar-02	MIDLANDS	KWEKWE
MANYARA OWEN	MDC	17-Mar-02	MASH CENTRAL	MT DARWIN
MAPHOSA RICHARD	MDC	20-Jan-02	MASVINGO	BIKITA EAST
MAPHOSA STEPHEN	ZANU PF	02-Feb-02	HARARE	BUDIRO
MAPINGURE ATNOS	UNKNOWN	09-Jan-02	MASVINGO	ZAKA
MATOPE KENNETH	MDC	13-Jan-02	MASH CENTRAL	GURUVE
MASARIRA GIBSON	ZANU PF	09-Jan-02	MASVINGO	ZAKA
MASEVA AMOS MISHEK	ZNLWVA	08-Mar-02	MASVINGO	GUTU NORTH
MIJONI SIMWANJA	UNKNOWN	15-Jan-02	MIDLANDS	KWEKWE
MOYO HENRY	MDC	07-Feb-02	MASVINGO	UNKNOWN
MPOFU MUCHENJE	MDC	19-Jan-02	MIDLANDS	MBERENGWA
MUNYARADZI	UNKNOWN	14-Feb-02	MASH EAST	MARONDERA EAST
MUNIKWA ISAAC	ZANU PF	17-Jan-02	MASVINGO	ZAKA
MUPAWAENDA TAKATUKWA	UNKNOWN	16-Feb-02	MASH WEST	ZVIMBA SOUTH
MUTEMARINGA FUNGISAI	MDC	27-Jan-02	MASH EAST	MUREHWA
NCUBE MTHOKOZISI	MDC	26-Jan-02	BULAWAYO	PELANDABA
NCUBE SAMBANI	MDC	17-Mar-02	MAT NORTH	HWANGE EAST
NAMAIRE SOLOMON	MDC	23-Jan-02	MANICALAND	MAKONI
NGUNDU SHEPHERD	MDC	05-Feb-02	MASH CENTRAL	MOUNT DARWIN
NHITSA TAKESURE	MDC	20-Feb-02	MASH CENTRAL	RUSHINGA
NYANZIRA TARIRO	ZANU PF	08-Feb-02	MANICALAND	BUHERA NORTH
SANYAMAHWE KUZIVA	MDC	18-Jan-02	MASH EAST	MUREHWA SOUTH
SHELTON LLOYD	ZANU PF	27-Feb-02	MASH EAST	CHIKOMBA
SIBINDI JOSEPH	MDC	01-Jan-02	BULAWAYO	UNKNOWN
SIBINDI HALAZA	MDC	30-Jan-02	MAT NORTH	TSHOLOTSHO
SIBANDA JAMES	MDC	01-Feb-02	MAT NORTH	NKAYI
SIBANDA CHARLES	MDC	02-Mar-02	MIDLANDS	ZHOMBE
SACWE JAMESON	MDC	29-Jan-02	MAT NORTH	LUPANE
UNNAMED (1)	UNKNOWN	23-Jan-02	MASVINGO	MWENEZI
UNNAMED (2)	UNKNOWN	23-Jan-02	MASVINGO	MWENEZI
UNNAMED	UNKNOWN	26-Feb-02	BULAWAYO	MAKOKOBA
UNNAMED	3 MDC POL. AGENTS	16-Mar-02	MANICALAND	CHIPINGE SOUTH
UNNAMED	MDC POL. AGENT	13 Mar-02	MASH EAST	MUTOKO SOUTH
VIKAVEKA DARLINGTON	MDC	15-Mar-02	MASH EAST	MARONDERA EAST

SOURCE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM

PROPERTY OF
ZESN RESOURCE CENTRE
ACGN No.



ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK

2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
REPORT

MARCH 2002

PROPERTY OF
ZESN RESOURCE CENTRE
ACGN No.

PROPERTY OF
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ACCN No.



ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK

2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPORT

MARCH 2002

PROPERTY OF
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Acronyms

CEDAW	-	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIO	-	Central Intelligence Organisation
EU	-	European Union
ESC	-	Electoral Supervisory Commission
ICCPR	-	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDs	-	Identity documents
MDC	-	Movement for Democratic Change
MISA	-	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MMPZ	-	Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe
NCA	-	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organisation
POSA	-	Public Order and Security Act
SADC	-	Southern Africa Development Cooperation
UDHR	-	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMP	-	Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe
UN	-	United Nations
War vets	-	War veterans
Zanu (PF)	-	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZBC	-	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZESA	-	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZESN	-	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZTV	-	Zimbabwe Television



Acknowledgements


This is the ZESN report of the 2002 Zimbabwe Elections which took place from 9 -11 March 2002. There were three elections taking place in Zimbabwe. In Harare, the elections were for the Mayor, City Councillors and the National President. In Chitungwiza, elections were held for the Mayor and the National President. In the rest of the country, voters only voted for the National President.

Any election is a process, not an event. It is a process which can be divided into three major phases, namely pre-polling, polling and post-election. In most cases, what happens on the polling day is but a confirmation of what will have taken place before the actual poll.

ZESN activities for the 2002 elections were targeted at ascertaining that the general conduct would be such that the result of the elections would be locally, regionally and internationally recognised as acceptable. To this end, it was necessary to engage in a process of voter education, research and advocacy, monitoring the media and monitoring the pre-polling environment, the polling environment and the events in the post-polling period.

We acknowledge the efforts of Farai Chiweshe, Perpetua Bganya and the ZESN secretariat in the production of the working document for the report. ZESN member organisations contributed at various levels towards the achievement of ZESN's objectives, giving information and editing the report. Their contribution was made through membership of the various structures including the board, management committee, national activity taskforces and provincial taskforces. ZESN members worked as observers, supervisors, voter education trainers and facilitators amongst others. We extend our gratitude to them.

Thanks also go to the members of the ZESN secretariat for their efforts in facilitating and co-ordinating the activities of ZESN towards the achievement of its objectives. Our funding and networking partners also assisted by providing the technical and financial support base for the implementation of various activities. Without them, the achievements of ZESN would not have been possible. Our sincere thanks go to them.





It is our belief that this report represents a true account of the events which took place, before, during and after polling for the presidential and municipal elections in 2002. We offer this report as our own contribution to the development of a free and fair electoral process and a democratic political process in Zimbabwe. We hope that our observations and conclusions are considered as genuine and honest attempts at assisting in the process towards national development at the social, economic and political levels.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Reginald Matchaba-Hove', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Reginald Matchaba-Hove
Chairperson-ZESN

29 April 2002



Executive summary

Zimbabwe's third presidential election in March this year represented the first real opportunity since the introduction of the post of executive president in 1987 for the nation's electorate to vote for a leader of their choice. While the two previous presidential elections saw several contenders stand against President Mugabe, none had hereto presented a serious national challenge to the authority of ZANU (PF)'s candidate.

However, the emergence of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 provided Zimbabweans with a realistic democratic alternative to ZANU (PF) rule and this was put to the test for the first time in the 2000 parliamentary elections. That election witnessed an expression of substantial support for the opposition MDC throughout the country, despite a sustained nationwide campaign of violence and intimidation against MDC supporters and the electorate in general.

Since then, increasing levels of political violence continued to afflict Zimbabwean society which for the first time saw the organised emergence of state sanctioned and financed paramilitary youth militia stationed at bases throughout the country. This constituted a totally unacceptable militarisation of the ruling party's presidential election campaign, and demonstrated the extent to which the ruling party used state resources to campaign for its candidate.

This intensely hostile political climate was exacerbated by the introduction of repressive, anti-democratic laws and the determined efforts by the government to undermine the fairness and transparency of the electoral process.

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) notes with the gravest concern that as a result, thousands of Zimbabweans were prevented from casting their vote, many more were disenfranchised by legislation, the electorate in general were subjected to intolerable levels of violence and intimidation that also prevented the political opposition from campaigning freely, and that the voting process itself was fatally compromised.

Accordingly, ZESN is unable to endorse the 2002 Presidential Election as meeting basic democratic standards and cannot declare this poll to have been either free or fair.

This document summarises the findings that compelled ZESN to make this declaration.

Systematic nationwide campaign of political violence

The Human Rights NGO Forum reported that between 1 January 2002 and 14 April 2002, 54 deaths occurred as a result of politically motivated violence. Other incidents of political violence reported included 945 cases of torture, 214 kidnappings, 229 cases of intimidation, 143 cases of unlawful detention, 29 disappearances, 99 cases of unlawful arrests, five cases of rape, 48 school closures and the confiscation of



about 1 000 identity documents. These acts were allegedly perpetrated against opposition party supporters by ruling party supporters and other state institutions.

In addition, the Forum reported that since January 2001, 70 000 people were displaced from their homes as a result of indiscriminate politically motivated violence and intimidation. The internal displacements intensified in the election campaign period.

The Forum's reports also noted that camps and bases housing paramilitary militia youths supporting the ruling party were systematically established in the immediate vicinity of polling stations throughout the country and resulted in the direct intimidation of voters before casting their votes. These militia were also responsible for the abduction and torture of civilians and, during the election itself, for the detention of opposition party polling agents and independent observers from civil society.

Legislative excesses

The Government fast-tracked repressive and anti-democratic legislation through Parliament, which, in some instances, was passed into law in unconstitutional and unorthodox circumstances. The legislation subverted the democratic process, especially relating to electoral laws and institutions, and severely curtailed the lawful democratic activities of opposition parties and civic organisations.

The controversial legislation included the Broadcasting Services Act, General Laws Amendment Act, the Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act and Electoral Act.

Civic organisations and the MDC turned to the courts to challenge the constitutionality of some of this legislation, and in one instance the Supreme Court declared null and void the General Laws Amendment Act because it ruled that the Bill had been unconstitutionally reintroduced into Parliament following its initial defeat in the House.

However, President Mugabe reinstated many of the anti-democratic provisions contained in this legislation just days before the election using statutory instruments contained in Section 158 of the Electoral Act which empower him to take such action.

As a result, repressive regulations affecting the qualification of voters, the management and monitoring of the electoral process, the voters' roll, voter education and the postal ballot, among others, were gazetted in the closing hours of the election campaign.



This greatly added to the confusion of the electorate and effectively emasculated civic society from performing its democratic right to inform and educate voters on electoral matters and to monitor and observe all aspects of the electoral process itself. The laws also further compromised the independence of the Electoral Supervisory Commission and combined with an already flawed constitutional framework to ensure that the election was conducted without even meeting minimum democratic standards of transparency and fairness.

Legal and regulatory framework

The framework was characterised by the following:

- The establishment of a partisan judiciary created by forced resignations.
- Regulations limiting the accompanying of ballot boxes to counting centres by electoral officials, monitors, party agents (excluding independent domestic observers) compromised the transparency of the electoral process.
- The enactment of the oppressive Public Order and Security Act (POSA) curtailed all civil and political rights to freedom of expression and assembly and prevented opposition parties from campaigning freely. Whilst Robert Mugabe held about 50 rallies countrywide during the official election campaign period, the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai managed less than 10 rallies. Many other MDC rallies were banned by the police or were called off as a result of the threat of violence. The Act also curtailed free movement of the public and NGO civic educators. The power of the police to ban meetings was used to frustrate voter education programmes by civic society. The General Laws Amendment Act restricted voter education to the ESC and political parties, denying the electorate the opportunity to receive independent education. This Act also restricted election monitoring to civil servants contrary to the election norms and standards adopted by SADC countries (including Zimbabwe), which recommend that independent monitors from civil society monitor the conduct of the polling and counting processes.
- As a result, the Act prevented civic organisations from playing their traditional role of providing election monitors under the supervision of the ESC. Instead, their personnel were reduced to the function of independent local observers subject to the invitation of the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. In this way, the crucial task of independent observation of the electoral process became an arbitrary activity, and only a paltry 420 local observers were invited at the last minute (out of a total of the 12 500 names submitted by ZESN members and affiliates). This made a mockery of the exercise to measure the transparency and fairness of the voting process effectively.

The media

The state media grossly abused their public mandate to provide equitable coverage of contesting political candidates in a national election. The national public broadcasting corporation, ZBC, denied the main opposition MDC airtime to present its policies either on radio or television.

For example, the findings of the Media Monitoring Project (Zimbabwe), MMPZ revealed that out of a total of 14 hours and 41 minutes and 30 seconds that ZBC television news bulletins devoted to the presidential election campaign (between 1 December 2001 and 8 March 2002), ZANU (PF)'s candidate was granted a total of 13 hours, 50 minutes and 30 seconds, a little more than 94%. This compares to the national broadcaster's television coverage of the opposition MDC and its candidate, of just 31 minutes and 30 seconds, a paltry 4%. But even this was subverted by ZBC, which used this time to attack, denigrate and discredit the MDC. Radio coverage followed a similar pattern.

The state press also provided unfettered coverage of the ZANU (PF) election campaign, which often invoked inflammatory, racist and violent language to discredit the opposition MDC.

This undisguised bias in favour of the ruling party in the state media ran contrary to democratic practice and deprived Zimbabweans of their fundamental right to be accurately informed, not to mention the opportunity to make informed decisions.

In addition, government passed laws that severely restricted the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and took action against local and international media organisations and their employees, further restricting the free flow of information. The climate of violence also prevented the privately owned press from disseminating their product in many areas around the country. Further, individuals found in possession of newspapers produced by the privately owned press were frequently assaulted, further restricting Zimbabwean citizens' right to freely access a diversity of information sources.

To some extent, the bias of the state press was mitigated by the presence of alternative independent sources of information in Zimbabwe's print media. But the de facto monopoly of the airwaves enjoyed by the ZBC invested it with a public responsibility to fairness and accuracy that it manifestly abused.

The Registrar-General's office and the Election Directorate

These institutions ran the election with partiality and this led to the following:



- The Registrar-General's office failed to obey a court ruling ordering local government elections in Harare and Chitungwiza to be held before the presidential election. As a result, dual (presidential and municipal) elections were staged in Harare and Chitungwiza and this contributed to a state of electoral confusion in the electorate and among official election personnel, especially in relation to who was qualified to vote. This was exacerbated by the failure of official electoral institutions to disseminate timely, accurate and adequate voter education/voter information material.
- The effectiveness of the High Court order extending polling in Harare and Chitungwiza to a third day was compromised by the delayed opening of polling stations and their prompt closure at 7:00 pm. This resulted in many people still queuing to vote being turned away by the police.
- The transparency of the electoral process was fatally flawed by the refusal of the Registrar-General's office to make public, at any stage, a consolidated voters' roll. This made it impossible for the public and political parties to inspect the roll and to raise objections, or even to assess the national electoral base. Such a fundamental failure in itself rendered the election open to abuse since it was impossible to identify voters or rectify the register.
- The Registrar-General and the Electoral Supervisory Commission failed to provide clear and adequate public information on all aspects of the electoral process, particularly on the location of polling stations. As a result, the public was not given sufficient notice to identify polling stations nearest to their homes and the opposition MDC was deprived of its right to deploy its election agents into the field in good time. This also affected the deployment of independent local observers and therefore gave rise to a situation where some polling stations opened without the presence of opposition party officials or observers.
- A discretionary and restrictive interpretation of the Citizenship Act by the Registrar-General provided for the possibility of disenfranchising many thousands of potential voters. Unknown numbers of voters were consequently struck off the voters' roll.
- Restriction of postal voting to members of the armed forces, diplomatic staff and electoral officials disenfranchised many thousands of Zimbabweans living abroad.
- A postal voting system that totally lacked transparency was used and it was unmonitored by independent observers and opposition election agents. It was also reported that the uniformed forces were obliged to vote under the supervision of their commanding officers.
- The secret registration of voters beyond the 'final' officially declared deadline of 27 January 2002 and the subsequent retrospective extension of the deadline to 3 March 2002.



- A total lack of transparency in the compilation and correction of the consolidated voters' roll and a total lack of any information about the nature of a supplementary voters' roll that was still being compiled right up to the opening of the polls.
- The printing of extra ballot papers and the refusal by the election authorities to provide any definitive figure for the number of ballots printed. The production of ballot papers and other voting materials was not open to verification by political parties, monitors and independent observers.
- Entry restrictions were imposed on observers and journalists at counting centres.
- There was no mechanism to ensure the independent verification of voting figures provided to the Election Directorate by the counting centres.

Polling stations

The following scenarios were observed with regards to polling stations:

- The reduction of polling stations in the urban areas, which are perceived to be strongholds of the opposition MDC.
- There was no information on the total number of polling stations or their location until two days before the election.
- Late announcement of major increases in rural polling stations and decreases in urban polling stations jeopardised the deployment plans of domestic observer groups and some opposition party election agents.
- Limited and inaccurate information about the number and location of mobile polling stations made it difficult for opposition election officials and domestic observers to identify where they were.
- The extremely slow pace of processing voters at urban polling stations, especially in Harare and Chitungwiza, resulted in high levels of frustration. This resulted in many incidences of disorder in the voting queues and added to the disruption of the voting process.
- The failure of some published polling stations to appear on election day and open the unannounced appearance of new polling stations.

The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC)

The ESC is the statutory body charged with monitoring and supervising elections in Zimbabwe. It is appointed by the President and reports only to the President and is therefore not an independent body.



Legislative amendments in the run-up to the election further compromised its independence by demanding that the institution only recruit its election staff, including monitors, from the civil service, which employs individuals who owe their jobs to government. This resulted in the erosion of the democratic process in a number of ways, amongst them the following:

- Changes to the legal and regulatory framework for monitoring, resulted in the militarisation of the ESC through the recruitment of monitors from the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Education. This also resulted in a total lack of transparency regarding the electoral process.
- Civic organisations were removed from their traditional role of providing the ESC with trained election monitors and their task was reduced to performing the passive and arbitrary role of providing independent domestic election observers. But even this function was compromised to the point of being incidental since accreditation depended upon approval by the Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, who 'invited' about 420 members from ZESN and its affiliates to become observers.

The futility of this role is better understood in light of the fact that there were about 5000 polling stations countrywide, including about 600 mobiles.

- Voter education material provided by the ESC was in all cases inadequate and insufficient, and in some cases late and confusing, especially for the tripartite elections.

Observers

The problems encountered were as follows:

- Invitations to domestic and international observer groups by government were selective and arbitrary.
- Local observers were denied access to polling stations as a result of being unaccredited.
- Most local observers deployed by ZESN and its members were harassed in the following ways:
 - Beatings.
 - Torture.
 - Arrest and detention.
 - Confiscation of their monitoring tools and/or identity cards.
- International observers were attacked (e.g. the South African Observer Mission was attacked in Chinhoyi).



Opposition polling agents

- A significant number of polling agents for the opposition MDC were attacked, abducted or detained whilst on their way to their polling stations and thus were not in the polling stations during voting, leading to fears of ballot rigging.
- Some MDC polling agents were beaten, detained and died during the election period.

Election results and the voters' roll

Noteworthy under this heading are the following issues:

- Election results were announced under a tense and suspicious atmosphere. The number of registered voters and those who were turned away were never given, and the numbers of spoiled ballots were not announced together with the constituency results. Furthermore, the figures provided by ZESN observers, the ESC and those announced by the Registrar-General did not tally. Results were not announced at counting centres but were communicated to, and announced by the Registrar-General from the National Election Command Centre.
- The official results of the Harare and Chitungwiza municipal elections, which were held over the same period as the presidential election, were announced much later. But even these appear to be subject to change as later announcements by the Registrar-General contain significant differences to the original 'final' figures.

Conclusion

The 2002 presidential election was characterised by the implementation of an unprecedented systematic, nationwide campaign of violence and intimidation aimed at terrorising the rural electorate and preventing the opposition MDC from mounting a serious public political challenge to the ruling party anywhere in the country. In order for this to succeed, the police were strictly confined to the selective application of the law. The resultant breakdown in the rule of law allowed state-sponsored paramilitary militias and other ruling party supporters to act with impunity, terrorising entire communities in many urban centres as well as among the rural population.

To complement this anarchic environment, the government introduced repressive and anti-democratic legislation that seriously undermined Zimbabweans' constitutional rights to their freedom of expression, assembly and association. Other legislation further compromised the independence of electoral institutions and processes and disenfranchised thousands of voters through a flawed registration process and bureaucratic obstruction.



This evidence clearly demonstrates that the 2002 presidential election failed to meet the basic norms and standards for the conduct of a free and fair election as established by the SADC Parliamentary Forum and adopted by all member countries.

Consequently, ZESN believes that the collective will of the Zimbabwean electorate was not allowed adequate expression and that the lack of transparency in the electoral process itself warrants an audit of the election results. Depending on the outcome of this exercise, ZESN also recommends that a fresh election be held after an agreed transitional period-during which constitutional and electoral reforms guaranteeing a free and fair election are put in place.

Recommendations

ZESN believes the following recommendations must be implemented as key requirements to ensure a return of peace and democracy to Zimbabwe:

- The restoration of the rule of law and its full and impartial application, including the prosecution of those responsible for political violence.
- An audit of the election results by an independent body agreed upon by all participating candidates and parties.
- If necessary, a fresh election should be held, but only after an agreed transitional period during which constitutional and electoral reforms guaranteeing free and fair elections are put in place.

This will require constitutional reform which will provide for the following:

- The establishment of an independent electoral commission which is free of executive control and responsible for the management, administration and supervision of elections.
- The repeal of all legislation that presently invests the authority of election management in other government institutions.
- The repeal of all legislation undermining fundamental constitutional rights, including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association and movement and the right to vote.



- Provisions ensuring equitable access to state-owned media for contesting political parties and fair and accurate coverage by the national public broadcaster.
- An end to ZBC's monopoly of the airwaves and its removal from state control. The repeal and redrafting of the Broadcasting Services Act to allow for a more progressive regulatory climate reflecting the right of Zimbabweans to invest in the broadcasting media.
- Electoral reforms to protect the right of residents to vote and ensure the impartial selection of professional election staff from civil society. It will also be necessary to establish a non-discriminatory postal ballot system.
- The simultaneous running of parliamentary and presidential elections.
- Access to state resources for all contesting parties.

Provisions for the following should also be made:

- The upkeep of an accurate and up-to-date voters' roll accessible to the public.
- Strict observance of voters' rights to electoral information by the timely and adequate dissemination of all relevant information.
- An election code of conduct for political parties, the media, observers and monitors.
- Accessible and adequate polling stations allocated to every province or constituency.
- The full participation of civic society in voter education, election monitoring, observation, lobbying and advocacy as guaranteed by law.
- Provision for state security agencies and electoral staff to conduct their duties impartially and professionally.
- The establishment of independent inquiry to investigate political violence and recommend a process of reconciliation and rehabilitation.
- The specific incorporation into law of SADC's norms and standards for free and fair elections.
- That the counting of ballot papers be conducted at each polling station.
- The use of international bodies and mechanisms to redress violations and mediate in restoring peace in Zimbabwe.



Methodology

This report is the account and analysis of events and information gathered before, during and after the 2002 presidential election held from 9-11 March 2002. The report was compiled by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a coalition of 35 civic society organisations formed to co-ordinate activities pertaining to elections (*see annexure 14 at the back of this report*).

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network was formed in 1998 by civic society organisations to enhance a democratic, transparent, free and fair electoral process and environment through co-ordinating activities of member organisations in the field of election monitoring, voter education, research and advocacy, media and communication.

In order to achieve its objective, members of the Network are grouped into taskforces, which implement activities all over the country with the secretariat facilitating all the work involved. ZESN focuses on the following activities:

- Voter education.
- Research and advocacy.
- Election monitoring and observation.
- Media and information.
- Networking and capacity building.

The Network's main task is to ensure that the election monitoring and observation methods, training, as well as voter education training methodology and materials are standardised among its members in order to ensure uniformity in terms of information dissemination to the electorate. The ZESN activities cover the whole nation, working through the existing 120 political constituencies.

Long-term monitoring

Recognising that election monitoring is a process not an event during the polling days, ZESN established long-term monitors to audit the political environment in Zimbabwe prior to the Presidential Election. (About 240) Long-term observers were deployed across the country and observed the pre-election period from November 2001 to 28 February 2002. The long-term monitors' reports assess the environment on a province-by-province basis looking at the following issues:



- Electoral process and irregularities.
- Political violence.

The information and assessment in the long-term monitoring report formed the basis of this report.

Sources of information

This report is based on observations of the electoral process prior to, during and after the Zimbabwe presidential elections in 2002, the mayoral elections in Chitungwiza, and the mayoral and council elections in Harare in the same year.

Information and data compiled to assess the 2002 Presidential Elections was gathered through the diverse member organisations, the ZESN taskforces, the long-term monitors, the accredited local election observers and 12 100 ZESN observers under a parallel observation process. During the days of polling, the information flow was organised and channelled through Provincial and National Command Centres. Command centres were set up in the provinces and the National Command Centre in Harare were the central clearing points for reports on the actual voting and counting process.

The other sources of information providers were the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Zimbabwe Peace Project, Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe, media reports and political analysts.



CHAPTER 1

Political and historical background

Regular, free and fair elections enable citizens to express their will by choosing their leaders and representatives in government. This is crucial in a democracy because the government derives its power from the mandate of its people. The government has legitimate power to govern if the people accept it and its governance is based on their mandate.

Prior to 1979, black Zimbabweans did not have the right to vote for representatives and the government of their choice or to stand for election. The nationalist movement for independence mobilised the African majority around the concept of 'one man, one vote'. Relenting to political pressure and the armed struggle, the white minority government held the first 'majority rule' elections in 1979 under the auspices of the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia administration. Thus, for the black majority, electoral politics essentially began in 1979.

Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has undergone significant political transformation. The current governing system is based on majority rule. The Executive President combines the functions of Chief-of-State and head-of-government. The legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, called the House of Assembly, which has 150 seats of which 120 are elected by popular vote every five years. The President directly appoints 12 seats, provincial governors occupy eight and ten are occupied by traditional chiefs who are elected by their peers. The Executive President appoints the Cabinet.

Since independence, Zimbabwe has remained *de jure* a multi-party state with the ruling ZANU (PF) party maintaining an overwhelming parliamentary majority in the 1990 and 1995 elections. However, in the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU (PF) dominance in parliament ended with the emergence of the MDC, which was established in 1999.

The 2002 election took place against the background of an electoral environment of alleged manipulation through the establishment of electoral authorities which are under the final control of the head of state. One major concern has always been with the voter's roll, which has never been a true reflection of the totality of the voting population at any one time. The problem of the voters' roll remains one of the most contentious and perennial problems of elections in Zimbabwe. The weak and divided state of the opposition also helped ZANU (PF) to stay in power, virtually unchallenged, well into the 1990s. For the voters, there were no other parties offering tangible goods and plausible policy alternatives. Examples abound of parties that were launched with a bang only to expire with a whimper.

After the first decade of independence, the honesty of ZANU (PF) leaders came under increasing scrutiny with the publicising of several major corruption scandals involving high-ranking members of the ruling party.



Under-performance of the economy caused by mismanagement and corruption, unfair terms of trade and indiscriminate servicing of foreign debt, soon began to show with the contraction of the manufacturing industry. This increased the levels of unemployment and, combined with reduced government expenditure on social services increased public disenchantment with the government - creating the environment for the emergence of opposition to the state.

Although there was no strong organised opposition to the state, dissenting voices began to speak from the academia, from the newly emerging free press and an increasingly fearless civil society. Non-governmental organisations, particularly those working in the field of human rights became more vocal in exposing the state's human rights abuses and the corruption eating away at the economy, and therefore at the social and economic rights of Zimbabweans. Predictably, the state adopted a defensive position at the signs that the proverbial honeymoon was over.

Opposition to the state and state suppression of this dissent grew from the early 1990's. In the late 1990s, the state reluctantly agreed to a constitutional reform process, the highlight of which was the referendum on a proposed constitution in February 2000. The 'NO' vote to the state's proposed constitution was the first real setback for ZANU (PF) and a clear sign that they could no longer take their political hegemony for granted.

The country soon erupted into an orgy of violence unlike any seen in Zimbabwe since the liberation struggle. The state harking back to the days when it had been most successful turned back to the rhetoric of land redistribution, which had won the liberation war, and the support of the rural people. In the battle for the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans, violence was used to suppress real and imagined dissent against the state. The majority of the violence was perpetrated by ruling party members and supporters although members of the opposition were also implicated in the violence.

The pre-2000 election period recorded the highest number of cases of political and election related violence since 1980. The 2000 election itself was characterised by a high voter turnout with the results showing clearly that urban voters voted overwhelmingly for the MDC and rural voters for the ZANU (PF). The ruling party won this election narrowly beating off a strong challenge from the MDC with 62 seats to 57 seats. The violence and harassment of the opposition continued until after the 2002 Presidential Election. The euphoria generated by the 'NO' vote in the constitutional referendum of February 2000 had created the impression in the minds of some of the citizens that democracy could prevail in Zimbabwe (as the referendum result was seen as a reflection of the will of the Zimbabwean people).

The violent situations prevailing in Zimbabwe after the 2000 election and the apparent lack of political will to tackle it raised concerns about the government's willingness to the creation and sustenance of a free and fair electoral environment. The promulgation of Clemency Order of 2000 political violence perpetrators sent the message that political violence and election related violence were acceptable.



Regional and international interests in the elections in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean 2002 Presidential Election was yet again a test on the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, imperialism juxtaposed to notions and principles of democracy, political power and interests. As late as August 2001, the Zimbabwean civic society was informing the world of the gross human violations and the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe. On 10 September 2001, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Committee, commented on the celebrated Abuja Agreement as follows:

We are most concerned that the Commonwealth meeting chose to focus upon land, instead of the lack of the rule of law as the major cause of the crisis, namely misrule, particularly since the Constitutional Referendum in February 2000. We strongly disagree with the conclusion that land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The Abuja meeting has perpetuated the myth that the crisis is due to land. Land reform is obviously a pressing need in Zimbabwe but the Zimbabwean Government has used this issue to deflect attention from the campaign of terror that it has conducted against its political opponents. (*Crisis in Zimbabwe Report, 2002*).

Manipulation of the West's past colonial ventures and, of course, its continued interests in Zimbabwe was used by Mugabe, together with the land issue, to win the support of not only Zimbabweans but the region as a whole. The politics of race and the demonisation of the main opposition party, MDC, as an imperialist agent and denunciation of Tony Blair Prime Minister of Britain became part of the ZANU (PF) election campaign. The deportation of EU Observer Mission leader, Pierre Schori, and the EU-imposed targeted sanctions on President Mugabe and senior government officials received wide public media coverage. The EU sanctions were seen to be grossly patronising by ZANU (PF) and the EU was accused of intruding into the internal affairs of Zimbabwe.

The local public owned paper portrayed the sanctions as confirmation of ZANU PF's campaign against European colonial hegemony. SADC countries' response to the crisis in Zimbabwe was based on South Africa President Thabo Mbeki's quiet diplomacy. The body decided to support President Mugabe's notions of sovereignty and imperialism without questioning the levels of violence and undemocratic practices in Zimbabwe.

Consequently, the Zimbabwe government received support not only in many regional meetings held within the region but also at the Commonwealth Summit held from 1-2 March 2002 in Australia. To criticise the Zimbabwe government was to appear to be supporting Western arrogance, racism and indifference to the plight of Africa's people. For Zimbabweans to criticise the government would result in unfavourable labelling as unpatriotic or worse, a spy for the West.



Economic and social context in the pre-election period

The United Nations estimated that about half a million of Zimbabwe's 12,5 million people were going hungry in the few months before elections. The electioneering was run amidst a food crisis for which there appears to be no solution. By early March 2002, the staple maize crop production and supply had dropped by nearly 50%. The economic problems in Zimbabwe were such that inflation was running at 117%, unemployment at a record 60%, over 80% of Zimbabwe's 12,5 million people living below the poverty line. The education and health systems had deteriorated and approximately 2000 Zimbabweans were dying each week from HIV/AIDS. The fast-track land redistribution programme continued with reports of fresh farm invasions and violence on the farms.

The foreign currency crisis remained with many companies closing down and many people losing their jobs. Foreign investment declined by 80%, industrial production had dropped dramatically as had field crops for export including wheat and maize - resulting in the need to import 40% of the country's needs. With the critical shortages of basic commodities and essentials, Zimbabweans went to the polls to cast their vote. Statistics of Zimbabwean economic refugees showed an increase.



CHAPTER 2

Legal and constitutional framework

Section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe, and that if any other law is inconsistent with it, that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. Thus, Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy and so must act in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The three arms of Government i.e. the Executive, Judiciary and Legislative are also under and subject to the Constitution, which recognises the concept of separation of powers.

The Constitution enshrines a Declaration of Rights, which provides for the basic freedoms of conscience, assembly, association, worship, expression and movement. Zimbabwe's electoral law is largely contained in the Constitution and the Electoral Act, which governs the conduct of elections. The Constitution provides for the term of the President as six years and sets out conditions under which the President shall hold office. Parliamentary elections are held at five-yearly intervals while the presidential elections are held every six years. Constitutional experts have questioned the wisdom of holding the two elections in different years. The prospect of a president of a party defeated in a general election continuing in office till his term expires could trigger a constitutional crisis.

The main act players in Zimbabwe's electoral system are:

- the Delimitation Commission.
- the Electoral Supervisory Commission.
- the Election Directorate.
- the Registrar-General of Elections.

The Delimitation Commission

It has the responsibility of determining the limits of the constituencies in Zimbabwe. Currently, Zimbabwe is divided into 120 constituencies, in accordance with Section 60 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

In dividing Zimbabwe into constituencies, the Commission takes into account firstly, the total number of registered voters and the total number of constituencies required and therefore the general average number of voters in every constituency. In respect of any area, the commission takes note of its physical features, the means of communication in the area, the geographical distribution of voters registered on the common roll and any community of interest between voters registered on the common roll who live in that area.



Please note: For the purposes of the 2002 Elections, the Delimitation Commission was not constituted and reliance was placed on the constituency boundaries delimited for the purposes of the 2000 parliamentary election, despite the fact that new voters were added onto the voters' roll.

The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC)

The ESC has the responsibility of supervising the registration of voters, the conduct of elections and it also considers any proposed Bill or Statutory Instrument which may be referred to it and which relates to Presidential, Parliamentary or Local Authority elections (Section 61 of the Constitution). Like the Delimitation Commission, the President appoints it.

The Election Directorate (ED)

The Election Directorate consists of a chairperson appointed by the President, the Registrar-General of Elections and at least two other members (but not more than ten) appointed by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. Traditionally, the Election Directorate has consisted of civil servants under the chairmanship of the Public Service Commission (PSC). The responsibilities of the Directorate are:

- to co-ordinate the activities of ministries and departments of government in regard to the delimitation of constituencies, the registration of voters, the conduct of polls and all other matters connected with elections.
- to give instructions and make recommendations to the Registrar-General in regard to the exercise of his functions under the Electoral Act, and other persons in the employment of the state (for the purpose of ensuring the efficient, proper, free and fair conduct of elections).
- to ensure that elections are generally conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly (Section 4 of the Electoral Act: Chapter 2:01).

The Registrar-General of Elections

The Registrar-General of Elections is a public servant whose office falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, he runs elections in accordance with the Electoral Act, which is administered not by the Minister of Home Affairs but by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

The Registrar-General of Elections is responsible for running the whole electoral process. This involves the following responsibilities:

- registration of voters.
- preparation of the voters' roll.

- presiding over the nomination court for the nomination of candidates.
- provision of ballot papers.
- setting up of polling stations.
- provision of electoral staff.
- declaration of election results.
- custody of election materials.

These extensive functions make the Registrar-General of Elections very central to the entire electoral process. At the same time, any weaknesses or limitations in the discharge of these functions have negative ripple effects on the rest of the electoral process (Sachikonye, 1999).

Other provisions in the Electoral Act enhance the centrality of the Registrar-General of Elections. Section 15(2) of the Electoral Act states that the Registrar General 'shall not be subject to the control of any person or authority other than the Election Directorate'. The Registrar-General is not subject to the control of the ESC, but shall have regard to any report or recommendation of the ESC. It is against the above background that Zimbabwe went to the presidential polls on 9 March and 10 March 2002.

There was, prior to the election, a lot of confusion surrounding the laws governing the conduct of elections. In January 2002, the Parliament of Zimbabwe passed the General Laws Amendment Act, which made a number of changes to the Electoral Act, but that Act was later set aside by the Supreme Court on 27 February 2002. This meant that the old law would apply. The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs subsequently gazetted new regulations on 5 March, which re-enacted substantially the provisions of the General Laws Amendment Act relating to elections.

The Presidential Temporary Powers were evoked for this purpose.

General Laws Amendment Act 2002

The stipulations of the General Laws Amendment were as follows:

Voter education -The Act gave the ESC monopoly on voter education, with a provision that the ESC could appoint and register persons who would assist it in providing voter education. Section 14 (c) 5 of the Act reads, 'No foreign contribution or donation for the purposes of voter education shall be made except for the Commission'. This provision made it impossible for NGOs to consider registering to provide voter education under the ESC. However, provisions in the Act *ultra vires* the Constitution. For instance, the ban on voter education infringes Section 20 of the Constitution.



Election observation and monitoring -The General Laws Amendment Act had the following implications on civic society monitoring of elections:

- It made members of Public Service the only persons qualified to be appointed election monitors. This meant that ordinary persons recruited and trained by civic organisations could not be appointed as monitors but only as observers.
- The Act expanded the list of persons qualified for accreditation as observers to cover both local and foreign persons. Among the locals who could be appointed, as observers were (eminent persons from within Zimbabwe and individuals representing local organisations. In both cases, the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs extends the invitation.

The power of an observer was substantially reduced compared to that of a monitor. According to this Act, an observer who detects an irregularity only has the right to inform a monitor, or the ESC or constituency registrar. An observer has no entitlement to inspect or follow any vehicle transporting ballot boxes and it is not mandatory that there be an observer at each polling station. The effect of this was not only to restrict the role of civil society in this election, but also left the final decision of whether they could observe the elections to the government.

The 27 February 2002 Supreme Court judgement proclaiming the General Laws Amendment Act unconstitutional did not change anything on the ground for civic society monitors because on 4 and 5 March 2002, the provisions of the General Laws Amendment Act were brought back under the Presidential Powers.

Postal voting system - The postal ballot system was modified. The government amended the law with the effect of restricting those voting from abroad to uniformed forces and Zimbabwe's diplomatic missions. All other Zimbabweans living abroad or away from their constituencies could not use postal voting and they were therefore disenfranchised.

Zimbabweans with permanent residence status in other countries were not allowed to vote unless they produced passports and proof, e.g. bills that they had lived in their constituencies for a continuous period of 12 months prior to the elections.

Removal of names from the voters' roll - The Registrar General was given the discretion to make amendments to the voters' roll after registration and inspection, and during the election. This included the removal of names from the roll. The Amendment permitted the election officials to make corrections on wrongly spelt names without referring the case to the magistrate, as was the case before.

The Public Order and Security Act 2002

This Act is modelled along the lines of the Law and Order Maintenance Act of 1960. The Act criminalised criticism of the President, making it a serious offence to engender hostility towards, or cause hatred, contempt or ridicule of the President; whether in person or in respect of his office.

The Act also gives considerable power to the Police Force. The Act makes it an offence to engender feelings of hostility towards an officer or the police force and an offence to expose it to contempt, ridicule or disesteem. Section 24 (5) of the Act obliges any organiser of a meeting to give at least four days of written notice of the holding of the gathering to the regulating authority. During the 2002 election, the police were given the power to prohibit public meetings and demonstrations if they thought that these would cause public disorder and they also had the power to disperse whatever meetings or demonstrations they considered illegal.

The Act has a provision that makes it an offence for anyone inside or outside Zimbabwe to publish or communicate a statement which may lead to 'inciting or promoting public disorder or public violence or endangering public safety'. The Act was unprecedented and curtailed the freedom of movement, speech, expression and association guaranteed under the Constitution.

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill (Act)

The Minister of Information and Publicity presented the bill in parliament in November 2001. Under the proposed legislation, foreign journalists were barred from working in the country. The Bill made it clear that all media professionals will have to be granted authorisation by a special commission to be set up by Government, which will also impose a code of conduct. In addition, the Bill would make it illegal to rewrite a story published by another mass media service without permission from the owner.

The Bill introduced a new regime of licensing journalists and made acts of terrorism punishable with life imprisonment or the death penalty. Under this Bill, it will also be an offence to deliberately spread information aimed to discredit a person, cause alarm or despondency and conceal, falsify or fabricate information presented under the use of authentic reports. Unlike the other Bills that were gazetted, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy remained a Bill during the election period. This was due to the major criticism some of its provisions received (these provisions were labelled ill-conceived, badly drafted and dangerously threatening to the people's fundamental rights).

The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act

The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act was made law on 6 July 2001. It outlawed dual citizenship. People who migrated from neighbouring countries and became naturalised Zimbabweans, were asked to re-apply for Zimbabwean citizenship or lose it permanently. Their children who were born in Zimbabwe were also stripped of their citizenship as well and asked to renounce a 'claim' to their parent's country of birth's citizenship. Over one third Zimbabweans, mostly of Malawi, Mozambican and Zambian descent, were affected by the amendments. The Act was largely seen to be targeting whites who were seen to be supporters of the opposition. More than 3 000 whites in Bulawayo alone and in many other places, did not cast their ballot in the elections because of the citizenship issue.

Amongst the affected was the former Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister Sir Garfield Todd who was advised that he had ceased to be a citizen of Zimbabwe and therefore could not vote.

Funding of political parties

The Political Parties (Finance) Act prescribed funding for all political parties which won a minimum of 15 seats in parliament. In the 1995 Parliamentary General Election, ZANU (PF) won 117 of the 120 seats and was therefore the only party eligible under the Act to receive funds from the state. In 1999, a Supreme Court judgement ruled that thresholds for access to funding should be lowered to a minimum of 5% of the total valid votes in an election contest. Thus, parties which receive at least 5 percent in an election will receive funding and, the greater the number of votes received, the higher the funding. MDC benefited from the fund after the 2000 general elections.

In 2001, an amendment to the political parties (Finance) Act made it illegal to receive foreign funding for political parties contesting the elections. This again was seen as being targeted at the MDC, which has more international support than the ruling party.



CHAPTER 3

Pre-election period

Voter registration and inspection of the voters' roll

The registration process began on 15 October 2001 and ended on 13 December 2001. The process was extended to 27 January 2002. A notice from the Registrar General extended it again from 2 March to 3 March 2002. Reports from observers pointed to registration of voters taking place up to the days of polling.

The voters' roll was opened for public inspection initially for the period from 19 November to 9 December 2001 but was eventually extended by a week to 19 December 2001. After 19 December 2001, the registration process was done without much publicity. The MDC challenged in court the deadline for registration and the restrictive proof of residency requirements demanded by the Registrar-General for one to register. The proof of residency could be any of the following:

- In the case of rural and farm dwellers, confirmation by the village head or farm owner, vouching for the residence status of the person seeking registration.
- In the case of urban dwellers, any of the following documents:
 - a) certificate of occupation/title deeds;
 - b) lodger's permit/card issued before 19 November 2001;
 - c) Rates/water bills in the applicant's name,;
 - d) Electricity statements in the applicant's name or credit bills/statements showing the physical address of the applicant.

As a result of the demand for the various forms of proof of residency, confusion ensued and the Minister of Home Affairs later made a statement in parliament to the effect that there was no need for proof of residency for one to be registered as a voter. A High Court order confirmed this position following an MDC application. However, *The Herald* of 7 December 2001 quoted the Registrar-General as saying that his office would continue to demand the evidence in terms of Sections 19 and 20 of the Electoral Act, arguing that he was empowered by the Act to seek or require proof of residency from applicants who wanted to be registered as voters.

The application of the Citizenship Act of Zimbabwe [Chapter 4:01] also caused confusion during the registration exercise. All those who had dual citizenship were required to renounce one of them and given a deadline of 6 January 2002 for that purpose. Those who renounced their Zimbabwean citizenship were not allowed to vote as they had been struck off the voter's roll.

Of great concern was the confusion and secrecy surrounding the voter registration exercise. This was because of the numerous changes to the laws governing the elections and uncertainty about whether those who were still registering even just before the elections would appear on the voters roll in time for the elections.



Following amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act, the Registrar-General sent out notices of objection to all those people who had renounced their Zimbabwean citizenship, advising them that they would not be able to vote. Affected persons successfully challenged this in the High Court so that they could exercise their right to vote. The High Court ruling was to the effect that, among other things, the Registrar General shall restore to the voters' roll of any constituency:

- all voters who on or before 18 January 2002 were on that roll or were eligible but were refused to be on that roll, who may have lost or renounced their citizenship of Zimbabwe but who, since 1985, had been regarded by a written law to be permanently resident in Zimbabwe and that the Registrar General shall make adequate and reasonable administrative arrangements for all voters registered on the common roll who would not be in their constituencies on the polling days to exercise their right to vote.

Apart from lack of transparency in voter registration deadlines, and inspection, the legal wrangles which ensued during the pre-election period added to the confusion. A lot of voters were disenfranchised for lack of knowledge of updated information on the whole electoral process. Indeed, ZESN received a number of reports and complaints filed by potential voters who felt that they had been disenfranchised.

A summary of grievances showed, among other things, that:

- The electorate was generally ill-informed on who was eligible to vote, especially those who were affected by the amended Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act.
- Some young voters still dependent or living with their parents were turned away when they tried to register as voters because they did not have proof of residence.
- There was a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing and/or a clear lack of communication between the Registrar-General's office and the registration officers on the ground. For instance, the requirements for registration as voters were not applied consistently through the country, such as the production of proof of residence, which disenfranchised a whole spectrum of people. Furthermore, it provided an uneven playing field for potential voters because in some cases, registration without proof of residence was subject to the leniency of the registration officers.
- The Registrar-General was not clear on who was considered as a permanent resident since the amendment of the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act.
- The omission of names from the voter's roll, including the names of those who had voted in the 2000 parliamentary elections and those who had since registered.

The voter registration exercise was haphazard at best, with no clear set and systematic standards.

A large number of the electorate continued to register but they did not know if they would be placed on the roll and vote.

Human rights situation

Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives' and the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of governments, which 'shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by "universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures (*African Charter on Human and People's Rights*).

The prevailing human rights situation since the 2000 parliamentary elections and, more specifically, in the last three months before the presidential elections was not conducive to the realisation of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Although the freedoms of speech, expression, assembly and association are enshrined in the Constitution, the protection of these rights was not guaranteed by the State. It is vital for voters to obtain accurate and impartial information in order to decide whom to vote for. However, the importance of free media has not been very much respected in Zimbabwe, where the Government largely controls the print and electronic media.

The incumbent government attracted severe criticism from both international and domestic observers on the issues of illegal detentions, allegations of torture, extortion and abuse of detainees, deportation, 'disappearances', illegal seizures of white-owned land, restrictions on freedom of assembly, speech and association, attacks on the independent press and independent judiciary, harassment of opposition activists by members of the army, war veterans and youth acting with the acquiescence of the government.

The application of the rule of law remained extremely poor and deteriorated further following the President's refusal to comply with court orders regarding the government's fast-track land reform programme. A Clemency Order issued by the President on 6 October 2000 granted unconditional amnesty for violations committed in the turbulent run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary elections, including torture. This was an unofficial sanction of the political violence. Other areas of concern included the following:

- The erosion of the independence of the judiciary over the last two years and the tendency to disregard court decisions that are not favourable to government.
- The apparent selective application of the law by the police, mostly in favour of the ruling party.
- The breakdown of the rule of law.



Voter education

Voter education is one of the cornerstones of free and fair elections. It cannot be overemphasised that the process of voter education has to be non-partisan in order for it to adequately serve its purpose. Voter and civic education are essential parts of empowering the electorate to vote knowledgeably. The information that needs to be conveyed to the electorate includes the following:

- Amendments to electoral laws and procedures.
- How and where to register as a voter.
- How to make a complaint about the voter's roll.
- What an election is meant to do and who is standing for the elections.
- What each constituency boundaries are.
- Where to vote.
- How to vote.
- That one's vote is one's secret.

The government restricted voter education by NGOs unless they were selected by the ESC to do so under the General Laws Amendment Act. The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs said that the reason for this was that the situation had been discovered to be undesirable, considering the fact that most non-governmental organisations were allegedly partial, foreign-funded and loyal to their funders (*The Herald, 7 November 2001*).

It appears there was confusion surrounding the issue. For instance, media reports quoted the chairman of the Electoral Supervisory Commission as saying that non-governmental organisations could still continue with their voter education campaigns. Undoubtedly, the numerous changes to the electoral laws and subsequent court challenges made it difficult for ZESN to engage in a comprehensive voter education drive. Nevertheless, ZESN materials were initially examined and considered good by the ESC.

Although voter education and training of the trainers' workshops were held in several provinces, the tense political climate proved to be an impediment. In Mashonaland West, East and Central, for example, workshops to train observers and public meetings had to be cancelled, and instead moved to Harare. 'War veterans' queried what ZESN was doing and where ZESN was able to hold workshops, the local traditional leadership had to be consulted first.




Due to the tense political atmosphere, the emphasis of ZESN voter and civic education had to be moved from public meetings to decentralised information dissemination of materials, documents and flyers. Different organisations with localised structures such as the churches were also used to disseminate voter education material. Another limitation to public meetings for the purpose of carrying out voter education was that the Public Order and Security Act requires that the police are notified four days in advance of any public meetings.

Political violence

Zimbabwe's political environment was one in which the opposition was unable to undertake any meaningful campaign in the rural areas due to massive intimidation and physical violence. There were specific areas that were off limits to the opposition. It was not possible for the opposition to campaign in Mount Darwin North and South, Guruve and Shamva in Mashonaland Central Province, Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe in Mashonaland East Province, Mashonaland West Province and Midlands Province.

Cumulative totals of Political Violence from 1 January 2002 - 14 April 2002



Sources: HR Forum legal statements, CFU reports and newspaper reports, Amani Trust Medical Assessment.

The bulk of the violence was allegedly perpetrated by ZANU (PF) youth militia who maintained their terror campaign, relentlessly mounting attacks in the high density suburbs of Harare and Bulawayo and abducting people in other areas and torturing them in bases that they had established around the country.

Contrary to police reports stating that 14 persons had died as a result of political violence, the Human Rights NGO Forum recorded 48 reported murders.



Provincial reports of violence

The ZESN long-term monitors in all the provinces reported many incidents where campaigning for the opposition was impeded at every instance. One of the reports observed the following:

'The 2002 Presidential Election is tough that the ruling party is afraid of losing. Even the army officers are being diverted from their duties and being used as a campaign team.'

The number of known militia bases were located as follows in the Provinces: Mashonaland Central (40); Matebeleland (29); Mashonaland West (23); Masvingo (13); Bulawayo (13); Mashonaland East (9); Chitungwiza (9) and Harare (5). In Masvingo, the party militia was camped at vice-president Muzenda's Paradise Park Motel.

Below is a list of some of the incidents of violence around the country as reported by ZESN observers in the run up to the elections.

Harare Province - There were few reports of violence in the affluent suburbs but reports of political violence appeared to be confined to the high-density areas. Like in other parts of the country, people were forced to buy ZANU (PF) party cards at exorbitant prices and were also forced to attend ZANU PF rallies. The usual threats of a return to war in the event of ZANU (PF) losing the election were prevalent. In Mbare, ZANU (PF) youths attacked the house of MDC ward chairperson Mrs Saidi and destroyed property. As with other similar cases, no arrests were made. At Siyaso in Mbare, Ally Manyengwa was attacked by a number of people in a Nissan Truck. On 6 February 2002, ZANU (PF) youths and MDC youths clashed at Stodart Hall in Mbare. There were running battles all over Mbare, resulting in 16 houses being attacked and four houses petrol bombed. In fact, clashes between ZANU (PF) and MDC youths were prevalent in the Mbare area. Two ZESN voter educators were beaten in Cranborne near the military camp and a docket was filed at Braeside Police station.

Manicaland Province - Considerable levels of political intolerance, violence and intimidation were experienced. The Makoni constituency emerged as one of the most politically volatile areas in the province and Makoni Member of Parliament, Didymus Mutasa, was specifically implicated in many monitors' reports for being responsible for the upsurge of violence in Makoni District. He was accused of operating above the law with his militia. He allegedly said many inflammatory and inciting statements one of them being 'if you want war, then vote the MDC'.

Mashonaland East Province - The situation in Mashonaland East was tense and generally not conducive for campaigning especially for the opposition. Only ZANU (PF) could carry out its campaign activities while supporters of the opposition were beaten. Even failure to attend ZANU PF political meetings attracted reprisals.

On 20 February 2002, people in Dombotombo high-density suburb were forced to attend a ZANU (PF) rally. Independent newspapers perceived to be in support of the opposition, such as *The Daily News*, were banned in several parts of Mashonaland East. In Marondera, the newspaper could hardly be found on the streets, as newspaper vendors found with the newspaper were harassed. People seen around the streets with copies of independent newspapers were thoroughly beaten. This robbed the populace of Marondera of an alternative view of the events unfolding in Zimbabwe.

ZANU (PF) supporters in the province repeatedly labelled teachers and headmasters MDC sympathisers. A number of teachers were forced to leave rural areas for urban areas. A case in point is that of a headmaster at Chakadini Secondary School who was beaten by ZANU (PF) supporters for allegedly being an MDC sympathiser. He subsequently went on leave.

Masvingo Province - Violence and intimidation were rampant in most areas of the province. Suspected ZANU (PF) youths mounted illegal roadblocks throughout the province and requested travellers to produce ZANU (PF) party cards. Failure to do so resulted in reprisals. Villagers were forced to attend party meetings at night while suspected opposition officials were assaulted. There were reports of liberation war veterans going about recruiting youths for national service at the Border Gezi Training Centre.

On graduation, the youth allegedly embarked on terror campaigns against supporters of the opposition. Voters were also lured to support ZANU (PF) party through various other strategies, such as the donation of fertiliser to villages and the launching of a number of projects ahead of the election, which amounted to vote buying. The ruling party also tasked chiefs and headman with the responsibility of ensuring that their people attended ZANU PF rallies, whereas, traditionally they are supposed to be non-partisan.

Midlands Province - There was widespread intimidation and assault of people perceived to be opposition supporters by ZANU (PF) youths and war veterans. People were forced to buy ZANU (PF) membership cards, usually at exorbitant prices. In Kwekwe, ZANU (PF) cards were being sold for as much as \$200 while in Mkoba people were being forced to buy cards for as much as \$150, the cards normally cost \$80. Failure to buy ZANU (PF) cards was construed as support for the opposition. Fourteen ZESN observers from Gokwe were detained for the whole night and their IDs confiscated by ZANU (PF) youths in Gweru whilst on their way to an observers' training workshop.

Campaign Period

It was one of the bloodiest electioneering periods Zimbabwe has experienced since 1980 and was more violent than the 2000 general elections. It was a period fraught with political violence, intimidation, assaults, deaths, abductions and torture, rape and sexual harassment, gross violations of civic and political rights fear, confusion and uncertainty.



In the background to all this electioneering, critical food shortages of basic commodities hit Zimbabwe, coupled with a devastating drought that worsened the national crisis.

The long-term monitors reported the following disturbing patterns that occurred in the provinces during the campaign period:

- Freedoms of speech, movement and association particularly for the opposition supporters were severely curtailed. In many areas, the ruling party had the freedom to assemble, campaign and put on party T-shirts. In the provinces, the ZANU (PF) party cards were the passport for travelling, government aid, and required when shopping for maize grain or mealie meal.
- Many voters in the provinces ran the risk of being disenfranchised because they had to seek refuge elsewhere.
- The threat of war featured strongly as a ZANU (PF) campaign strategy.
- Only the state-owned newspapers, which reported in favour of the ruling party, were allowed unlimited circulation in the provinces, while independent newspapers were barred.
- ZANU (PF) supporters, war veterans, uniformed forces and youths from the Border Gezi National Youth Service embarked on a door-to-door movement to coerce people to buy ZANU (PF) cards.
- People were forced to attend ZANU (PF) meetings during the evenings.

Partiality of security forces


In a veiled reference to opposition candidates on 9 January, 2002, the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces together with the Commander of the Army, the Commander of the Air Force, the Commissioner of Police, the Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation and the Commissioner of Prisons stated that they would not accept a political leader, even if democratically elected, who did not have a history of participating in the liberation struggle. The threat was strongly condemned by civic society, and it had a negative impact on the elections as it induced fear in the electorate and violated the whole principle of one's right to vote freely.

The police ignored court orders to enforce the law and applied the law selectively - they harassed members of the opposition, civil society and minorities. Instead of carrying out their constitutional duty of protecting citizens, they committed gross human rights violations against the populace and did not provide protection to many victims of political violence. Some of the police officers were accused of participating in the looting and invasion of the commercial farms (*The Daily News*, 2 April 2002).

Misuse of Government resources for campaigning purposes

As in the previous elections, the ruling party used government resources including vehicles, air force helicopters, civil servants, public media, government offices and funds for campaign purposes.

The Presidential Election Campaign television coverage of Candidates



Source: *Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)*

Media in the pre-election period

It is widely accepted that a free, fair, democratic and transparent electoral process allows for the freedom of speech for the candidates, the media and others. Equal access to the public controlled media is a necessity that must be granted to enable the electorate to make informed and unbiased choices.

After the elections, dates were announced, ZBC gazetted that it would officially open its airwaves for use by campaigning parties equally. However, statistics provided by the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) are to the contrary.

The independent print media was subjected to public accusations and labelling as opposition supporters faced threats including, arrests, harassment, intimidation and bombings of printing press premises and offices of *The Daily News*. The ZANU (PF) supporters also stopped circulation of *The Daily News* in numerous rural areas of Zimbabwe and urban areas in Mashonaland East, West and Central Provinces. Street vendors selling any independent papers were harassed and intimidated.

Given that in an ideal election, the public media plays a critical role in facilitating communication between the contesting candidates and the electorate, the human rights abuses highlighted above had grave implications on the freeness and fairness of the elections.

What occurred in the Zimbabwean pre-election context is best summarised by the SADC parliamentary forum's statement that states that,
in the majority of SADC countries, the state owned media is controlled by Government. This often causes imbalance in the playing field between the stakeholders mainly the ruling party and opposition parties. It contributes to lack of transparency through selective reporting.

Virtually no access was given to the opposition parties in the state media and public media was turned into an instrument of political propaganda in a campaign characterised by highly misleading reports to vilify the opposition and glorify the ruling party.

The Role of Zimbabwe civil society

Civil society is the totality of social institutions and associations (both formal and informal) that are not strictly production-related outside governmental structures. Once capacity of civil society is strengthened, this changes the balance of power in society. A dense civil society is important for democracy because it establishes a counterweight to state power. This was demonstrated in Zimbabwe (mainly in 1997 to 2000), when an organised and empowered civil society emerged to challenge the ruling class under the constitutional reform process. It was through the demand for constitutional reform that Zimbabweans clearly began to show their discontent with the ruling party when they rejected the government's draft constitution. Civil society went further to organise together and participated in the 2000 general election by providing voter education and election monitoring.

In 2002, legislation was promulgated to change civil society's role not only in voter education but also in election monitoring.

Although the voter education programme was implemented, the tense political climate proved to be an impediment. In all Mashonaland Provinces, for example, workshops to train observers and public meetings had to be cancelled and instead moved to Harare. Where ZESN managed to hold workshops, local traditional leadership, had to be consulted first. As stated earlier, different organisations with localised structures were used to disseminate voter education material. It has also been already noted that another limitation was, of course, the notorious POSA which requires that the police are notified in advance of any public meetings. On numerous occasions, the police sent letters to ZESN secretariat requesting it not to hold some of its public meetings.

However, in spite of all these impediments, the ZESN membership resolved to continue with its voter education as the regulations were, in any case, unconstitutional.

Monitors, domestic and international observers

The issue of election monitors and observers proved to be controversial. There was lack of transparency on the part of the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the ESC on their selection criteria of local monitors and observers.



ZESN observers were not accredited until about two days before the elections and, worse still, they only accredited about 420 out of the 12 500 names that ZESN had submitted to them. This made the deployment of observers difficult. Some international observers were excluded from the invitation list despite having previously observed local elections in the past. Those from the EU pulled out in protest.

The government had earlier fast-tracked a General Laws Amendment Act, which among other regulations, amended the Electoral Act to stipulate that the ESC, which is responsible for administering the election, shall appoint, accredit and deploy at each polling station members of the Public Service to act as monitors. This raised doubts as to the impartiality of the whole process, as civil servants were now monitoring themselves. Civic organisations were to be invited to the elections as observers.

The Government did apply provisions of this law and published names of 70 organisations in the local papers inviting names of observers for the 2002 election. ZESN sent over 12 500 names from its member organisations to the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs as advertised for in the invitations.

Ninety-six (96) hours before the elections, the fate of the local monitors who had already received extensive training was still unknown. Two days before the elections, government contacted those organisations that had applied to be registered as domestic observers. About 420 people were accredited from the submitted list of 12 500 names from ZESN. On average, three people were accredited from each organisation. Other organisations perceived to be anti-ZANU(PF) were denied accreditation and ZANU (PF) aligned groups received large numbers of accredited observers, the majority of whom had never observed any election before nor had they received training in election observation. The government handpicked names of the local observers and any persons perceived to be sympathetic to MDC did not receive accreditation.

This action by the government received condemnation and ZESN decided to carry out a parallel observation process. In accordance with its deployment plan, local observers were deployed country wide to observe the elections 100 metres away from the polling stations and assess as much as they could during the polling days. The government also invited individual countries and international and regional organisations as observers but some European countries and the United States of America organisations were excluded from their invitations as government viewed them to be sympathetic to opposition parties. Of particular note was the expulsion from Zimbabwe of Pierre Schori who came as head of the EU delegation observer team. His expulsion resulted in the rest of the EU countries pulling their observers out.

It is interesting to note that warmly received and invited observers had no prior experience of sending observer missions and were mostly from countries with histories of undemocratic and fraudulent elections.

This did not present a good picture of the government as it behaved like it had something to hide. Election observers and monitors do not influence the outcome of an election but only enhance transparency. They also help build confidence within the electorate in the voting process.



Gender and the 2002 elections

Political space has shrunk considerably for women in Zimbabwe. In the 2000 elections, only 13 women won parliamentary seats (compared to 22 seats in 1995).

As we approached March 2002 polls, it was clear that the elections had no space for women and women's interests albeit, women being the majority voters. Women had to overcome many barriers so they could enjoy the equal and universal suffrage.

International and regional instruments

Zimbabwe has ratified or acceded to the following international human rights conventions relevant to the consideration of gender in relation to free and fair elections:

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
- Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
- The Government of Zimbabwe is, by acceding to the CEDAW, bound to guarantee equal participation of women in the political and public life of Zimbabwe and, in particular, shall ensure that women are on equal terms with men as far as this right is concerned.

Zimbabwe, like all countries that have acceded to CEDAW, has been scrutinised by a UN Committee and this committee has stated that the negative attitude towards women and discriminating customary laws and practices continue to contribute to the slow pace in advancing the status of women in politics.

At regional level, Zimbabwe has ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and Zimbabwe is also a party to the Declaration on Gender Equality signed by all SADC heads of state. In these conventions, Zimbabwe has committed to placing gender firmly on the political agenda and ensuring the equal representation of women and men in the decision making structures.

The situation at national level

At the national level, Section 23 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe allows discrimination on any grounds in the areas of family law, marriage, divorce, inheritance and customary law. Although the government has ratified CEDAW, it has not yet been domesticated into Zimbabwean laws.

Against this background, the following characterised the electoral process in Zimbabwe.

Voters' roll - In February, the Registrar-General was given new powers under amendments to S34 of the Electoral Act to alter the voters' roll at any time without directly informing the voters concerned of his intention and giving them the right of protest and/ or appeal. Its powers were extended to correcting any error or omission or to any change on the original name or address of the voter. The Registrar-General did indeed exercise his powers and altered married women's surnames to their husbands' without notifying them or seeking their consent, potentially disenfranchising women who were still using their maiden names on their identity documents.

Proof of residency requirement - The proof of residency demanded by the amendment to the Electoral Act disenfranchised many impoverished homeless Zimbabweans. The majority of women in Zimbabwe are in unregistered marital unions and therefore could not provide proof of residency in their own names.

In addition:

- Many are lodgers with no lease agreement and they were again discriminated against, as they could not provide the proof required.
- Many women are economically dependent on their husbands, partners or parents and they were turned away from the voter registration because they were unable to produce proof of residency, as they had no accounts in their names, telephone bills and/or rate bills.
- In the rural areas, confirmation of residence status was left to the village head who is a patriarchal head and had sole discretion to refuse the registration of women if he so wished, especially if the woman or woman's husband was seen as supporting an opposition political party.
- The evicted farm workers, the bulk of whom are women were of no fixed abode and therefore could not meet the proof of residency requirement.
- The proof of residency requirement, coupled with deprivation of the postal vote, affected thousands of women living outside Zimbabwe for economic survival.

Amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act - The effect of the amendment affected many women of foreign origin married to Zimbabwean men and those of migrant parenthood from neighbouring countries such as Malawi and Mozambique who were asked to renounce foreign citizenship of these countries in order for them to be eligible voters. Many were unable to do this because they had to pay money to the embassies for their papers to be handled. Others did not have the requisite documents as descendants of migrant workers, with no documents. The information of the amendments was never disseminated to the rural populace and this meant that many of the women would only find out that they could not vote at the polling station on polling day.



Electoral law and the Constitution - No particular attention has ever been given to engendering the electoral laws of Zimbabwe, especially since the Constitution allows discrimination under customary and family law. With the patriarchal system, a woman in Zimbabwean can be told how to vote by a male relation in their family.

Voter education - The voter education provided by the ESC paid no attention to the issues of women. Though in the past civic society tried to engender the voter education, this too is still inadequate.

Political violence - The electoral process was characterised by politically motivated violence and intimidation. The publicised reports concentrated on the men as perpetrators and women as victims. However those producing the reports are still to do a gendered analysis (in terms of statistics of women affected, geographical distribution and age).

Reports of sexual torture were given, and between 1-16 February 2002, the Human Rights NGO forum reported that three women were raped. These are the reported cases and with the nighttime 're-education' sessions and youth militia camps in the rural areas, the unreported cases obviously exceed the three and this is critical in view of the reality of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Internal displacements - Many women fled their homes as the violence escalated in the pre-election period and they are currently housed in shelters around the country. The effect of this is that they could not go back home and vote. The brave women who remained in their homes after their husbands had fled continued to be intimidated and harassed and are vulnerable to sexual torture and rape.

Political parties and women's issues - The two main political parties managed to make the issue of women's rights a non-political/campaign issue. Each political party made mention of women's rights in their manifestos but this was never alluded to during the campaigning period.

Poverty and other gender issues

The majority of the poor in Zimbabwe (especially those living in rural areas) are women. Their lot in life meant they were manipulated and intimidated into voting through the dissemination of wrong information, i.e. that their vote was not secret, voting for the opposition would lead to war, etc. They were manipulated into buying the ruling party cards via threats of their not receiving food aid, agricultural seeds and implements and via threats against the safety of their family and property.

Election officials - The election organs in Zimbabwe are male-dominated and headed by men. Women were a third of the number of officials running the election. Only one ESC member is a woman. As in 2000 elections, ZESN created space for women to monitor the elections. However, due to legislative amendments, ZESN overwhelmingly put its energy into lobbying for change in the laws but, unfortunately, did not put into place mechanisms for producing a gendered questionnaire and a gender checklist.



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The polling process - The location of polling stations at business centres was not conducive for women. However, some attention was paid to pregnant and old women. Extension of voting hours in Harare and Chitungwiza did not benefit some women as they left the line for household chores.

Candidates - Despite the fact that women are the majority of voters comprising 52% of the population, there was no female presidential candidate. In the 2002 elections, no woman contested as a presidential candidate. Following the 2000 Parliamentary elections, the number of elected women Members of Parliament fell from 22 to 13.

There is need to mainstream gender into the electoral organs and processes. It is also necessary to investigate cases of women abuse and bring the perpetrators to justice. Women should lobby for a gender checklist and mainstreaming of gender sensitive electoral process in Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER 5

The Media

On 25 March 2001, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (at its Plenary Assembly in Windhoek, Namibia) adopted a number of recommendations designed to strengthen the integrity and transparency of the democratic electoral practice in the region. The document containing these recommendations, Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region includes a number of provisions relating to Press freedom and access to the public media.

Principally, the Forum calls on governments to

‘...take the emergence of private media as a healthy development in the institutionalisation of the democratic process and the conduct of elections, and should therefore refrain from taking decisions and actions that thwart a strong private media.’

It also declared that: ‘Opposition parties should be given equal opportunity and agreed-upon time and space on the state owned media to put their announcements, broadcasts and advertisements.’

However, instead of implementing these clauses, the Zimbabwean authorities have passed laws and taken actions that demonstrably inhibit the practice of these recommendations.

Despite the efforts of civic society to encourage the ESC to adopt and enforce an ‘equitable code of practice’ for the media during elections, the institution has not implemented the recommendations from civic organisations and observer missions submitted to the ESC during the parliamentary election campaign in the year 2000. The government too, has failed to reform the Electoral Act in a way that would entrench the recommendations of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and the Act notoriously remains silent about media conduct during an election.

Ironically, the only piece of legislation that appears to provide some equity to competing political parties appears in the controversial Broadcasting Services Act, which requires all broadcasters to give ‘reasonably equal coverage’ to all parties contesting in an election.

However, the findings of the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) demonstrate that the service provided by the national public broadcasting authority, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) during the campaign period flagrantly ignored this condition.

In addition, the multitude of laws introduced by government before and during the election campaign period included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which among its other repressive provisions, contains a ban on any critical media coverage of the security forces and particularly of the incumbent president, who was, of course, a candidate in this presidential election.



These vague and sweeping powers, together with the harsh penalties for violating them, added to an already hostile and intimidating media climate in the election period.

Despite several last-minute amendments to the Electoral Act, none of these dealt with regulations governing the activities of journalists, compounding existing confusion over media workers' plans for covering the election without falling foul of the law.

Clarity over the rules governing journalists' access to polling stations, other electoral centres and to voters, was only provided by the Registrar - General, Tobaiwa Mudede, as polling stations opened on 9 March 2002. These included the requirement that presiding officers should allow journalists to enter polling stations. However, the regulations also included restrictions preventing journalists from photographing voters casting their ballots or seeking exit poll samples, as well as asking how potential voters intended to vote.

Abuse of state media

The findings of the Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ) reveal that the ZBC grossly abused its public mandate to provide equitable coverage of contesting political candidates in a national election.

ZBC television carried a total of 407 election campaign stories in its news bulletins monitored between 1 December 2001 and 8 March 2002, the day before the polls opened. Of these, 345 (85%) favoured ZANU(PF)'s presidential candidate. Only 38 (or 9%) covered MDC activities, but virtually all of them were used to discredit the opposition party and its candidate. The 24 (6%) other reports gave publicity to the three other candidates contesting the election, none of which held a rally.

Preliminary findings reveal radio followed the same pattern

Radio Zimbabwe, ZBC's most popular station carried a total of 275 campaign-related stories in the news bulletins monitored. A total of 237 of them (86%) were promotional stories in favour of ZANU PF, while 20 (7.3%) were all negative stories about the opposition MDC. The other 18 stories were for two of the other three presidential hopefuls.

Statistics for Radio 3FM reflected almost exactly the same percentage coverage of the two main presidential candidates. Notably, both stations ignored the independent candidate, Wilson Kumbula.

However, the most damning statistics to emerge from MMPZ's work was the fact that out of 14 hours and 41 minutes and 30 seconds in total of ZBC television news bulletins devoted to the presidential election campaign, ZANU (PF)'s candidate was granted a total of 13 hours and 50 minutes and 30 seconds, a little more than 94%.



This compared to the national broadcaster's television coverage of the opposition MDC and its candidate, of just 31 minutes and 30 seconds, a paltry 4%. But even this was subverted by ZBC, which used the time to attack, denigrate and discredit the MDC. All other contesting presidential candidates were granted a total of 19 minutes and 30 seconds, or about 2% of the total news airtime devoted to presidential campaign coverage.

Never before in the life of the Media Monitoring Project has ZBC television's coverage been so grossly biased.

Political advertising

Although there was no orthodox political advertising promoting the presidential candidates on ZBC throughout the campaign, ZBC television filled the continuity breaks between its main evening news bulletins and throughout its programming with images and music promoting land reforms and peasant farming that supported ZANU (PF)'s main campaign policy. This footage, dubbed 'Reflections', constituted subliminal political advertising in favour of ZANU (PF) candidate and, together with images from the Minister of Information's musical video, *Hondo yeMinda* (War for the Land), dominated the continuity sections of prime time television viewing.

The airing of these images constituted a crude and reprehensible attempt by the broadcasting corporation's authorities to indoctrinate television audiences with (ZANU PF) propaganda. ZBC television also flighted hours of one-sided prime-time current affairs programmes promoting government's land reforms and repeats of 'liberation' documentaries aimed at reinforcing the ruling party's claim that Zimbabwe's sovereignty was still under threat.

ZBC coverage of political violence

ZBC grossly distorted the intensity and extent of the nation-wide campaign of politically motivated violence and intimidation visited upon Zimbabwe's population. Official police statistics stated that 14 deaths due to political violence had occurred between 1 January 2002 and 3 March 2002. The Human Rights NGO Forum reported 31 killings up to 28 February 2002. However, ZBC television only reported six deaths, five of them allegedly ruling party supporters. Radio 3FM aired four reports of politically motivated killings. All victims were reported to be ZANU (PF) supporters.

Radio Zimbabwe carried five reports. Two of the victims were reported to be ZANU (PF) and the political affiliation of the other three was not stated. Although the police were reported on television as saying there had been at least 250 cases of politically-motivated violence in the first 25 days of February alone, ZTV reported just 25 (or 10%) of them. Radio 3FM reported 32 (13%) and Radio Zimbabwe, which enjoys by far the biggest national audience of all stations, reported 15 incidents, representing just 6% of the official police figures.



By any standard, such an appalling disparity suggests that ZBC deliberately suppressed the truth about the nature and extent of politically motivated violence in this election campaign period. Indeed, the emphasis in virtually all its reports on political violence focused on blaming the opposition for conducting a nation-wide 'terror campaign', a claim that directly contradicted the documented findings of the Human Rights NGO Forum and of the reports in the privately owned press. In addition, much of the evidence for ZBC's claims relied on unsubstantiated sources or on the police statements, which were themselves subject to suspicion.

Unequal coverage of candidates

This flagrant and undisguised bias in favour of the ruling party on all ZBC stations deprived Zimbabweans of their fundamental rights to be accurately informed and of the opportunity to make informed decisions. Such extreme levels of distortion in the coverage of this election campaign again demonstrate that the national public broadcasting corporation clearly became a propaganda tool of the ruling party.

As a result, there is a clear need for the authorities to put an immediate end to ZBC's anti-constitutional, unethical and discriminatory broadcasting activities, to enact legislation that will remove the corporation's oppressive *de facto* monopoly over the electronic media and place it under the full control of a truly independent broadcasting regulatory authority free from the tyrannical control of the Zimbabwe government.

Campaign coverage

Press coverage of the election campaign and of the polling days remained polarised with the privately owned press criticising changes to all manner of legislation, thus undermining Zimbabweans' fundamental constitutional rights, including the electoral process, the disenfranchisement of thousands of potential voters and the total lack of transparency in the mechanics and conduct of the election process itself.

These gave rise to stories predicting the possibility of electoral fraud. In addition, the private press reported government harassment of the MDC's leadership and the increasingly intense, systematic nation-wide intimidation of the population by alleged supporters of the ruling party. Not surprisingly, the privately owned press connected these elements and interpreted them rationally as a concerted effort by government to ensure the re-election of the ruling party's candidate.

The public press, on the other hand, represented by the Zimpapers' stable of newspapers, covered the introduction of repressive legislation without question, relying on official government announcements and additional government voices (particularly those of the Ministers of Information and of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs) to defend them.

These papers also persistently reported official allegations of a variety of 'conspiracies' against government, allegedly perpetrated by the opposition, without providing evidence to support them. These were then used to reinforce entirely propagandist articles echoing entirely unsupported allegations by the ruling party and its candidate that the opposition MDC was a puppet of white racists and Western neo-colonial imperialist interests, most particularly Britain, who were using the party to overthrow the 'authentic' government. The state press, led by its flagship publication, *The Herald*, provided unfettered coverage of the ZANU (PF) election campaign, which often invoked inflammatory, racist and violent language in the party's efforts to discredit the MDC and convince the electorate of the authenticity of its allegations.

Press coverage of Political Violence

This extended to the public press' coverage of politically motivated violence, which, more than once, 'convicted' MDC officials and supporters of being responsible for politically motivated murders before any conviction had been secured in a court of law. A prime example of this was the murder in Bulawayo of the war veteran Cain Nkala, whose killers have still not been convicted. The extensive publicity given to this incident by the state media together with the assistance of damning police statements enabled government officials, including the President, to describe the MDC as a 'terrorist' organisation bent on the violent overthrow of the government. Henceforth it became easy for the state media to ascribe any political violence to the MDC's 'terror campaign' without bothering to substantiate the claim itself. It therefore became impossible to separate fact from fiction in the state media's coverage of violence.

While it is true that coverage of politically motivated violence in the privately owned press was heavily biased in that they reported a far higher number of incidents in which MDC supporters, activists and ordinary civilians were victims, the reports were usually better sourced than the state media, quoting eye-witnesses, victims, and even police confirmation on occasion, despite the public declaration by senior officers that they would refuse to cooperate with the privately owned newspapers:

Even so, none of the media provided a true picture of the extent of the violence, according to official police figures mentioned earlier in this report, although the commercial press provided a more accurate reflection of the number of incidents recorded. MMPZ's findings reveal that the private and public print media reported the loss of 22 lives to politically motivated violence between 1 January 2002 and 3 March 2002. This compares to 31 reported by the Human Rights Forum up to the end of February 2002.

The public press recorded seven deaths. Five were alleged to be ZANU (PF) supporters, while one was said to be a member of the MDC, and the other was unattributed. The private press recorded 16 deaths. Fifteen were alleged to be MDC supporters and one was said to be a ZANU (PF) supporter.



Only one death of an alleged ZANU (PF) supporter in Budiro was reported in both Zimpapers and the private press.

A total of 156 incidents of political violence were recorded in the first 25 days of February 2002 in all sections of the print media. The public press carried 51 incidents of political violence. MDC was blamed in 47 incidents and four were not attributed. The private press carried 106 incidents in which ZANU (PF) was blamed 91 times, 14 were blamed on war veterans, the CIO, the army and the National Youths Service, and one on MDC supporters.

Both sections of the print media reported one incident of political violence in which MDC legislators were arrested. The private press reported that they were arrested for trying to hold a campaign rally, while the public media reported that the legislators were arrested for carrying weapons. Print monitors were unable to establish whether any other incidents of violence were duplicated in the public and private print media. This was due to the fact that the public press relied more heavily on police statements providing insufficient evidence to be able to compare incidents in the privately owned press, whose reports tended to rely more on the evidence of eyewitnesses and the victims themselves. While the police have been used as sources in the privately owned press, they have rarely been used as the primary source, presumably because senior police officers have publicly stated that they will not co-operate with the private press.

In any case, duplication would bring the figure for the number of incidents of politically motivated violence reported in all the local mainstream print media even lower than the 156 cases reported. It can be demonstrated therefore, that all sections of the press seriously under-reported the occurrence of politically motivated violence when compared with Police Commissioner, Chihuri's official statement that there were 250 cases of political violence in the first 25 days of February.

While the privately owned press can be said to have provided a more accurate picture of the situation on the ground (according to police statistics), they only managed to cover 42% of the number of incidents recorded by the police. However, in the case of the public press (*chiefly The Herald and The Sunday Mail*), which enjoy unfettered access to police information, it is apparent that they have utterly failed in their duty to provide their readers with a remotely accurate figure of the violence occurring in the country, reporting barely one-fifth (20%) of the number of incidences reported to the police.

This failure by the state-owned media to fulfil their public mandate by providing their audiences with a truthful and accurate reflection of the real situation regarding the occurrence of political violence in Zimbabwe is cause for concern. Considering that the state media have unrestricted access to government authorities, including the police, this extreme distortion of the truth reinforces the impression that the public media are deliberately suppressing the true nature of the intensity and extent of the role political violence has played in this presidential election campaign.



Freedom of the press

Reports in the private press and from human rights groups also clearly suggest a systematic assault on the public's right to information.

During the election campaign, and even before it formally started, ZANU (PF) officials and supporters assaulted and terrorised delivery van drivers, vendors and readers of privately owned newspapers in several areas around the country, thus effectively establishing "no go areas" for the private press. The police have appeared inactive in putting an end to this reprehensible practice, which appears to have been most effective in the three Mashonaland provinces and in some parts of the Midlands.

A number of stories have been published of vendors and readers alike being assaulted for being in possession of a privately owned newspaper. To date, even the security forces, including the police, are reported to be heavily discouraged from reading privately owned newspapers.

The worst incident of an assault of this nature occurred in Mashonaland Central on 5 February 2002, when a Mount Darwin schoolteacher, Shepherd Ngundu, was accused of being an MDC supporter because he was found in possession of a copy of *The Daily News* and was subsequently beaten to death with chains and bars.

According to the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA, Zimbabwe Chapter) many journalists were unable to access polling stations in the rural and peri-urban areas, despite the proclamation by the Registrar-General's office. Journalists from the *Voice of the People* short wave radio station were denied accreditation. The question of journalists' access to polling stations was left to the discretion of police officers to determine. This resulted in many journalists being unnecessarily threatened and refused access.

The simple process of interviewing the electorate was made impossible by police officers that accused journalists of causing mayhem and confusion at polling stations. The Presiding Officers in most polling stations 'gave' the police free rein in dealing with journalists. In addition, restrictive and arbitrary accreditation practices imposed by the authorities prevented many local and foreign journalists from being officially accredited, including local Zimbabwean journalists working for the short wave radio station, *Voice of the People*. (Produced by MMPZ)

Polling days - how the voting process unfolded

Please note: The quantity and quality of data gathered fall short of what was expected due to the last minute decision by the government of Zimbabwe to deny accreditation (and thus entry into the polling and counting centres) to more than 12000 trained ZESN observers. Those who eventually documented their observations mostly did so from a 100-metre distance from the polling station and at a very high risk to their personal safety. Several observers ended up being harassed, arrested, beaten up or tortured and thus some report forms never made it to the data entry room.

In spite of the above, summary reports were generated from the data entered to give a picture of the voting and counting process countrywide. Below is a brief narrative summary of the findings.

Location and accessibility of polling stations

Polling began on, 9 March, 2002, with nearly all polling stations generally opening at the stipulated time of 7:00 am. However, some designated polling stations failed to open in time. Cherutombo Primary School in Marondera opened after an unjustified three-hour delay despite the fact that potential voters had formed a queue. There are a number of polling stations that totally failed to open but reasons for which have not been proffered to date. Such polling stations were Allan Wilson Boys High School in Harare, Tsiga School in Mutoko, Mutare Boys' High School, Mary Mount Teachers' College and Meikles Park in Mutare Central constituency. In some rural constituencies, undesignated polling stations were found to be operational. Examples of these are Muponda in Mutasa constituency and Mutambara Primary School in Chimanimani.

In rural constituencies, the general indication was that polling stations were easily accessible to people intending to vote. This was due to the fact that for the presidential election, unlike in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the government decided to reduce the number of polling stations in urban areas and made a substantial increase of polling stations and mobile polling stations in rural areas (*see Annexure 11 - Statistical Analysis of Polling Stations*). This resulted in a conspicuous under-utilisation of voting facilities in instances of low voter turnout in such areas, e.g. at Hombwe School in Mashonaland West in Chinhoyi only 271 people had cast their votes by 4. 45 pm on the first day of polling.

In rural constituencies, long queues were not a common sight as was the case with urban centres where the deliberate reduction of the number of polling stations by the government was deemed to be a ploy calculated to disenfranchise urban voters, who are generally believed to be sympathetic to the opposition political parties.

In urban areas, especially in Harare, Chitungwiza and Bulawayo where voter turnout was as high as in all constituencies, voting queues stretched for a kilometre or more on the first day of polling.



This engendered disillusionment in the potential voters resulting in some deciding not to vote after all. At Glen-View Primary School in Harare, queues formed at 4.00 am and polling began at 7:00 am and continued until 19:00 p.m. In some instances where facilities were supposed to be for tripartite elections, potential voters were baffled at seeing only facilities for presidential polls, e.g at Churu Farm Ward 1 for instance.

However, some segments of the electorate could not be deterred from their intention to cast the ballot and they braved long hours in the queues, some of which threatened to be unruly. At one polling station in Harare, the presence of riot police was sought after the atmosphere had become potentially menacing. The long queues and the fact that a big percentage of people had not been able to cast their ballots by the end of the two days necessitated an extension of the number of voting days by one day, which the Registrar-General selectively interpreted to apply to Harare and Chitungwiza only.

After a successful application by the MDC to the High Court, the government granted an extension of polling by one day. Despite the High Court order, polling stations did not re-open on time due to bureaucratic snags that demanded that polling officers wait for an order from their various agencies to open the polling stations. The polling stations that had already opened in compliance with the order closed in the early hours of the morning, presumably in anticipation of an instruction to re-open. Polling resumed afterwards around 11:00.am after potential voters had already formed queues. At exactly 1900 hrs (7pm), the polling stations closed despite the fact that there were still people waiting their turn to vote in long queues. Thus, the extension to the third day was irrelevant and ineffective.

The electorate generally received the location of polling stations at clinics, schools, shopping centres and social clubs well. However, there are isolated reports which indicate that locations of some polling stations in places such as police stations worked to the psychological disadvantage of voters, e.g. at Waverley Police Station, reports were to the effect that voters did not cast their ballot in a relaxed environment due to the heavy police presence. At Chirozva School, which was a polling station, there was a base for ZANU (PF) youths that unleashed terror and gross harassment to the voters and displayed the utmost disregard for electoral laws.

Local observers

The fact that most of the observers posted to various polling stations were not allowed access into the polling stations played a disastrous blow on the reporting system that the observation programme was mainly designed to cater for. The hostility shown to the ZESN observers was so blatant that some were even barred from the 100-metre radius that they are legally allowed to observe from. The majority of observers, especially in politically volatile provinces like Mashonaland Central, East and Mashonaland West at St Anne's Goto and Hwedza Centre, ended up observing from a 200-metre radius (*see Annexure 13 on Incidents against ZESN observers*).

an arrogant refusal to recognise the said observers as a legitimate and important component of the electoral process cut across the whole spectre of observation be it parallel or otherwise. As such, in most instances accredited observers received the same intolerant and fierce opposition from the polling officials. In Makoni East, at Denza Primary school the police confiscated observation forms from the observers. The reasons afforded for ostracising the observers was because they belonged to the opposition. In Mashonaland West, one observer took refuge in a mountain after the police officers at the polling station branded him an MDC activist and persecuted him. In Mutare, there were widespread arrests of the observers - whose charges and offences have not been made clear to date. Some observers were detained for a period amounting to 72 hours without the offences, which they were purported to have committed being disclosed to them. Some were later charged with contravention of the Public Order and Security Act, a draconian act of law fast tracked in Parliament just before elections to facilitate for arrests of dissenting voices and sectors of society during election time.

Due to the reasons mentioned so far, most observers could not adequately execute their functions, which was only possible had they been allowed to be inside the polling stations. The detail provided by the few observers afforded the opportunity to be inside the polling stations is mostly scant. Vital information which is very crucial for purposes of ensuring a free and fair election such as whether ballot boxes were empty before polling started, whether ballot papers were adequate and up to the required standard, whether ballot boxes were sealed at the closing of polling each day and reopened in good order was mostly not available.

Polling atmosphere and irregularities

A total of 564 reports were received from the 10 provinces highlighting incidents occurring on election day. Cases of bribery and voter impersonation did not feature prominently as they comprised about 2% of reported incidents around the country. However, reports also showed that large numbers of voters were turned away from voting especially in Harare (11%). There were reports of unregistered youths casting votes in some areas and reports of inadequate voting materials was received from Gokwe.

There were also reports of temporary closures of polling stations but with no reasonable explanation given, e.g. Mt Pleasant District office in Harare North on Day one of polling. It is interesting to note on the results that Harare North, a largely low population density area had more votes cast than in the high-density areas of Mabvuku, Zengeza and Mufakose. Questions arise as to what was taking place during the temporary closure. At Mutare Junior School, an extra copy of the voters' roll was with the presiding officer in a separate room (and he was seen receiving telephone calls and some eligible voters into the room).



Processing of voters

In most constituencies, reports indicate that there was relative calm during polling periods except for a few minor incidences of disquiet created by members of ZANU (PF) who endeavoured to sloganeer at the polling stations an anomaly the polling officials would either ignore or rectify swiftly. However, in urban areas, the presiding officers seemed unfamiliar with the task which they were meant to execute which led to the suggestion that untrained personnel were deployed in urban constituencies or that the officers deliberately under-performed to frustrate voters.

It was also notable that in rural areas, the government appointed monitors seemed keener in monitoring local observers instead of monitoring polling officers and the polling process. As stated earlier, voters in urban constituencies could not exercise their voting rights within time. There were reports to the effect that polling officers in some constituencies in Harare were not undertaking their voting roles with the requisite speed for instance there were reports that at one polling station in Harare, only 7 people were being processed in an hour. These unnecessary and unjustified delays, compounded with the effect of the reduction of polling stations in urban areas created a potentially chaotic atmosphere that had the voters not exercised restraint, the situation would have degenerated into mass unrest. In most urban areas, polling was extended further than the stipulated time to cater for the huge numbers of people who had failed to vote within the initially planned time.

In some constituencies, there were reports of a large number of voters who were turned away because their names were not found in the voters' roll. At a polling station in Chinhoyi, one person who was turned away had a receipt which indicated that she had actually registered to vote.

In Harare, there were numerous arrests of people who were purported to have intended to vote twice. At Halingbury Primary School, about 38 people were arrested for the same offence and about 300 were held at Harare Central Police Station under circumstances of gross human rights violations. The people who were arrested at Halingbury Primary School vouched that they did not intend to vote twice but they could have picked up the traces of the indelible ink from the narrow gate that everyone passed through including those who had already voted. They were released at the end of the polling. However, these people were not charged until the time of release. It was the generally prevailing belief that the arrests were a deliberate attempt to lessen the number of urban voters to further an interest by the ruling party through the coercive apparatus of the state.

In most urban areas, it was observed that not all parties had election agents at the polling station. It was only ZANU(PF) that had agents at every polling station. The MDC had the second highest number of polling agents available at polling stations. The unavailability of opposition party agents can be attributed to the following factors:



- ZANU (PF) supporters had waylaid other parties' agents on their way to the polling stations and had severely assaulted some. The police force in conjunction with members of the national army and graduands of the Border Gezi Training Centre had arrested and assaulted polling agents of opposition political parties e.g. in Honde Valley in Mutasa constituency where party agents of the opposition MDC were arrested and detained at Ruda Police Station by members of the national army. The opposition Member of Parliament for the constituency, Evelyn Masaiti was also arrested and severely assaulted by the soldiers.
- Some names were not on the presiding officers' registers of accredited party agents

During the polling days, some political parties were noticed flouting electoral laws but the presiding officers did not take any action. An example of this was the ferrying of people to polling stations. ZANU (PF) was observed bussing people at Zuze in Makoni and the MDC was also noted doing the same at Clearwater in the Chipinge North constituency. At Glendale, ZANU (PF) flouted the 100-metre radius rule by campaigning and canvassing for support within the prohibited area. When the anomaly was brought to the attention of the presiding officers by the election observer, the presiding officer indicated that he was not interested in taking action because observers were only entitled to observe and should not tell him what to do. Some chiefs in some areas showed their partisanship even in the polling station. Chief Nyamuga enquired from voters whom they had voted for and threatened to remove those who had voted for the opposition from his Sengwe area. He threatened that if drought relief was made available, he will reward those who voted for ZANU (PF) by giving them the food aid.

In Harare, at Shiriyedenga Primary School, the youths tried to prevent people without ZANU (PF) membership cards from voting. The voters condemned this and a period of commotion ensued at the polling station.

The supplementary voters roll that was compiled by the Registrar-General was only made available in areas where the ruling party had a stronghold and this was mainly in rural areas.

Mobile polling stations

There were many more mobile polling stations than in previous elections and these were not adequately monitored. In some cases, the times for starting and finishing voting were changed without adequate publicity and this resulted in the confusion of many potential voters.

Tripartite elections

It was the general observation that voters were confused on how to undertake tripartite voting. There was not enough voter education to equip the people with the relevant knowledge on how to conduct such elections.



The diagram produced by the ESC, which had been circulated earlier and had information on how to vote (applicable to Harare and Chitungwiza residents) was very complicated to comprehend, even for the literate. The result was that some voters having exercised their mayoral and council vote in one municipal ward or constituency were disqualified from voting for the presidential vote in another ward in the same constituency that they would have been specifically told to vote in. As a result, people kept being told to vote from one place to the other. The general feeling was that the confusion about the location of the polling stations and slow processing of voters as far as tripartite elections were concerned was deliberately orchestrated so as to minimise the number of voters for the presidential poll.

Provincial breakdown of observers' reports

The observers' reports point to a generally uniform experience as the observers attempted to carry out their observation duties and were hindered by the fact that they were not accredited. Most of the information recorded by observers came from observing 100 metres away or from friendly officials amongst those who were inside the polling station. The observers faced hostility from most quarters including party agents of and supporters of the MDC and ZANU (PF) although the harassment was harsher from the latter. Observers were also harassed and attacked by polling officials, ESC monitors, youth militia and members of the police force. Several observers were detained in police cells for a number of days and there are reports of observers being detained in ZANU (PF) torture camps for several days. A number of observers have also reported cases of sexual assault by groups of hostile youth and one observer alleges rape at the hands of a teacher with whom she had taken refuge.

All provinces report occasional problems with some ink detectors that suffered from battery failure and on a few occasions, the fact that ballot paper ran out. In both cases, voting had to stop until the problem had been rectified. There were instances when voters wore or displayed a candidate's party or personal insignia. The most severe action recorded in this instance is brief detention and questioning. Most were simply ejected from the polling station with a severe reprimand. Observers also noted that some unfortunate would-be voters across the country shook hands with those who had already voted or came into contact with areas which a voter had touched after voting and were thus unable to vote.

Bulawayo Province - According to the observers, ZANU (PF) set up tables outside polling stations where they were writing down the names of the people who had voted. Observers also note that ZANU (PF) supporters were in some instances allowed free reign as they moved in and out of polling stations at will. The treatment from polling officials was not uniform. Some presiding officers and police officers allowed unaccredited observers into the polling station and only began to remove them when word came from the election command centres upon which they then became hostile. It was generally quiet with some reports of youths harassing voters. Several arrests were made for various crimes, including drunkenness and disrupting the voting process.



One prospective voter was arrested for wearing a National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) T-shirt to the polling station. Although voter turnout was high on the first day, there are no reports that at any one point it became unmanageable and it was lower on the second day.

Harare-Chitungwiza Province - The most notable feature of the election in Harare was that the voter turnout was clearly higher than had been anticipated and planned for and this resulted in potentially explosive scenes at most polling stations throughout the entire voting period. Many voters began queuing in the early hours of the morning on all three days of voting. There was heavy police presence at most polling stations. The police used force in certain instances to control the crowds. On the first day, the polling officers were extremely slow in processing the voters with most voters queuing for many hours. Although the voting process had become faster by the second day, polling officials were still unable to cope with the number of voters who spilled over into the third day when the prevailing confusion was exacerbated by the fact that most polling stations only opened around midday. At exactly 19:00 polling stations closed when many people were still in the line to vote. It appears that part of the confusion was created by the fact that voters were essentially voting in three elections for the president, the mayor and ward councillor. In some instances voters who had gone to the wrong ward polling stations in the right constituency chose to vote for the President only rather than spend more time in the queue.

By the second day, any unaccredited observers remaining in the polling stations were ejected only to spend the rest of the election observing from a distance.

Manicaland Province - Voting in this province was generally peaceful and orderly with no reports of major incidences on the first day of voting. At several polling stations, supporters of ZANU (PF) were observed to be telling people in queues how to vote or harassing voters who had come out of the polling station and wanting to find out whom they had voted for. There was a problem with people who came to vote without IDs and it would appear that voters did not always have the correct information on where and how to vote. The police detained several observers for varying lengths of time. There were reports of instances where one party's supporters had defaced the voting guide in the voting booth in support of their party. Kraal heads were also involved in shepherding their kraal members to the polling stations and noting down those who had voted. In one instance, the police confiscated the sheet of paper and tore it up but took no further action.

Mashonaland Central Province - This province was particularly troublesome, especially for the observers who faced a great deal of hostility from groups of youth militia which had been deployed in the area. Many observers report that they had to take shelter in the bush after being attacked by the youths.



From the first day, unaccredited observers were not allowed into the polling station and remained around the polling station at their own peril, as they had no guarantee of support from the police. In certain instances, the ESC monitors assisted the police and polling agents in ejecting observers from the polling stations and the environs of polling stations.

There were groups of youth militia observed in and around the polling stations interrogating those deemed to be strangers in the locality.

Mashonaland East Province - Although most of the observers were not able to enter the polling stations, they were able to observe that the situation was generally peaceful during the two days when polling took place. The voter turnout was generally high on the first day but was lessening by the second day of voting. Several observers noted that some voters travelled from the urban areas where they lived to vote in the rural areas. Observers recorded incidents where the situation became tense when supporters of one candidate began to chant slogans resulting in some instances in altercations between rival supporters. Observers also found local residents to be uncomfortable and uncooperative in answering their questions. Although most voters knew what they were doing, there were some that lacked basic information including where to go and what to do when they got there. They were reported incidents of the ink detecting machines out of order in UMP during the voting process.

Matabeleland South Province - Polling stations generally opened on time but in one polling station, the ink detector broke down at 7.10 am until 7.42 am and this caused delays in the voting process. When the machine was reported to be functioning, voters complained that it was faulty for it wrongly detected the voters as having already voted, thereby wrongfully denying them their chance to vote. A large number of people who were turned away were wearing clothes with party insignia. Accessibility to the polling stations was not difficult due to the increased number of polling stations and mobiles in outlying areas.

At most polling stations, the constituency registrars responsible for some polling stations never visited the said polling stations and generally the duties that they were supposed to perform were not attended to.

In the polling stations that the constituency registrar visited, reports were to the effect that they executed their functions satisfactorily and that they were mostly helpful. At one polling station, the constituency registrar changed the name of the polling station without the knowledge of the observers and some party agents, e.g. an agent of the MDC. This kind of treatment, which was selectively applied to agents of the opposition political parties, was observed in nearly every other aspect of the electoral process. Of notable clarity was the way that complaints against ZANU (PF) supporters were handled. Polling officials were on record known to turn a blind eye and find an excuse to cover up the ineptitude. For instance, when a report was given that there were ZANU (PF) supporters campaigning within the prohibited 100 metre radius the polling official replied that he could not do anything about the anomaly because it was happening outside the polling station.

An election monitor had to be excused from his duties at one polling station because he was inebriated. This was a cause for concern since by virtue of his conduct the quality of the monitoring process became questionable.

Masvingo Province - Polling generally began at the stipulated time in most polling stations. However, in one polling station, there were delays posed by the ink detector, which went out for one and half hours and could only be fixed when another battery was procured. On the second day of voting there was shortage of ballot papers at one polling station and this severely crippled the polling process.

The constituency registrar visited polling stations dismissing unaccredited party agents. At one polling station, one woman married to a war veteran assumed the duties of the presiding officer and the presiding officer took no action. The presiding officer at one polling station totally ignored the reports brought by an observer because he was not accredited. As in many other provinces, the observers who were not accredited were not allowed in the polling station but were to observe from a distance of 100 metres from the station.

The people who were sent away were wearing campaign material and these people were supporters of the ruling party who wantonly engaged in whatever action illegal or otherwise with the knowledge that there was no form of reproach that could be visited upon them, e.g. at one polling station a ZANU (PF) youth barred voters from entering the polling station without a justifiable reason.

Mashonaland West Province - At one polling station, the constituency registrar passed through and did not endeavour to do any of the prescribed functions. The element of partisanship was more conspicuous in this province more than anywhere else. The polling officers were at their most uncooperative and arrogant in this province and a greater degree of intolerance was exhibited towards the observers more than in any other province in the country.

There was nothing of significance which was reported other than the above.

Midlands Province - In the Midlands province, a polling station, Zvishavane-Marian School in Buchwa opened late at 10.57 am on the first day of polling. There was no plausible explanation proffered for the delay even though hints that the polling officers were missing some of the required voting material circulated. In rural areas, many voters voted under the supervision of their headman and those who voted paid a fee of \$80 - the purpose of which was not apparent.

At Chemakudo Polling Station, there were ZANU (PF) information fliers indicating the part where people were supposed to place their vote. The fliers were placed right in the polling booth. The polling officers seemed to be unperturbed by this development.

At Bonda school, there was a polling station which was not designated where two queues were formed, one queue being for the elderly and another for the youth. This was also true with polling at Mapedza Primary School.



The significance of such a polling system was not readily realised by everybody at hand.

There was gross intimidation and harassment of voters in Gokwe North. Helicopters were noted flying over the area for no apparent reason and ZANU (PF) supporters and their sympathisers had cleared party agents for the opposition out of the polling station. Observers experienced the most hostile attitudes from the polling officers but this could be attributed to the fact that it had been noticed that the observers were being ferried in MDC party cars. Some perceived MDC supporters were forced to pretend they were illiterate and by requesting the polling officials to vote for ZANU (PF) on their behalf 'proved' their support for the ruling party.

Matabeleland North Province - Voting was generally peaceful but all the other discrepancies that were inherent in the other provinces, e.g. the harassment of voters by supporters of the ruling party, the discrimination of local observers against domestic observers and the general impatience and intolerance of polling officers towards the local observers and opposition party agents were noted.

Logistically, there were hiccups in the electoral process as in the other provinces. The ink detector broke down in most polling stations and the people in the queues had to endure long delays while this was being rectified.

There were no other major incidences of electoral anomalies in the province.



CHAPTER 7

Registered voters, vote counting and results

Registered voters

Probe Market Research Analysis of the Compilation of the Voters' Roll.

Probe Market Research, an affiliate of Gallup International Poll Group, undertook a study of the voters roll using a sample of 1 675 potential voters.

The study was done with no copies of the death register and the supplementary voters' roll, as these were not accessible to any interested voters or opposition political parties. The study established the following:

- 98 % of registered voters interviewed expressed an intention to vote.
- 39% were unregistered voters because of lack of IDs.
- Names of 40% of those interviewed appeared in the constituencies where they were registered.
- 50% physically checked their names on the voters' roll and appeared at the correct addresses.
- 22% changed addresses, 2% had moved out of the country and 5% were deceased.
- 2% of those interviewed who believed they were on the voters' roll were not on the voters' roll.

According to the study, a 100% voter registration would be 3.6 million and not the 5,6 million names on the voters roll. Furthermore, the final figure of 5 612 272 registered voters is an inflated increase. The Probe Market Research study referred to the 1997 study which pointed to a 12 million population size for Zimbabwe, with an average family size of 6 children and showed that over 50% of the population is under 16 years of age while 60% is under 18 thereby leaving only 4.8 million potential voters. Against the HIV/AIDS pandemic and economic migration from Zimbabwe, the total figure is likely to be lower.

According to the study, the official figure of registered voters appears substantially high and points to the need to audit the voters' roll in order to discount the effect of such factors as double entries and failure to remove names of those deceased and people who have changed addresses from the voters' roll.

The voters' roll was not readily available to various stakeholders to enable them to cross check the number of registered voters with the actual number of people who voted. There was also a perception of lack of transparency in the manner in which the voters' register was being produced.

For instance, while the majority of people knew that the voter registration exercise had ended on 27 December 2002, it was later discovered that some selected individuals were being registered. This prompted the Registrar-General to issue a special gazette in retrospect to the effect that the voter registration had closed on 3 March 2002. This fuelled speculations that the voters' register was being doctored. This was further compounded by the variation of figures of registered voters which appeared in *The Herald* on 13 February 2002 and 11 March 2002 respectively.



Figures Of Total Registered Voters Per Province

NUMBER	PROVINCE	REGISTERED VOTERS BY 13 FEBRUARY 2002*	REGISTERED VOTERS BY 11 MARCH 2002*	VARIATIONS (-/+)
1	HARARE	888,663	882,176	-6487
2	BULAWAYO	368,454	363,028	-5426
3	MATEBELELAND NORTH	338,144	338,186	+42
4	MATEBELELAND SOUTH	341,506	343,996	+2490
5	MASHONALAND CENTRAL	456,278	480,072	+23,794
6	MASHONALAND WEST	554,949	572,677	+17,728
7	MASHONALAND EAST	576,363	589,185	12,822
8	MANICALAND	622,616	658,694	+36,078
9	MASVINGO	631,534	655,122	+23,588
10	MIDLANDS	700,543	724,659	+24116
TOTALS		5479050	5607795	128745

* Source: The Herald

The offices of the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and the Registrar General could not give the reasons for the reduction of the number of voters instead of an increase in the Harare and Bulawayo Provinces. However, the public largely perceived the reduction as deliberate since the two provinces were known potential strongholds of the opposition.

Comparison Of Registered Voters 1995 - 2002

Province	1995 Registered voters	2000 Registered voters	13/02/02 Registered voters	11/03/02 Registered voters	Variance between 2000 and 11/03/02
Harare	804 398	839 235	888 663	882 176	42 941
Bulawayo	350 526	375 743	368 454	363 028	-12 717
Matabeleland North	289 781	327 740	338 144	338 186	10 446
Matabeleland South	294 615	331 623	341 506	343 996	12 373
Mashonaland Central	370 979	441 552	456 278	480 072	38 520
Mashonaland West	516 487	530 364	554 949	572 677	42 313
Mashonaland East	484 248	535 106	576 363	589 185	54 079
Manicaland	554 945	612 253	622 616	658 694	46 441
Masvingo	558 608	612 306	631 534	655 122	42 816
Midlands	597 702	682 882	700 543	724 659	41 777

* Source: Delimitation Reports

It is interesting that the number of voters registered in 2002 for Bulawayo shows a reduction from 2000. In the Mashonaland provinces, there was a substantial increase of the registered voters. From the above figures, it would seem that voter numbers in some provinces increased substantially from 1995 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2002 compared to others, e.g. in the Midlands and Mashonaland Central Provinces.



Election results and counting

The summary of the declared results for the 2002 presidential elections is as follows:

Robert Mugabe	1 685 212
Morgan Tsvangirai	1 258 401
Wilson Kumbula	31 368
Shakespeare Maya	11 906
Abel Siwela	11 871

Vote counting in nearly all constituencies began on Tuesday 12 March 2002. In most constituencies, with the exception of Harare and Chitungwiza, ballot boxes were transferred to counting centres on Monday 11 March 2002. In a number of constituencies, counting started in the absence of polling agents from the opposition parties. In some instances where the agents managed to evade ZANU (PF) youths and the national service militias, they were denied the entry into counting centres or chased away by ruling party youths. An example of these types of anomalies allegedly occurred at Mhangura counting centre where Minister Mombeshora, in the company of ZANU (PF) militia known as 'Top Six' chased away opposition party agents and election observers from the centre. In counting centres where observers managed to be present, the final tally of results was not announced by the constituency registrars as is normally the practice. Instead, the results were faxed to the Registrar-General in Harare quietly.

In Harare, the Registrar-General took an average of four hours to announce the results that would have been faxed to him. An example is the Hwange East constituency where counting was finished at 8.30 pm and the results were faxed to the National Command Centre and only announced at midnight. The same treatment of vote counting also happened in the Mazowe East constituency.

There was an unexplained and unprecedented delay in the counting in Harare and Chitungwiza mayoral and council elections. It took two days after the counting of the presidential vote to have the Harare and Chitungwiza council and mayoral vote counting to be finished and announced. However, at the time of writing this report, almost a month after the elections, the results for the Harare and Chitungwiza elections have not yet been publicised.

Almost 99% of the reports on the post-voting period confirm that the verification of ballots and the counting were conducted according to laid down procedures. An outstanding feature about the counting process, however, was that the total result per candidate was not announced in almost all counting centres countrywide but was sent directly to the National Election Directorate Command Centre in Harare where it was announced to the nation via radio and television. This meant that observers on the ground had no figures with which to verify the authenticity of the publicly announced figure. The few who managed to get the figure at the counting centre did so by using creative means.

The following table summarises some observations pointing to the need for the election results to be audited, in order to allay the suspicions of inflating the election results.



Irregularities which affected the results

CONSTITUENCY	POLLING STATION	REMARKS
Hurungwe West	Chisape School Kaira Primary School	MDC seal not permitted on the ballot box Missing ballot books 0015201-0015300
Mutare West	Rwizi Primary School	MDC polling agents assaulted and beaten, polling station closed-no ZESN observers.
Mutare North	Chief Hall Mutare	Missing ballot books serial number 401-500 and 501-600
Goromonzi	Rusike Primary School Chibvute Primary School	Seal removed Seal removed
Hurungwe	Tavay (Mobile 20)	Day 1 not at Dixie, Day 2 not at Goodhope as advertised
Guruve North	Gulliver	Polling station not listed, voters screened by headman, no MDC agent and observers.
Seke Shamva	2 Simukayi Primary School Samanyanga Secondary School Mobile 5 (Musambanyama)	Seal removed on police instructions Seal broken by President's office staff. Seal broken
Shurugwi	Mobile 3	600 ballot papers missing (6 books)

Comparison of Official Results Announced on Two Separate Occasions by the Registrar-General.

CANDIDATE	Press Conference on 10 April 2002	Video Cassette 13 March 2002
Robert Mugabe	1 681 212	1 685 212
Morgan Tsvangirai	1 262 403	1 258 401
Wilson Kumbula	31 368	31 368
Shakespeare Maya	11 906	11 906
Paul Siwela	11 871	11 871
Spoilt Papers	48 131	-
TOTAL VOTES CAST	3046891	2 998 758

Source: *The Daily News*, 11 April 2002

The above figures are at variance with the videotape as announced on 13 March 2002. Moreover, the total figures from the video cassette do not include spoilt papers as the actual grand total adds to 2 998 758.

Disparities between ESC and Registrar-General Results

There were variations in some constituency figures given by the ESC (Although voting was still ongoing, when the ESC released its figures) to MDC officials and the ones announced by the Registrar-General though the grand figures were the same. What is noteworthy is the reduction in final figures per constituency announced for some areas as compared to when voting was still taking place.



Disparities between ESC and Registrar-General Results

PROVINCE	ESC Figures	Election Directorate and Registrar-General	Variance ESC - ED - RG	Comment
Bulawayo	169 501	162 616	6 885	MDC stronghold
Harare				
Chitungwiza	439 656	412935	26 721	MDC stronghold
Mashonaland Central	304 677	300 613	4 064	ZANU (PF) stronghold
Mashonaland East	361 357	349 565	11 792	ZANU(PF) stronghold
Mashonaland West	316 140	322 641	601	ZANU(PF) stronghold
Masvingo	400 525	372 095	28 430	Variable
Midlands	342 772	418 024	75 252	ZANU (PF) stronghold
Matabeleland South	167 849	162 179	5 670	MDC stronghold
Matabeleland North	192 268	175 935	16 333	MDC stronghold
Manicaland	330 960	353 954	22 994	Variable

Sources: MDC Election Report and The Daily News

A sample of counting centre figures (from four provinces) has been compiled in the next table. They show the ballots scored by the ZANU-(PF) and the MDC candidates. The figures are arranged in two columns per candidate, with one column showing the total announced by the Election Directorate (shown as ED) and another the total recorded by the ZESN observer present in the counting centre. These figures show interesting disparities.

Comparison of results: ZESN results versus The Election Directorate's results

Province	CONSTITUENCY	MUGABE (ED)	MUGABE (ZESN)	TSVANGIRAI (ED)	TSVANGIRAI (ZESN)
Harare	Glenview	2079	2 709	16527	16 527
	Highfield	3187	3 153	14919	14 880
	Mufakose	7761	3 561	12101	16 700
Bulawayo	Nkulumane	4917	3 137	18602	14 000
Mashonaland East	Murewa South	16913	16 616	5180	5 192

As noted above, the figures from Glenview, Highfield, Mufakose, Nkulumane, and Murewa South show differences in the case of both candidates. The most glaring difference is in Mufakose where the figure for Mugabe (ED compared to ZESN) is higher by 4200 votes while Tsvangirai's is reduced by 4599 votes. Nkulumane has a similar glaring disparity in that 4602 reduces Tsvangirai's result while 1780 increases Mugabe's.



It would be premature to draw conclusions about the counting and the results from the few examples highlighted above due to the small size of the sample. What is clear, though, is that there is cause for concern about the accuracy and authenticity of the final results released by the Election Directorate. If from the examples given, anomalies can be identified, it is possible that more anomalies could be uncovered from a larger sample.

ZESN calls for an audit of the election results as these disparities affect the legitimacy of the election outcome.



CHAPTER 8

The post-election period

World-wide condemnation of the election result characterised the end of the controversial Zimbabwe presidential elections of 2002. The violence, political intolerance, intimidation and killings by ZANU (PF) supporters, the war veterans and the youth militia continued even after the disputed ZANU (PF) victory.

Internal assessment of the poll

The immediate assessment within Zimbabwe was, of course, divided depending on who was talking.

Civil Society - Almost all the groups within Zimbabwe unanimously declared the elections neither free nor fair. All the organisations cited not only the violence but also the gross irregularities and human rights violations as reasons to dispute the election results.

The Women's Coalition and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition went beyond proclaiming the election not free and fair and rejected the outcome of the 2002 Presidential Elections. The National Constitutional Assembly in its statement questioned the legitimacy of the president and unequivocally said it was due to a flawed constitutional framework that enables the ruling party to rig the process.

Political Parties - President Mugabe's main rival Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC rejected the election result and called Mr Mugabe's win illegitimate. He further said, 'We have been cheated of the right to freely and democratically elect the president of their /our choice'

Zanu (PF) celebrated President Mugabe's victory and he was inaugurated as President on 17 March 2002. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo said, 'It is a wonderful result for Zimbabwe and Africans, a reaffirmation of African dignity and independence in the face of attempts by the lies of Tony Blair to recolonise us.'

Regional and international assessment

The Commonwealth Observer Group along with the Norwegian, Ghana and SADC Parliamentary Forum observer teams, strongly condemned the election saying it was held in a climate of fear and was therefore not free and fair.

Observers from Nigeria, South Africa and the Namibian government called the elections free and fair. The OAU reported that in general, the elections were transparent, credible, free and fair.

However, it was the Commonwealth Observer Group's assessment which led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for a year on 19 March 2002. A troika comprising the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, South African President Thabo Mbeki and Australian Prime Minister John Howard made the recommendation after consideration of the Commonwealth Observer Mission's report. The report noted the following:



- High level of politically motivated violence and intimidation.
- ZANU(PF)'s paramilitary youth group largely responsible for intimidation.
- Restrictions on independent local observers.
- Lack of transparency in the registration process.
- Polling stations reduced in urban areas.
- Many were unable to vote in Harare and Chitungwiza because the process was very slow.
- Limitations on freedom of speech and movement hampered opposition campaign.

Political Violence and the General Situation in the Country - As Zimbabweans awaited the election results, the security forces were put on high alert and police set up roadblocks on the main roads to the capital, Harare, and soldiers and police officers were placed in strategic MDC /strongholds around the country. A day after the election results, a young security guard was killed at a farm outside Marondera by a group of war veterans living at the farm. A white farmer was grievously assaulted. The violence, intimidation and harassment re-surfaced after only two days of respite. Acts of retribution by ZANU (PF) continue to occur on a day-to-day basis as predicted.

As part of a nation-wide exercise to punish those who voted for Morgan Tsvangirai, members of the army allegedly beat three MDC supporters to death in Chipinge South on 16 March 2002. In Norton, another post-election victim was a white farmer who was killed by those occupying the farm. Reports of ZANU PF supporters going on rampage in the tourist town of Victoria Falls were recorded and published in *The Daily News*, the independent daily in Zimbabwe. The general atmosphere in the country was tense and the cloud of fear was evident. In Bulawayo, on 13 March 2002, *The Daily News* was destroyed wherever it was seen and vendors were harassed by the ruling party supporters.

Selective punishment and lack of protection of citizens by the police continues in the post-election period.

Continued implementation of draconian legislation

Zimbabweans witnessed the implementation of the dreaded Public Order Security Act (POSA) on a day-to-day basis. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) had their General Council Meeting disrupted by the police on 14 March 2002. POSA was used to render their meeting illegal (and declared political). In response to this interference, the ZCTU called for a mass stay away by all the workers from 20 to 22 March 2002. The strike was declared illegal by the police and received mixed reaction from the public.



Many workers turned up for work (in fear of retribution or confusion as to what was really expected of them during those three days) and few shops that were closed in the first few hours of the morning on 20 March 2002 (when the stay away was supposed to start) were re-opened).

The NCA called for a demonstration on 6 April 2002 to press for a new constitution. This demonstration was declared illegal under POSA. It resulted in over 400 arrests of NCA activists and beatings of the same.

International pressure

The pressure on Zanu PF is to establish a government of national unity with its main rival, the MDC. In his inaugural speech, President Mugabe seemed to be on a path of national reconciliation but it remains to be seen what will happen in Zimbabwe regarding this issue, as the leader of the main opposition party and Mugabe's real rival, Morgan Tsvangirai and two of his top officials have been formally charged with high treason for allegedly plotting to assassinate the President.

The MDC said it is gathering evidence to prove that the election was rigged and will then decide on whether to take the matter to court or resolve it politically. It eventually filed a court challenge against the results on 12 April 2002.

It is uncertain what the future holds for Zimbabwe. Although most Zimbabweans now discuss politics more freely than in the past and whilst a significant number of Zimbabweans have expressed concern at the election result, there are no indications of how and where this discontent will be channelled.



CHAPTER 9

Analysis, conclusions and recommendations

Norms And Standards For Free And Fair Elections

The SADC Parliamentary Forum, (SADC PF) created in terms of Article 10(6) of the SADC Treaty, made recommendations for elections, individual rights, and fostering transparency and integrity in the electoral process. These recommendations are contained in its Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, which were adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly on 25 March 2001 in Windhoek, Namibia. In its effort to promote plural, multi-party democracy, the Parliamentary Forum's immediate objective is to determine the openness, freeness and fairness of elections held in the SADC region.

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network adopted the Parliamentary Forum's electoral principles for assessing the acceptability, the freeness, fairness and legitimacy of Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential elections.

REGISTRATION AND THE VOTERS' ROLL

SADC PF Recommendation: There should be provisions and practical arrangements for continuous voter registration and an updated voters' register must be made available to all stakeholders in the elections (SADC-PF Recommendations)

The registration exercise was poorly publicised and the registration period too short to capture a substantial portion of eligible voters, especially young voters. The Registrar-General was held in contempt of court for disregarding a High Court order not to close the registration of voters until the constitutionality of the registration process had been challenged.

- The voter registration deadline kept on being postponed and it was never publicised to all but only to the ZANU (PF) supporters. Registration of voters continued up to polling day.
- No copy of the supplementary voters' roll was given to an NGO or contesting political party.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION

SADC PF Recommendation: The sanctity of the freedom of association and expression should be protected and strictly observed to ensure the unimpeded freedom to campaign throughout the country, including reasonable safeguards at political meetings, rallies, polling stations and party premises. Relevant laws and a mutually agreed upon code of conduct should be signed by all stakeholders.

- The opposition and civil organisations were denied the right to assemble and demonstrate. The passing of the Public Order and Security Act (2002) further eroded these rights.



- The ruling party and its supporters closed off many rural areas to the opposition, whose freedom to campaign openly by holding rallies was severely restricted through threats of violence and intimidation and by restrictions imposed by the police. Most rural areas were 'no-go areas' for NGOs who wanted to conduct civic and voter education.
- The opposition party's premises were burnt down in Bulawayo and their premises in Harare raided by the police. A grenade was thrown into another of their Harare premises.

THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES

SADC PF Recommendation: All Government Security Forces should act impartially and professionally and should be able to provide reasonable safeguards at political meetings, rallies and polling stations and party premises

- The Commissioner of Police declared his loyalty to the ruling party and refused to do his constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law without fear or favour.
- The Police Commissioner, Augustine Chihuri declared his loyalty to Zanu (PF) and allegedly fired and demoted any police officer perceived to be supporting the opposition.
- The police ignored court orders to enforce the law, they applied the law selectively, and they harassed members of the opposition, civil society, minorities and other defenceless groups, such as farm workers. Since the referendum on the Constitution, held in February 2000, the police have not brought anyone to justice for the murders of more than 91 members of the opposition, even after a court ordered the police to take action against known perpetrators.
- The youth militia was involved in organised violence across the country based on 120 camps. Youth militia were obstructing opposition supporters from travelling freely to attend meetings as they set up roadblocks and demanded Zanu (PF) party cards as well as confiscated IDs of perceived opposition supporters.
- War veterans continue to break the law with impunity including murder, assault, rape, arson, pillage and other acts of political violence and intimidation without fear of prosecution and in complicity with ruling party supporters, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) the police and the state media. Many ruling party supporters, incarcerated for political violence, were pardoned by presidential decree in 2000.
- The armed forces were implicated in murder, assault, beatings, destruction of property and other human rights abuses to further the political agenda of the ruling party.



- In a veiled reference to the opposition MDC presidential candidate, the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, together with the Commander of the Army, the Commander of the Air Force, the Commissioner of Police, the Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation and the Commissioner of Prisons, stated that they would not accept a political leader (even if he was democratically elected) of whom they did not approve.
- The Zanu (PF) supporters and war veterans embarked on a purge of suspected opposition MDC supporters in the civil service post election era in Bindura. Retribution of MDC supporters intensified after the election in most rural constituencies and an estimated 20 000 fled their homes.
- Distribution of food aid in some parts of Zimbabwe was being done along party lines, i.e. your political affiliation determined if you would get food aid or not.

ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

SADC PF Recommendation: Complete independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission should be reaffirmed in the constitution, with the commissioners selected by a panel of judges in consultation with all stakeholders. It should be required by law to provide for an adequate, competent, integrity and non-partisanship secretariat instead of having staff seconded from ministries and departments of government. Thus it will also need its own budget directly voted for by Parliament and not get allocation from a Ministry or a Government Department.

- The ESC has been rendered useless in Zimbabwe as it only supervises and does not run the elections. Election administration and management is split among many organs, which compromises co-ordination and the quality of the decision-making process.
- The election process is not managed, administered and controlled by the ESC, but by the Registrar-General.
- The impartiality of the Commission is compromised because the President, a contestant in the elections, appoints (and can remove) members of the Commission and prescribes the tenure and conditions under which they hold office. Furthermore, the Commission reports to the President through his party or on his behalf contests in virtually all elections taking place in Zimbabwe.
- One of the ESC members is the ruling party's Central Committee member.
- Other organs which run the elections: Delimitation Commission, Election Directorate and Registrar-General are perceived to be partial.
- The Commission does not control an independent budget as it receives funds allocated under the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.



- Retired army personnel run the ESC.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

SADC-PF Recommendation: The role of civil society, mainly in election monitoring and civic education, should be recognised by the government.

- The government has recently amended the Electoral Act, which now prevents civil society from independently monitoring elections and conducting voter education.
- The Government must recognise the right and need for civic organisations to promote civic awareness, educate voters and monitor elections.

THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS

SADC PF Recommendation: All stakeholders including the government and political parties should recognise that observers are important for fostering transparency, integrity and in institutionalising the democratic process in the conduct of elections.

- In terms of the definition to 'observe' under the amended Electoral Act, the government will only be required to accredit invited members of the international community, including SADC, to observe the actual polling and counting at elections.
- The amendments to the Electoral Act require election observers from SADC countries to wait for a formal invitation from the Commission or the Minister and hence registration for voting in the 2002 elections started before the invitation was extended to any other group.
- The government must recognise that international election observers are part of the process of institutionalising multi-party democracy and that they, like SADC observers, should be allowed to observe the entire electoral process, especially the pre-election period, including voter education.
- SADC Parliamentary Observer Missions should be able to observe the pre-election (including voter registration and the post-election period whenever they are held in any SADC Country without waiting for an official invitation
- The government invited election observers from the countries it deemed 'friendly' as these were expected to endorse the electoral process and the election results and most of the countries that were invited do not have a history of democratic and transparent electoral process.
- The SADC Parliamentary Forum did not get an early invitation to enable them to monitor and observe the pre-election environment. This renders them ineffective in assessing the pre-election environment.
- There must be a mutually agreed code of conduct for election monitors and observers.



FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC MEDIA

SADC PF Recommendation: Governments should take the emergence of private media as a healthy development in the institutionalisation of the democratic process and the conduct of elections, and should therefore refrain from taking decisions and actions that thwart a strong private media.

- The government passed the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill, which places severe restrictions on the freedom of expression of the private local media during the run-up to the presidential elections.
- The Broadcasting Services Act was passed despite certain provisions being declared unconstitutional by the Parliamentary Legal Committee.
- The government-appointed Broadcasting Authority did not issue new broadcasting licences before the presidential elections, thereby preventing independent radio and television stations from transmitting from within Zimbabwe despite an earlier Supreme Court ruling granting broadcasters the constitutional right of freedom of expression. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Commercialisation Bill further lengthens the period in which new broadcasters can enter the broadcasting arena.
- Editors and journalists working for local and international independent newspapers have been threatened, tortured, deported and detained illegally.
- Other local journalists were not accredited.
- Newly set up private radio stations, Voice of the People and SW Africa were condemned.
- Initiatives for community radio stations were thwarted.

ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC MEDIA

SADC-PF Recommendation: Opposition parties should be given equal opportunity and agreed upon time and space on the state-owned and controlled media to place their announcements, campaign programmes and advertisements.

- There was little access given to the opposition parties and candidates in the state media.
- The public media was turned into an instrument of political propaganda in a campaign characterised by reports vilifying the opposition and glorifying the ruling party.
- No code of conduct was put in place for the media.



HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE

SADC-PF recommendation: The right to vote should be accepted as a birth right in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Therefore, eligible individuals should have the right to non-discriminatory voter registration and nomination procedures. This right should be enshrined in the constitution of a country

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and key indicators to democratic tradition were not embraced in the 2002 presidential election due to the following reasons:

- Universality calls for non-discriminatory measures in all aspects of the electoral process. This process was grossly violated in the Zimbabwean 2002 elections, with an ineffective and impartial and discriminatory registration procedure marring the whole process.
- Equality requires that one's vote should be given equal weight with everyone else's. This was not the case in the 2002 elections. No equal and effective access was given to polling stations as they were substantially reduced in the urban areas.
- Fairness demands a level playing field for all contestants in the process and the dissemination of all information to all stakeholders. This principle was violated in the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe.
- Secrecy can only be assured if the voter casts the vote alone and with the knowledge that only he or she will ever know whom they voted for. This was highly compromised where ZANU (PF) supporters were writing a Register of people who had voted. The traditional leaders would go with their own villagers and hence influence the voting patterns. Perceived supporters of the opposition were told that on polling day, they should pretend to be illiterate in order to be assisted on polling day and thus divulge to someone else who they wanted to vote for.
- Most citizens in rural areas cast their votes in fear and amidst rampant incidences of intimidation. Rights of expression, association and assembly which are all fundamental freedoms were not upheld in the entire election process.
- Many people who were born in Zimbabwe, but whose parents were born elsewhere, were denied the right to vote due to amendments of the Zimbabwe Citizenship Act.
- An amendment to the Electoral Act allowed the Registrar-General to change the original name or address of any voter at any time without the knowledge of that voter, raising fears of vote rigging.



- The Electoral Act was amended to allow diplomatic personnel and the armed forces to use a postal vote, a right that was denied to many ordinary citizens living outside Zimbabwe.
- The amended Electoral Act, which authorises the Registrar-General to demand that voters furnish proof of residence, an unnecessary requirement for presidential elections, disenfranchised many young people.
- Many Zimbabweans wishing to cast their vote in the presidential election were turned away at polling stations without any official reason being given.

MULTI-PARTYISM

SADC-PF Recommendation: the concept of pluralism and multiparty democracy and politics should be enshrined in the constitution as the preferred form of political development and the basis of good governance. All stakeholders should commit themselves to pluralism, multiparty democracy and politics as a condition for participating in the political process of the country.

The observations point to lack of political commitment to a multi-party system as evidenced by the lack of tolerance of divergent political views in Zimbabwe. Hate speech, character assassination from the ZANU (PF) leadership characterised campaign methods being used and adverts in the public media. The election campaign was reduced to personality issues.

MISUSE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES AND FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

SADC-PF Recommendations: Where the government supports political parties with taxpayers' money, an agreed upon formula must be used and adhered to in allocating funds to the contesting parties such as Zimbabwe's formula of allocating funds according to the percentage of the total votes received in the last election. There must be accountability in the use of public funds

The ruling party used government facilities for campaigning including state security forces, public media, helicopters, and vehicles from parastatals such as ZESA.

The 2002 Political Party Finance Act amendment made it illegal for political parties to receive foreign donations. As such, ZANU (PF) had an unfair advantage over other contesting parties. In some cases, it was difficult to differentiate between party and government functions.

TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

SADC PF Recommendations: The process should be such that it is open enough to allow the public, political parties and candidates to be informed on a timely basis about developments concerning electoral matters. Electoral rules should apply fairly to all political parties and candidates. Electoral Authorities should deal openly and on equal terms with all political parties.



The Zimbabwean standards and experience in conducting elections gained over the years deteriorated during the 2002 presidential elections. Voter registration was shrouded in secrecy in terms of dates of closure of registration. Discriminatory registration and restrictive proof of residency barred many eligible voters from participating. Relevant voting information like the identity and location of polling stations and a final voters' roll, were not accessible to the electorate. There was poor preparation for the tripartite elections and the mechanisms of where, when and how to vote in the dual and tripartite elections were not adequately covered.

There was no delimitation of constituencies for this election despite new voters being added on the voters' roll. Vote buying was rampant during the campaigning period with the ruling party using land redistribution lists, lists of allocated stands, advertisements of salary and allowances increments for traditional leaders, army and civil servants to lure voters. Some of the increments were reversed for some sectors after the election. The postal voting was not done in a transparent way as it excluded many Zimbabweans, thus depriving them of a chance to exercise their right to vote.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

SADC PF- Recommendation: The courts should be strengthened in terms of human and financial resources. All electable positions should be the subject of judicial review and all cases emanating from electoral petitions should be subject to electoral review.

The promulgation and selective application of certain laws is a big problem for Zimbabweans. As such, the ruling ZANU (PF) had an unfair influence over the judiciary in the 2002 elections as the party's leader could use his executive presidential powers to usurp and reintroduce draconian legislation set aside by the courts. This shows that the principle of separation of powers was undermined (since ideally the judiciary, legislature and executive should operate as separate entities and should have no influence on one another).

POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS

SADC-PF Recommendation: The culture of accepting results and consensus building should be cultivated and encouraged in candidates, political parties and members of the public especially when election observers have certified the election results free and fair. It is also important to institutionalise conflict management, mediation and resolution structures.

Retribution for opposition supporters and sympathisers and purging of the civil service occurred in the period. Violence seems to be on the increase despite the ZANU (PF) - MDC talks. If there is not enough political will put into the talks and enough fostering of the spirit behind them, the polarisation of Zimbabwean society will continue and will definitely worsen. There are no conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. There is also little consensus on the major national issues and the way forward in Zimbabwe.



It is the view of ZESN that the government's conduct during the 2002 elections violated almost all of the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards on the following grounds:

- Voter registration was discriminatory and not transparent.
- Voter education was disrupted and there was insufficient time for the ESC to conduct voter education after the legislation empowering it to do so was promulgated.
- The fast-tracking of legislation meant that there was insufficient time for the ESC to train its 22 000 monitors, all of whom were civil servants.
- It is inappropriate for civil servants to monitor elections. This task should have remained with civil society.
- There were disturbing episodes of violence even during the polling days. For instance, opposition polling agents and ZESN observers were harassed and prevented from carrying out their work.
- There was questionable data on the rural and urban figures, which stated that there was a higher voter turnout in the rural areas than in the urban centres.

Final recommendations

In view of ZESN's assessment that the elections were not free and fair, ZESN recommends the following be implemented to usher back democracy and peace to Zimbabwe:

1. The restoration of the rule of law
2. An audit of the election results by an independent body agreed upon by all participating candidates and parties
3. After the findings ZESN recommends that the Election re-run should only be held after an agreed transitional period during which constitutional and electoral reforms conducive for a free and fair election are put in place.
4. Electoral reforms: Setting up an Independent Electoral Commission with the role of running, administering and managing the elections. This requires a constitutional reform process that will lead to:
 - i) An independent and autonomous electoral commission that administers and manages the elections in Zimbabwe and is overallly responsible for handling all aspects related to elections.



- i) Respect and the observation of civil and political rights i.e. right to assembly, association, movement and campaigning. Effectively this means the repealing of the fast-tracked legislation i.e. POSA, Access to Information Act, and Electoral Amendments.
 - iii) The provision of equal access to the state - owned media for contesting political parties.
 - iv) The liberalisation of the media and air waves
 - v) To develop an acceptable postal voting system, under which all Zimbabweans living outside are able to vote.
 - vi) The establishment of an electoral tribunal that deals with election cases and appeals.
 - vii) The state to ensure that all persons qualified to vote has an opportunity to exercise their right to vote.
 - viii) The simultaneous running of the parliamentary and presidential elections
 - ix) Access to state resources by all contesting parties.
5. An accurate and updated voters roll must be made accessible to the electorate.
 6. (I) Voter Registration must be well publicised and should be an ongoing exercise that continues until at least one month before any election.
II) The voter's right to voting information must be strictly observed by the timely and adequate dissemination of election dates, procedures of voting and location of polling stations.
 7. There must be a code of conduct for political parties, media, observers and monitors.
 8. Accessible and adequate polling stations in every province/constituency.
 9. Administration of elections to be done by professionals, and non-partisan officials.
 10. Allow and recognise the role of NGO's in voter education, election monitoring, observation, lobbying and advocacy.
 11. Non selective application of justice and the arrests of the alleged perpetrators of political violence.
 12. State security agencies and electoral officials to be impartial and professional in the execution of their duties.
 13. The setting up of an independent body to investigate the political violence and that should lead to a reconciliation and rehabilitation process.



14. Incorporation and domestication of the SADC principles and norms for free and fair elections.
15. Counting of ballot papers should be done at each polling station
16. Use of international bodies and mechanisms to redress the violations and mediate in restoring peace in Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

The 2002 presidential election was characterised by violence, intimidation, the draconian legislation, the disenfranchising of voters through the flawed registration process, the partiality of the election administrative machinery and the breakdown of the rule of law and the disputed election results. It is from the foregoing observations that ZESN declares that the 2002 elections violated the SADC norms and standards and as a result the will of the Zimbabwean electorate was not expressed in a transparent, free and fair environment.

As a result of the above assessment, ZESN recommends that a re-run of the presidential elections should be done after an agreed transitional period, during which constitutional and electoral reforms conducive for a free and fair election are put in place.



Annexures

Annexure 1

VOTING PATTERN AGAINST REGISTERED VOTERS BY PROVINCE

NO	PROVINCE	REGISTERED VOTERS*	VALID VOTES CAST**	VALID VOTES CAST %
1	HARARE	882176	412,935	47%
2	BULAWAYO	363028	162,616	45%
3	MATEBELELAND NORTH	338186	175,935	52%
4	MATEBELELAND SOUTH	343996	162,179	47%
5	MASHONALAND CENTRAL	480072	300,613	63%
6	MASHONALAND WEST	572677	322,641	56%
7	MASHONALAND EAST	589185	349,565	59%
8	MANICALAND	658694	353,954	54%
9	MASVINGO	655122	372,095	57%
10	MIDLANDS	724659	418,024	58%
TOTALS		5607795	3030557	54%

*Source: *The Herald* 11 March 2002

**Source: *The Herald* 13 March 2002

Annexure 2


TOTAL VOTES RECEIVED BY EACH CANDIDATE

NO	NAME OF CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTES RECEIVED	%AGAINST VOTES CAST
1	MR. ROBERT MUGABE	ZANU-PF	1,685,212	56.20%
2	MR. MORGAN TSVANGIRAI	MDC	1,258,401	41.96%
3	MR. WILSON KUMBULA	INDEPENDENT	31,368	1.05%
4	DR. SHAKESPEARE MAYA	NAGG	11,906	0.40%
5	MR. PAUL SIWELA	INDEPENDENT	11,871	0.40%
TOTALS			2,998,758	100%

NOTE: These are the results as announced by the Registrar General, Tobaiwa Mudede

Annexure 3


RESULTS BY PARTY



NOTE: These are the results as announced by the Registrar General, Tobaiwa Mudede

Annexure 4

RESULTS BY CANDIDATES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VOTES



Annexure 5



Annexures

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	HARARE PROVINCE											BULAWAYO PROVINCE										
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD. Votes	% papers spoilt	% Poll	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD. Votes	% papers spoilt	% Poll		
BUDIRO	4082	20749	40	17	7	88	24895	53424	0.35	46,60												
CHITUNGWIZA	6855	16901	50	25	20	154	23851	52573	0.65	45,37												
DZIVARASEKWA	7385	18046	27	26	166	166	25650	55750	0.65	46,01												
GLEN NORAH	3907	19021	43	20	14	110	23005	50677	0.48	45,40												
GLEN VIEW	2709	16527	23	10	3	85	19272	49015	0.44	39,32												
HARARE CENTRAL	4292	13880	31	18	11	74	18232	39140	0.41	46,58												
HARARE EAST	5828	16717	64	23	23	179	22655	46035	0.79	49,21												
HARARE NORTH	5696	19525	62	7	22	117	25312	52178	0.46	48,51												
HARARE SOUTH	6219	13646	29	22	11	106	19927	38441	0.53	51,84												
HATFIELD	9502	15354	54	32	27	318	24969	48166	1.27	51,84												
HIGHFIELD	3187	14919	38	16	13	107	18173	41794	0.59	43,48												
KAMBUZUMA	3299	15469	38	23	6	78	18835	36692	0.41	51,33												
KUWADZANA	5047	18263	23	28	7	72	23368	45862	0.31	50,95												
MABVUKU	5066	17039	64	35	32	236	22236	48267	1.06	46,07												
MBARE EAST	5192	11353	49	26	17	236	16637	38640	1.42	43,06												
MBARE WEST	3342	14382	34	19	9	107	17786	38815	0.60	45,82												
MUFAKOSE	7661	12101	51	17	21	237	19851	40022	1.19	49,60												
ST. MARYS	6546	20094	78	38	22	220	26778	57777	0.82	46,35												
ZENGEZA	5580	15846	35	28	14	118	21503	45447	0.55	47,31												
Total	101395	309832	833	430	445	2808	412935	878715	0.68	46.99												
LOBENGULA MAGWEGWE	2896	15364	44	21	32	57	18357	44027	0.31	41,69												
BULAWAYO NORTH EAST	3794	18669	44	23	37	117	22567	46998	0.52	48,02												
BULAWAYO SOUTH	4666	18624	35	37	34	53	23396	48169	0.23	48,57												
MAKUKOBA	3027	13176	72	21	28	6	16324	38558	0.04	42,34												
NKULUMANE	4917	18602	45	25	34	97	23623	49879	0.41	47,36												
PELENDABA	3376	15485	49	23	60	83	18993	45346	0.44	41,88												
PUMULA LUVEVE	4015	17970	66	27	51	127	22129	49812	0.57	44,43												
MPOPOMA	3137	14000	47	17	26	90	17227	39001	0.52	44,17												
Total	29828	131890	402	194	302	630	162616	361790	0.39	41.11												

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD, Votes	% Papers Spoilt	% Poll
CHIRUMANZU	16791	6578	418	124	125	604	24036	50098	2.51	47.98
GOKWE NORTH	23663	7131	380	157	214	786	31545	47238	2.49	66.78
GOKWE EAST	24773	7830	279	105	124	782	33111	49478	2.36	66.92
GOKWE SOUTH	17398	5744	415	160	54	594	23771	40506	2.50	58.69
GOKWE CENTRAL	17777	9281	378	124	107	395	27667	44647	1.43	61.97
GOKWE WEST	22044	6713	582	166	129	774	29634	47007	2.61	63.04
MBERENGWA EAST	24672	3128	312	76	98	469	28286	41838	1.66	67.61
MBERENGWA WEST	21182	4395	403	101	135	496	26216	51129	1.89	51.27
SHURUGWI	19724	7950	318	120	98	392	28210	43621	1.39	64.67
ZVISHAVANE	15910	10815	246	92	74	340	27137	49312	1.25	55.03
GWERU URBAN	5570	13332	61	40	23	115	19026	50236	0.60	37.87
GWERU RURAL	9608	10401	247	75	123	411	20454	46636	2.01	43.86
MKOKA	5448	16129	41	26	14	131	21658	46111	0.62	45.89
KWEKWE	9917	17061	90	57	35	141	27160	41922	0.52	64.79
SILOBELA	9191	15980	178	81	102	276	25532	39714	1.08	64.29
ZHOMBE	15112	8887	336	123	123	353	24581	42307	1.44	58.10
Total	258780	151355	4684	1627	1578	7059	418024	731800	1.69	57.05

MANICALAND PROVINCE

BUHERA NORTH	16248	12897	403	123	156	419	29827	52447	1.40	56.87
BUHERA SOUTH	15531	12720	836	255	255	574	29597	50480	1.94	58.63
CHIMANIMANI	15859	12750	351	136	111	433	29207	51252	1.48	56.99
CHIPINGE NORTH	9198	12940	310	160	147	397	22755	52809	1.74	56.99
CHIPINGE SOUTH	69426	18336	791	229	313	761	26643	54896	2.86	56.99
MAKONI EAST	10230	7000	269	77	68	350	18494	37988	1.89	56.99
MAKONI NORTH	18352	4750	378	107	91	575	23723	42794	2.42	56.99
MAKONI WEST	13590	8511	380	133	117	412	22731	44713	1.81	56.99
MUTARE CENTRAL	5294	21290	48	23	21	124	26682	50603	0.46	56.99
MUTARE NORTH	7580	12940	120	47	50	497	25737	46163	1.93	56.99
MUTARE SOUTH	9673	5742	297	100	94	358	18906	38363	1.89	56.99

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TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	MANICALAND PROVINCE										T/RGD. Votes	% Papers Spoilt	% Poll
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes						
MUTARE WEST	13788	7724	568	142	109	474	22331			43203	2.12	51.69	
MUTASA	10832	12923	272	103	111	503	24241			44855	2.07	54.04	
NYANGA	19418	12781	507	197	177	616	33080			56853	1.86	58.19	
Total	172547	172225	5530	1832	1820	6493	353954			667419	1.83	53.03	
MASHONALAND WEST													
CHEGUTU	16083	11493	172	118	98	363	27964			55557	1.30	50.33	
CHINHOI	11432	8477	78	44	22	191	20053			39044	0.95	51.36	
HURUNGWE EAST	19455	4635	273	114	96	538	24573			45318	2.19	54.22	
HURUNGWE WEST	24057	6218	427	155	172	650	31029			53930	2.09	57.54	
KADOMA CENTRAL	9345	14446	97	53	37	181	23978			43597	0.75	55.00	
KADOMA EAST	18771	3123	198	32	43	324	22167			37961	1.46	58.39	
KADOMA WEST	21481	5656	145	76	52	462	27410			39720	1.69	69.01	
KARIBA	22240	9718	372	179	180	739	32689			58945	2.26	55.46	
MAKONDE	20421	2662	226	108	99	494	23516			44488	2.10	52.86	
MHONDORO	17681	10628	195	92	60	326	28656			50497	1.14	56.83	
ZVIMBA NORTH	21509	4755	229	117	88	572	26698			50497	2.14	52.87	
ZVIMBA SOUTH	27846	5687	224	79	72	687	33908			59277	2.03	57.20	
TOTAL	230321	87498	2636	1167	1019	5527	322641			578831	1.71	55.74	
MASHONALAND EAST													
CHIKOMBA	23450	7035	426	121	112	351	31144			48898	1.13	63.69	
GOROMONZI	20158	9608	284	132	109	548	30291			57123	1.80	53.15	
HWEDZA	21436	7282	382	157	130	476	29387			53939	1.62	54.48	
MARONDERA EAST	15719	11667	187	61	51	275	27685			51012	0.99	54.27	
MARONDERA WEST	16591	4891	259	82	78	391	21901			40604	1.79	53.94	
MUDZI	33838	4226	488	225	244	946	39021			62854	2.42	62.08	
MUREHWA NORTH	16616	5102	317	123	94	340	22252			43446	1.53	51.22	
MUREHWA SOUTH	16913	5180	399	143	127	481	22762			42500	2.11	53.90	
MUTOKO SOUTH	27339	2120	201	94	82	413	29836			40907	1.38		

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes	T/RGD. Votes	% Papers Spolt	% Poll
MASHONALAND EAST										
MUTOKO NORTH	22357	3748	314	101	83	549	26603	43446	2.06	61.23
SEKE	14667	12551	218	90	67	443	27593	52784	1.61	52.28
UMP	37341	3197	297	130	125	591	41090	56734	1.44	72.43
TOTAL	266425	76607	3772	1459	1302	5804	349565	594247	1.66	58.82
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE										
MAZOWE WEST	16471	6219	184	76	64	419	23014	51129	1.82	45.01
MAZOWE EAST	18404	7683	322	101	28	431	26538	46709	1.62	56.82
BINDURA	19932	11279	291	105	93	404	31700	58556	1.27	54.14
MOUNT DARWIN SOUTH	29680	2205	292	135	125	578	32437	47710	1.78	67.99
MOUNT DARWIN NORTH	29238	2144	362	171	157	652	32072	48428	2.03	66.23
GURUVE NORTH	28517	2700	291	140	111	439	31759	48504	1.38	65.48
GURUVE SOUTH	30651	2646	243	87	64	244	33691	42886	0.72	78.56
SHAMVA	25863	4277	294	105	99	427	30638	52582	1.39	58.27
RUSHINGA	26669	2523	220	108	126	409	29646	41847	1.38	70.84
MUZARABANI	25260	3463	248	100	47	417	29118	47147	1.43	61.76
TOTAL	250685	45139	2747	1128	914	4420	300613	485498	1.47	61.92
MASVINGO PROVINCE										
BIKITA EAST	16171	6211	464	152	187	523	23185	38595	2.26	60.07
BIKITA WEST	16930	8742	552	168	1	518	26542	43642	1.95	60.82
CHIREZI NORTH	20718	8665	285	121	100	483	29889	55216	1.62	54.13
CHIREZI SOUTH	19437	6389	375	194	214	680	26609	50498	2.56	52.69
CHIVI NORTH	17683	5638	409	75	116	483	23921	41157	2.02	58.12
CHIVI SOUTH	17190	4987	90	57	35	374	22359	42540	1.67	52.56
GUTU NORTH	22524	8934	430	104	130	432	32122	55702	1.34	57.67
GUTU SOUTH	17594	10845	550	208	154	508	29351	52460	1.73	55.95
MASVINGO CENTRAL	9757	15471	261	101	73	297	25663	47247	1.16	54.32
MASVINGO NORTH	13035	9333	264	87	80	300	22799	41184	1.32	55.36
MASVINGO SOUTH	13317	5526	549	170	145	563	19707	37463	2.86	52.60
MWENEZI	29019	3554	479	158	147	819	33357	56774	2.46	58.75

Annexure 5



Annexures

TABULATION OF 2002 ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS PER CONSTITUENCY

	MASVINGO PROVINCE										T/RGD, Votes	% Papers Spoilt	% Poll
	ZANU-PF	MDC	Kumbula	NAGG	Siwela	Spoilt Papers	Total Valid Votes						
ZAKA EAST	21529	5941	400	207	168	504	28245			48545	1.78	58.18	
ZAKA WEST	19699	7800	546	160	141	600	28346			51576	2.12	54.96	
TOTAL	254603	108036	5654	1962	1840	7084	372095			662599	1.90	56.16	
MATEBELELAND NORTH PROVINCE													
HWANGE WEST	4712	14736	146	53	75	281	19722			40943	1.42	48.17	
TSHOLOTSHO	10838	10089	420	147	246	516	21740			22256	2.36	97.68	
BINGA	5351	26886	386	213	419	1630	33255			54094	4.90	61.48	
LUPANE	7778	14524	497	199	252	612	23250			47607	2.63	48.84	
HWANGE EAST	4610	15950	222	73	145	727	21000			42335	3.46	49.60	
NKAYI	11552	15616	268	395	215	395	28046			53228	1.41	52.69	
BUBI-UMGUZA	16433	11970	279	104	136	418	28922			56535	1.45	51.16	
TOTAL	61274	109771	2218	1184	1488	4579	175935			316998	2.60	55.50	
MATEBELELAND SOUTH PROVINCE													
BEITBRIDGE	16448	6844	386	170	182	779	24030			48511	3.24	49.54	
BULILIMANGWE NORTH	7647	11730	507	175	224	559	20283			51895	2.76	39.08	
BULILIMANGWE SOUTH	6625	11994	317	134	42	420	19112			43485	2.20	43.95	
GWANDA NORTH	5867	12610	200	55	91	262	18823			37927	1.39	49.63	
GWANDA SOUTH	12070	6774	295	93	77	734	19309			38157	3.80	50.60	
INSIZA	9089	10579	295	95	117	363	20175			41134	1.80	49.05	
MATOBO	9740	12565	412	105	166	449	22988			48768	1.95	47.14	
UMZINGWANE	5883	11226	199	72	79	213	17459			35770	1.22	48.81	
TOTAL	73369	84322	2611	899	978	3779	162179			345647	2.33	46.92	

Source: *The Herald* 13 March 2002

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

	BULAWAYO PROVINCE									
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF	
Lobengula - Magwegwe	17041	2197	15364	2896	18260	-1677	699	-9.18	3.83	
Bulawayo North East	21100	2864	18669	3794	22463	-2431	930	-10.82	4.14	
Bulawayo South	20781	3193	18624	4666	23290	-2157	1473	-9.26	6.32	
Makokoba	12901	2196	13176	3027	16203	275	831	1.70	5.13	
Nkulumane	20380	3644	18602	4917	23519	-1778	1273	-7.56	5.41	
Pelandaba	16462	2696	15485	3376	18861	-977	680	-5.18	3.61	
Pumula - Luveve	18901	3020	17970	4015	21985	-931	995	-4.23	4.53	
Mpopoma	14813	2540	14000	3137	17137	-813	597	-4.74	3.48	
Sub total	142379	22350	131890	29828	161718	-10489	7478	-6.49	4.62	
HARARE PROVINCE										
Budiriro	21058	4410	20749	4082	24831	-309	-328	-1.24	-1.32	
Chitungwiza	15480	6056	16901	6855	23756	1421	799	5.98	3.36	
Dzivarasekwa	18516	6084	18046	7385	25431	-470	1301	-1.85	5.12	
Glen Norah	17866	3517	19021	3907	22928	1155	390	5.04	1.70	
Glen View	16470	3443	16527	2709	19236	57	-734	0.30	-3.82	
Harare Central	14207	3620	13880	4292	18172	-327	672	-1.80	3.70	
Harare East	18129	4391	16717	5828	22545	-1412	1437	-6.26	6.37	
Harare North	18976	4852	19525	5696	25221	549	844	2.18	3.35	
Harare South	12430	4730	13646	6219	19865	1216	1489	6.12	7.50	
Hatfield	11740	5413	15354	9502	24856	3614	4089	14.54	16.45	
Highfields	12616	3234	14919	3187	18106	2303	-47	12.72	-0.26	
Kambuzuma	13722	2542	15469	3299	18768	1747	757	9.31	4.03	
Kuwadzana	15691	4349	18263	5047	23310	2572	698	11.03	2.99	
Mabvuku	17495	5572	17039	5066	22105	-456	-506	-2.06	-2.29	
Mbare East	10754	4265	11353	5192	16545	599	927	3.62	5.660	
Mbare West	13118	122	14382	3342	17724	1264	3220	7.13	18.17	
Mufakose	15233	3965	12101	7661	19762	-3132	-3696	-15.85	18.70	
St Mary's	17740	6135	20094	6546	26638	2354	411	8.84	1.54	
Zengeza	14814	5330	15846	5580	21426	1032	250	4.82	1.17	
Sub total	296055	82030	309832	101395	411227	13777	19365	3.35	4.71	

Annexure 6

Annexures

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

	MANICALAND PROVINCE								
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	% DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Buhera North	10316	12850	12897	16248	29145	2581	3398	8.86	11.66
Buhera South	7821	14016	12720	15531	28251	4899	1515	17.34	5.36
Chimanimani	11410	8072	12750	15859	28609	1340	7787	4.68	27.22
Chipinge North	9283	3728	12940	9198	22138	3657	5470	16.52	24.71
Chipinge South	3283	4086	18356	6954	25310	15073	2868	59.55	11.33
Makoni East	7391	7509	7850	10230	18080	459	2721	2.54	15.05
Makoni North	3357	14835	4795	18352	23147	1438	3517	6.21	15.19
Makoni West	7356	11138	8511	13590	22101	1155	2452	5.23	11.09
Mutare Central	1770	3091	21296	5294	26590	3590	2203	13.50	8.29
Mutare North	15500	5564	17940	7580	25520	2440	2016	9.56	7.90
Mutare South	7273	6673	8742	9673	18415	1469	3000	7.98	16.29
Mutare West	5818	11498	7724	13788	21512	1906	2290	8.86	10.65
Mutasa	9278	5281	12923	10832	23755	3645	5551	15.34	23.37
Nyanga	10016	8891	12781	19418	32199	2765	10527	8.59	32.69
Sub Total	125808	117232	172225	172547	344772	46417	55315	13.46	16.04
MASHONALAND EAST									
Chikomba	6776	13417	7035	23450	30485	259	10033	0.85	32.91
Goromonzi	9489	14459	9608	20158	29838	119	5699	0.40	19.15
Marondera East	10629	10692	11667	15719	27386	1038	5027	3.79	18.36
Marondera West	4570	11221	4891	16591	21482	321	5370	1.49	25.00
Mudzi	2371	27149	4226	33838	38064	1855	6689	4.87	17.57
Murehwa North	4104	13694	5102	16616	21718	998	2922	4.60	13.45
Murehwa South	4426	13895	5180	16913	22093	754	3018	3.41	13.66
Mutoko North	2447	17374	3748	22357	26105	2571	4983	9.85	11.99
Mutoko South	1177	19228	2120	27339	29459	8111	943	-1.11	33.83
Seke	10821	9236	12551	14667	27218	1730	5431	6.36	19.11
Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	2128	27748	3197	37341	40538	1069	9593	2.64	23.69
Wedza	6049	18044	7282	21436	28718	1233	3392	4.29	14.76
Sub Total	64987	196157	76607	266425	343032	11620	70268	3.76	21.11

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

	MASHONALAND WEST								
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Chegutu	10412	12169	11493	16083	27576	1081	3914	3.92	14.19
Chinhoyi	7602	8176	8477	11432	19909	875	3256	4.39	16.35
Hurungwe East	4345	14814	4635	19455	24090	320	464	1.33	1.93
Hurungwe West	4532	18991	6218	24057	30275	1686	9243	5.57	30.53
Kadoma Central	5666	12049	14446	9345	23791	8780	-2704	36.90	11.37
Kadoma East	3362	11678	3123	18771	21894	-239	7093	-1.09	32.40
Kadoma West	4581	11758	5656	21481	27137	1075	9723	3.96	35.83
Kariba	7332	15048	9718	22240	32020	2386	7192	7.47	22.46
Makonde	3294	13066	2662	20421	23083	-632	7355	-2.74	31.86
Mhondoro	10783	9118	10628	17681	28309	-155	8563	-0.55	30.25
Zvimba North	5872	16175	4755	21509	26264	-1117	5334	-4.25	20.31
Zvimba South	4689	16508	5687	27846	33533	998	11338	2.98	33.81
Sub Total	72440	159550	87498	230321	317819	15058	70771	4.74	22.27
	MASHONALAND CENTRAL								
Bindura	11257	13328	11279	19932	31211	22	6604	0.07	21.16
Guruve North	2370	20513	2700	28517	31217	330	8004	1.06	25.64
Guruve South	3239	19988	2646	30651	33297	-593	10663	-1.78	32.02
Shamva	5621	19460	4277	25863	30140	-1344	6403	-4.46	21.24
Mazowe East	7473	18824	7683	18404	26087	210	-420	0.80	-1.61
Mazowe West	7085	14024	6219	16471	22690	-866	2447	-3.82	10.78
Rushinga	2483	20027	2523	26669	29192	40	6642	0.14	22.75
Mt Darwin North	2037	20629	2144	29238	31382	107	8609	0.34	27.43
Mt Darwin South	2295	22733	2205	29680	31885	-90	6947	-0.28	21.79
Muzarabani	3727	19441	3463	25260	28723	-264	5819	-0.92	20.26
Sub Total	47587	188967	45139	250685	295824	-2448	61718	-0.83	20.86

Annexure 6

COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)



Annexures

MASVINGO

	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Chivi South	4312	12056	4987	17190	22177	675	5134	3.04	23.15
Chivi North	3938	10947	5638	17683	23321	1700	6736	7.29	28.88
Bikita East	5015	7047	6211	16171	22382	1196	9124	5.34	40.76
Bikita West	7726	7445	8742	16930	25672	1016	9485	3.96	36.95
Mwenezi	1881	22676	3554	29019	32573	1673	6343	5.14	19.47
Chiredzi North	8675	10154	8665	20718	29383	-10	10564	-0.03	35.95
Chiredzi South	6414	11611	6389	19437	25826	-25	7826	-0.10	30.30
Gutu North	8179	14867	8934	22524	31458	755	7657	2.40	24.34
Gutu South	6606	11434	10845	17594	28439	4239	6160	14.91	21.66
Masvingo Central	12417	8023	15471	9757	25228	3054	1734	12.1	6.87
Masvingo North	7224	8146	9333	13035	22368	2109	4889	9.43	21.86
Masvingo South	5444	14954	5526	13317	18843	82	-1637	0.44	-8.69
Zaka East	6778	12730	5941	21529	27470	-837	8799	-3.05	32.03
Zaka West	7444	10928	7800	19699	27499	356	8771	1.29	31.90
SUB TOTAL	92053	163018	108036	254603	362639	15983	91585	4.41	25.26

MATEBELELAND NORTH

Binga	19894	2675	26886	5351	32237	6992	2676	21.69	8.30
Bubi-Umguza	12837	6645	11970	16433	28403	-867	9788	-3.05	34.44
Hwange East	15271	3617	15950	4610	20560	679	993	3.30	4.83
Hwange West	15132	2445	14736	4712	19448	-396	2267	-2.04	11.66
Lupane	14439	3300	14524	7778	22302	85	4478	0.38	20.08
Nkayi	15601	5746	15616	11552	27168	15	5806	0.06	21.37
Tsholotsho	12318	5634	10089	10838	20927	-2229	5204	-10.65	24.87
Sub Total	105492	30062	109771	61274	171045	4279	31212	2.50	18.25

MATEBELELAND SOUTH

Beitbridge	7686	12988	6844	16448	23292	-842	3460	-3.61	14.14
Buliimangwe South	11761	5617	11994	6625	18619	227	-2054	1.22	
Buliimangwe North	11767	8679	11730	7647	19377	-37	-1032	-0.20	
Gwanda North	13039	4358	12610	5867	18477	-429	1509	-2.11	


COMPARISON OF 2000 AND 2002 ELECTION RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)

MATEBELELAND SOUTH									
	MDC 2000	ZANU-PF 2000	MDC 2002	ZANU PF 2002	2002 Total	MDC DIFF	ZANU PF DIFF	%DIFF MDC	% DIFF ZANU PF
Gwanda South	9913	7944	6774	12070	18844	-3139	4126	-16.66	21.90
Insiza	12049	5304	10579	9089	19668	-1470	3785	-7.47	19.24
Matobo	14701	6419	12565	9740	22305	-2136	3321	-9.58	14.89
Umzingwane	12878	2887	11226	5883	17109	-1652	2996	-9.66	17.51
Sub Total	93794	54196	84322	73369	157691	-9472	19173	-6.04	10.27
MIDLANDS									
Kwekwe	15388	8352	17061	9917	26978	1673	1565	6.20	5.80
Silobela	15985	5848	15980	9191	25171	-5	3343	-0.02	13.28
Mkoba	14587	4840	16129	5448	21577	1542	608	7.15	2.82
Gweru Urban	12172	3877	13332	5570	18902	1160	1693	6.14	8.96
Gweru Rural	10190	6889	10401	9608	20009	211	2719	1.05	13.59
Chirumhanzu	5185	10708	6578	16791	23369	1393	6083	5.96	26.03
Gokwe Central	5987	11082	9281	17777	27058	3294	6695	12.17	24.74
Gokwe East	3674	17088	7830	24773	32603	4156	7685	12.75	23.57
Gokwe North	3967	15923	7131	23663	30794	3164	7740	10.27	25.13
Gokwe South	3615	12644	5744	17398	23142	2129	4754	9.20	20.54
Gokwe West	3240	14596	6713	22044	28757	3473	7448	12.08	25.90
Mberengwa East	3113	23595	3128	24672	27800	15	1077	0.05	3.87
Mberengwa West	3889	18315	4395	21182	25577	506	2867	1.97	11.21
Shurugwi	6524	14891	7950	19724	27674	1426	4833	5.15	17.46
Zvishavane	10373	13971	10815	15910	26725	442	1939	1.65	7.26
Zhombe	8165	10757	8887	15112	23999	722	4355	3.01	18.15
Sub Total	126058	193736	151355	258780	410135	25297	65044	6.17	15.95
Total	1166653	1207298	1281801	1699229	2981030	115148	491931	3.74	16.44

Key: Negative(-) means a decrease from the number of people who voted for that party in 2000 and those who voted for it in 2002.

NB: The percentage difference has been worked out using the total number of people who voted in 2002.


Annexure 7

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF VOTE COMPARISON PER PARTY BETWEEN 2000 AND 2002 FOR MDC AND ZANU (PF)**KEY**

1. MDC 2000
2. ZANU PF 2000
3. MDC 2002
4. ZANU PF 2002




Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY


- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002

Annexure 7

**KEY**

1. MDC 2000
2. ZANU PF 2000
3. MDC 2002
4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002


Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002

Annexure 7



KEY

- 1. MDC 2000
- 2. ZANU PF 2000
- 3. MDC 2002
- 4. ZANU PF 2002

Annexure 8

PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS

Year	Total votes	Registered voters	Vote/Reg	VAP	Vote /VAP	Invalid	F H	Population
2002	556 261	5 288 804	48.3%	6 392 195	40.0%	5.4%	11	13 047 482
1995	1 485 660	4 822 289	30.8%	5 718 500	26.0%	5.5%	10	11 437 000
1990	2 235 425	N/A	N/A	4 590 810	48.7%	N/A	10	9 369 000
1985	2 972 146	N/A	N/A	3 938 130	75.5%	1.5%	10	8 379 000
1980	2 702 275	N/A	N/A	3 213 000	84.1%	N/A	7	7 140 000
1979	1 852 772	2 900 000	63.1%	3 118 500	59.4%	3.6%	9	6 930 000

Annexure 9

PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

Zimbabwe Year	Total votes	Africa	Vote/Reg	VAP	Vote /VAP	Invalid	F H	Population
1996	1 557 558	4 822 289	32.3%	5 839 000	26.7%	3.0%	10	11 678 000
1990	2 587 204	N/A	N/A	4 590 810	56.4%	5.7%	10	9 369 000

SOURCE: IDEA's Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report 2002.

KEY: 1. Vote Registration - number of votes divided by number of names on voter,s register
Expressed as a %.

VAP - a number of votes divided by the Voting Age Population figure, expressed as a %

Vote/VAP - number of votes divided by the voting Age Population figure expressed as a %

Invalid - invalid voted

FH - Freedom House - indicate levels of freedom in a political system.

Population - total population as described under voting age population.

WHOSE CONSTITUENCY IN 2000 AND 2002

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		Differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
	Lobengula - Magwegwe	2896	15364	2197	17041	699	-1677	MDC
Bulawayo North East	3794	18669	2864	21100	930	-2431	MDC	MDC
Bulawayo South	4666	18624	3193	20781	1473	-2157	MDC	MDC
Mkokoba	3027	13176	2196	12901	831	275	MDC	MDC
Nkulumane	4917	18602	3644	20380	1273	-1778	MDC	MDC
Pelendaba	3376	15485	2696	16462	680	-9787	MDC	MDC
Pumula-Luveve	4015	17970	3020	18901	995	-931	MDC	MDC
Mpopoma	3137	14000	2540	14813	597	-813	MDC	MDC
Highfield	3187	14919	3234	12616	-47	-2303	MDC	MDC
Budiriro	4082	20749	4410	21058	-328	-309	MDC	MDC
Chitungwiza	6855	16901	6056	15480	799	1421	MDC	MDC
Dzivarasekwa	7385	18046	6084	18516	1301	-470	MDC	MDC
Glen Norah	3907	19021	3517	17866	390	1155	MDC	MDC
GlenView	2709	16527	3443	16470	734	57	MDC	MDC
Harare Central	4292	13880	3620	14207	672	-327	MDC	MDC
Harare East	5828	16717	4391	18129	1437	-1412	MDC	MDC
Harare North	5696	19525	4852	18976	844	549	MDC	MDC
Harare South	6219	13646	4730	12430	1489	1216	MDC	MDC
Hatfield	9502	15354	5413	11740	4089	3614	MDC	MDC
Kambuzuma	3299	15469	2542	13722	757	1747	MDC	MDC
Kuwadzana	5047	18263	4349	15691	698	2572	MDC	MDC
Mabvuku	5066	17039	5572	17495	-506	-456	MDC	MDC
Mbare East	5192	11353	4265	10754	927	599	MDC	MDC
Mbare West	3342	14382	122	13118	3220	1264	MDC	MDC
Mufakose	7661	12101	3965	15233	3696	-3132	MDC	MDC
St Mary's	6546	20094	6135	17740	411	2354	MDC	MDC
Zengeza	5580	15846	5330	14814	250	1032	MDC	MDC
Buhera North	16248	12897	12850	10316	3398	2581	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Buhera South	15531	12720	14016	7821	1515	4899	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chimanimani	5859	12750	8072	11410	7787	1340	ZANU PF	MDC

WHOSE CONSTITUENCY IN 2000 AND 2002

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
	Chipinge North	9198	12940	3728	9283	5470	3657	MDC
Chipinge South	6954	18356	4086	3283	2868	15073	MDC	ZANU NDONGA
Makoni East	10230	7850	7509	7391	2721	459	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Makoni North	18352	4795	14835	3357	3517	1438	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Makoni West	13590	8511	11138	7356	2452	1155	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutare Central	5294	21296	3091	17706	2203	3590	MDC	MDC
Mutare North	7580	17940	5564	15500	2016	2440	MDC	MDC
Mutare South	9673	8742	6673	7273	3000	1469	ZANU PF	MDC
Mutare West	13788	7724	11498	5818	2290	1906	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutasa	10832	12923	5281	9278	5551	3645	MDC	MDC
Nyanga	19418	12781	8891	10016	10527	2765	ZANU PF	MDC
Chikomba	23450	7035	13417	6776	10033	259	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Goromonzi	20158	9608	14459	9489	5699	119	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Marondera East	15719	11667	10692	10629	5027	1038	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Marondera West	16591	4891	11221	4570	5370	321	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mudzi	33838	4226	27149	2371	6689	1855	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Murehwa North	16616	5102	13694	4104	2922	998	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Murehwa South	16913	5180	13895	4426	3018	754	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutoko North	22357	3748	17374	2447	4983	2571	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mutoko South	27339	2120	19228	1177	8111	943	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Seke	14667	12551	9236	10821	5431	1730	ZANU PF	MDC
Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	37341	3197	27748	2128	9593	-1069	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Wedza	21436	7282	18044	6049	3392	1233	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chegutu	16083	11493	12169	10412	3914	1081	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chinhoyi	11432	8477	8176	7602	3256	875	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Hurungwe West	24057	6218	18991	4532	5066	1903	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Hurungwe East	19455	4635	14814	4315	4641	420	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Kadoma Central	9345	14446	12049	5666	-2704	8780	MDC	ZANU PF
Kadoma East	18771	3123	11678	3362	7093	-239	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Kadoma West	21481	5656	11758	4581	9723	1075	ZANU PF	ZANU PF

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
Kariba	22240	9718	15048	7332	7192	2386	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Makonde	20421	2662	13066	3294	7353	-632	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mhondoro	17681	10628	9118	10783	8563	-155	ZANU PF	MDC
Zvimba North	21509	4755	16175	5872	5334	-1117	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zvimba South	27846	5687	16508	4689	11306	998	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Bindura	19932	11279	13328	11257	6604	22	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Guruve North	28517	2700	20513	2370	8004	330	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Guruve South	30651	2646	19988	3239	663	-593	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Shamva	25863	4277	19460	5621	6403	-1344	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mazowe East	18404	7683	18824	7473	-420	210	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mazowe West	16471	6219	14024	7085	2447	-866	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Rushinga	26669	2523	20027	2483	6642	40	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mt Darwin North	29238	2144	20629	2037	8609	107	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mt Darwin South	29680	2205	22733	2295	6947	-90	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Muzarabani	25260	3463	19441	3727	5819	-264	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chivi South	17190	4987	12056	4312	5134	675	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Chivi North	17683	5638	10947	3938	6736	1700	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Bikita East	16171	6211	7047	5015	9124	1196	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Bikita West	16930	8742	7445	7726	9485	1016	ZANU PF	MDC
Mwenezi	29019	3554	22676	1881	6343	1673	ZANUPF	ZANU PF
Chiredzi North	20718	8665	10154	8675	9570	-10	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Chiredzi South	19437	6389	11611	6414	10564	-25	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gutu North	22524	8934	14867	8179	7657	755	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gutu South	17594	10845	11434	6606	6160	4239	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Masvingo Central	9757	15471	8023	12417	1734	3054	MDC	MDC
Masvingo North	13035	9333	8146	7224	4889	2109	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Masvingo South	13317	5526	14954	5444	-1637	82	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zaka East	21529	5941	12730	6778	8799	-837	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zaka West	19699	7800	10928	7444	8771	356	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Binga	5351	26886	2675	19894	2676	6992	MDC	MDC
Bubi-Umguza	16433	11970	6645	12837	9788	-920	ZANU PF	MDC



Annexure 10

WHOSE CONSTITUENCY IN 2000 AND 2002

CONSTITUENCY	2002		2000		differences		Whose Constituency?	
	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	ZANU PF	MDC	2002	2000
Hwange East	4610	15950	3617	15271	993	679	MDC	MDC
Hwange West	4712	14736	2445	15132	2267	-396	MDC	MDC
Lupane	7778	14524	3300	14439	4478	85	MDC	MDC
Nkayi	11552	15616	5746	15601	5806	15	MDC	MDC
Tsholotsho	10838	10089	5634	12318	5204	-2229	ZANU PF	MDC
Beit-Bridge	16448	6844	12988	7686	3460	-842	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Bulilimangwe South	6625	11994	5617	11761	2054	227	MDC	MDC
Bulilimangwe North	7647	11730	8679	11767	-1032	-37	MDC	MDC
Gwanda North	5867	12610	4358	13039	1509	-429	MDC	MDC
Gwanda South	12070	6774	7944	9913	4126	-3139	ZANU PF	MDC
Insiza	9089	10579	5304	12049	3785	-1470	MDC	MDC
Matobo	9740	12565	6419	14701	3321	-2186	MDC	MDC
Umzingwane	5883	11226	2887	12878	2996	-1652	MDC	MDC
Kwekwe	9917	17061	8352	15388	1565	1673	MDC	MDC
Silobela	9191	15980	5848	15985	3271	-5	MDC	MDC
Mkoba	5448	16129	4840	14587	608	1542	MDC	MDC
Gweru Urban	5570	13332	3877	12172	1693	1160	MDC	MDC
Gweru Rural	9608	10401	6889	10190	2719	211	MDC	MDC
Churumhanzi	16791	6578	10708	5185	6083	1393	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe Central	17777	9281	11082	5987	6695	3294	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe East	24773	7830	17088	3674	7685	4156	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe North	23663	7131	15923	3967	7740	3164	ZANU PF	ZANUPF
Gokwe South	17398	5744	12644	3615	4754	2129	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Gokwe West	22044	6713	14956	3240	7088	3490	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mberengwa East	24672	3128	23595	3113	1077	15	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Mberengwa West	21182	4395	18315	3889	2867	506	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Shurugwi	19724	7950	14891	6524	4833	1426	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zvishavane	15910	10815	13971	10373	1939	442	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
Zhombe	15112	8887	10757	8165	4355	722	ZANU PF	ZANU PF
							MDC Total	50
							ZANU PF TOTAL	70

Annexure 11

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLLING STATIONS

HARARE PROVINCE

	Fixed Polling Stations		Mobile Polling Stations		Difference		% Difference	
	2002	2000	2002	2000	Fixed	Mobile	Fixed	Mobile
Chitungwiza	9	13	0	0	-4	0	-30.8	0
Dzivarasekwa	9	13	0	0	-4	0	-30.8	0
Glen Norah	8	14	0	0	-6	0	-42.9	0
Glen View	7	9	0	0	-2	0	-22.22	0
Harare Central	10	16	0	0	-6	0	-37.50	0
Harare East	11	22	0	0	-11	0	-50.0	0
Harare North	9	17	0	0	-8	0	-47.1	0
Harare South	13	18	0	0	-5	0	-27.8	0
Highfield	6	8	0	0	-2	0	-25.0	0
Hatfield	9	12	0	0	-3	0	-25.0	0
Kambuzuma	7	9	0	0	-2	0	-22.2	0
Kuwadzana	7	9	0	0	-2	0	-22.2	0
Mabvuku	8	11	0	0	-3	0	-27.3	0
Mbare East	12	14	0	0	-2	0	-14.3	0
Mbare West	8	10	0	0	-2	0	-20.0	0
Mufakose	9	13	0	0	-4	0	-30.8	0
St. Mary's	11	13	0	0	-2	0	-15.4	0
Zengeza	7	12	0	0	-5	0	-41.7	0
Budiriro	7	11	0	0	-4	0	-36.4	0
TOTAL	167	244	0	0	-77	0	-30.0	0

BULAWAYO PROVINCE

Bulawayo North	22	30	1	1	-8	0	-26.7	0
Bulawayo South	15	22	0	0	-7	0	-31.8	0
Lobengula	11	14	0	0	-3	0	-21.4	0
Nkulumane	15	18	0	0	-3	0	-16.7	0
Mpumalanga Luveve	21	27	0	0	-6	0	-22.2	0
Pelandaba	13	17	0	0	-4	0	-23.5	0
Mpopoma	14	15	0	0	-1	0	-6.7	0
Makokoba	13	17	0	0	-4	0	-23.5	0
TOTAL	124	160	1	1	-36	0	-21.6	0

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

Chirumhanzu	59	34	5	5	25	0	73.5	-100.0
Gokwe North	62	36	0	2	26	-2	72.2	-100.0
Gokwe East	52	35	0	5	17	-5	48.6	0
Gokwe Central	52	40	0	0	12	0	30.0	-100.0
Gokwe West	59	37	0	3	22	-3	59.5	-100.0
Gokwe South	58	40	0	0	18	0	45.0	0
Gweru Urban	10	24	0	0	-14	0	-58.3	0
Gweru Rural	59	34	6	6	25	0	73.5	0
Mkoba	12	19	0	0	-7	0	-36.8	0

Annexure 11

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLLING STATIONS

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

	Fixed Polling Stations		Mobile Polling Stations		Difference		% Difference	
	2002	2000	2002	2000	Fixed	Mobile	Fixed	Mobile
Kwekwe	15	28	22	0	-13	2	-46.4	0
Mberengwa East	55	35	3	5	20	-2	57.1	-40.0
Mberengwa West	62	35	6	5	27	-1	77.1	20.0
Shurugwi	49	35	6	5	14	1	40.0	20.0
Silobela	39	40	5	0	-1	5	-2.5	0
Zhombe	47	50	3	0	7	3	17.5	0
Zvishavane	47	31	3	5	16	-2	51.6	-40.0
TOTAL	737	543	39	41	194	-2	3.4	-21.3

MASHONALAND WEST PROVINCE

Chegutu	23	32	23	8	-9	15	-28.1	187.5
Chinhoyi	25	24	3	6	1	-3	4.2	-50.0
Hurungwe West	34	34	16	7	0	9	0	128.6
Hurungwe East	36	36	15	4	0	11	0	275.0
Kadoma Central	13	19	0	2	-6	-2	-31.6	-100.0
Kadoma East	35	41	16	2	-6	14	-14.6	700.0
Kadoma West	51	38	2	4	13	-2	34.2	-50.0
Kariba	24	27	15	11	-3	4	-11.1	36.4
Makonde	47	34	11	6	13	5	38.2	83.3
Mhondoro	34	39	12	3	-5	9	-12.8	300.0
Zvimba North	39	34	9	5	5	4	14.7	80.0
Zvimba South	39	35	7	5	4	2	11.4	40.0
TOTAL	400	393	129	63	7	66	0.4	135.9

MASVINGO PROVINCE

Bikita East	40	23	2	1	17	1	73.9	100.0
Bikita West	48	21	0	1	27	-1	128.6	-100
Chiredzi North	34	29	11	5	5	6	17.2	120.0
Chiredzi South	42	38	3	2	4	1	10.5	50.0
Chivi North	41	30	0	0	11	0	36.7	0
Chivi South	41	32	0	0	9	0	28.1	0
Gutu North	39	38	13	6	1	7	2.6	116.7
Gutu South	47	43	4	3	4	1	9.3	33.3
Masvingo Central	29	25	2	3	4	-1	16.0	-33.3
Masvingo North	40	38	12	4	2	8	5.3	200
Masvingo South	44	38	0	0	6	5	15.8	0
Mwenezi	43	35	8	5	8	3	22.9	0
Zaka East	44	38	0	0	6	5	15.8	0
Zaka West	46	40	1	1	6	2	15.0	200
TOTAL	578	463	57	31	115	33	29.7	49.0



Annexure 11


STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLLING STATIONS

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE

	Fixed Polling Stations		Mobile Polling Stations		Difference		% Difference	
	2002	2000	2002	2000	Fixed	Mobile	Fixed	Mobile
Bindura	29	30	16	8	-1	8	-3.3	100.0
Guruve North	52	32	0	3	20	-3	62.5	-100.0
Guruve South	47	37	0	8	10	-8	27.0	-100.0
Mazoe East	37	34	3	2	3	1	8.8	50.0
Mazoe West	31	31	40	7	0	7	0	100.0
Mt Darwin North	35	34	3	1	1	2	2.9	200.0
Mt Darwin South	41	33	4	6	8	-2	24.2	-33.3
Shamva	39	35	6	5	4	1	11.4	20.0
Rushinga	51	35	5	5	16	0	45.7	0
Muzarabani	41	35	4	5	6	-1	17.1	-20.0
Total	403	336	55	50	67	5	19.6	21.7
MATEBELELAND NORTH								
Hwange West	40	35	10	5	5	5	14.3	100.0
Hwange East	53	35	5	5	18	0	51.4	0
Tsholotsho	50	38	10	2	12	0	31.6	0
Binga	42	32	8	8	10	0	31.3	0
Lupane	41	33	10	7	8	3	24.2	42.9
Nkayi	44	34	20	10	10	10	29.4	100
Bubi-Umguza	58	37	6	3	21	3	56.8	100.0
Total	328	244	69	40	84	21	34.1	49.0
MATEBELELAND SOUTH								
Beitbridge	42	35	8	5	7	3	20.0	60.0
Bulilimangwe N.	36	24	14	17	12	-3	50	-17.6
Bulilimangwe S.	45	30	5	9	15	-4	50	-44.4
Gwanda North	44	38	6	3	6	3	15.8	100.0
Gwanda South	46	37	4	3	9	1	24.3	33.3
Insiza	34	30	16	10	4	6	13.3	60.0
Matobo	41	37	9	3	4	6	10.8	200.0
Umzingwane	43	34	4	6	9	-2	26.5	-33.3
Total	331	265	66	56	66	10	26.3	44.7

Annexure 12

DEATHS RESULTANT FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1 JANUARY 2002 - 25 MARCH 2002



SOURCE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM

DEATHS RESULTANT FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1 JANUARY 2002 - 25 MARCH 2002

DECEASED DUE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE

NAME	POLITICAL AFFILIATION	DATE OF DEATH	PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY
MR BHEBHE NEWMAN	MDC	01-Feb-02	MAT NORTH	NKAYI
CHITEHWE	ZNLWVA	01-Jan-02	HARARE	HATFIELD
CHATUNGA RICHARD	MDC	20-Jan-02	MASVINGO	BIKITA EAST
DUBE NQOBIZITA	MDC	01-Mar-02	BULAWAYO	NKULUMANE
FORD TERRY	UNKNOWN	18-Mar-02	MASH WEST	MHONDORO
GATSI ERNEST	MDC	19-Mar-02	MASH CENTRAL	GURUVE NORTH
GWAZE TAFIRENYIKA	MDC	12-Mar-02	MASH EAST	
KATSAMUDANGA TICHAONA	MDC	05-Feb-02	HARAREHARARE	NQRTH
KUMALO KHAPE	MDC	06-Feb-02	MASH WEST	MHONDORO
KUVHEYA LAWRENCE	MDC	Mar-02	MASH EAST	CHIKOMBA
MAHUNI FUNNY	UNKNOWN	13-Mar-02	MIDLANDS	KWEKWE
MANYARA OWEN	MDC	17-Mar-02	MASH CENTRAL	MT DARWIN
MAPHOSA RICHARD	MDC	20-Jan-02	MASVINGO	BIKITA EAST
MAPHOSA STEPHEN	ZANU PF	02-Feb-02	HARARE	BUDIRO
MAPINGURE ATNOS	UNKNOWN	09-Jan-02	MASVINGO	ZAKA
MATOPE KENNETH	MDC	13-Jan-02	MASH CENTRAL	GURUVE
MASARIRA GIBSON	ZANU PF	09-Jan-02	MASVINGO	ZAKA
MASEVA AMOS MISHEK	ZNLWVA	08-Mar-02	MASVINGO	GUTU NORTH
MIJONI SIMWANJA	UNKNOWN	15-Jan-02	MIDLANDS	KWEKWE
MOYO HENRY	MDC	07-Feb-02	MASVINGO	UNKNOWN
MPOFU MUCHENJE	MDC	19-Jan-02	MIDLANDS	MBERENGWA
MUNYARADZI	UNKNOWN	14-Feb-02	MASH EAST	MARONDERA EAST
MUNIKWA ISAAC	ZANU PF	17-Jan-02	MASVINGO	ZAKA
MUPAWAENDA TAKATUKWA	UNKNOWN	16-Feb-02	MASH WEST	ZVIMBA SOUTH
MUTEMARINGA FUNGISAI	MDC	27-Jan-02	MASH EAST	MUREHWA
NCUBE MTHOKOZISI	MDC	26-Jan-02	BULAWAYO	PELANDABA
NCUBE SAMBANI	MDC	17-Mar-02	MAT NORTH	HWANGE EAST
NAMAIRE SOLOMON	MDC	23-Jan-02	MANICALAND	MAKONI
NGUNDU SHEPHERD	MDC	05-Feb-02	MASH CENTRAL	MOUNT DARWIN
NHITSA TAKESURE	MDC	20-Feb-02	MASH CENTRAL	RUSHINGA
NYANZIRA TARIRO	ZANU PF	08-Feb-02	MANICALAND	BUHERA NORTH
SANYAMAHWE KUZIVA	MDC	18-Jan-02	MASH EAST	MUREHWA SOUTH
SHELTON LLOYD	ZANU PF	27-Feb-02	MASH EAST	CHIKOMBA
SIBINDI JOSEPH	MDC	01-Jan-02	BULAWAYO	UNKNOWN
SIBINDI HALAZA	MDC	30-Jan-02	MAT NORTH	TSHOLOTSHO
SIBANDA JAMES	MDC	01-Feb-02	MAT NORTH	NKAYI
SIBANDA CHARLES	MDC	02-Mar-02	MIDLANDS	ZHOMBE
SACWE JAMESON	MDC	29-Jan-02	MAT NORTH	LUPANE
UNNAMED (1)	UNKNOWN	23-Jan-02	MASVINGO	MWENEZI
UNNAMED (2)	UNKNOWN	23-Jan-02	MASVINGO	MWENEZI
UNNAMED	UNKNOWN	26-Feb-02	BULAWAYO	MAKOKOBA
UNNAMED	3 MDC POL. AGENTS	16-Mar-02	MANICALAND	CHIPINGE SOUTH
UNNAMED	MDC POL. AGENT	13 Mar-02	MASH EAST	MUTOKO SOUTH
VIKAVEKA DARLINGTON	MDC	15-Mar-02	MASH EAST	MARONDERA EAST

SOURCE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM

STATISTICS ABOUT ZESN OBSERVERS DURING POLLING DAYS - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2002

PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY	ZESN Personnel at counting Centre	If No? - REASON	OBSERVERS ARRESTED/DETAINED	Violence Incidents Against Observers
BULAWAYO URBAN	LOBENGULA - MACWEGWE	1			
BULAWAYO URBAN	BULAWAYO NORTH EAST	1			
BULAWAYO URBAN	BULAWAYO SOUTH	-			
BULAWAYO URBAN	MAKOKOBA	0	Observers were chased away	3	
BULAWAYO URBAN	NKULUMANE	1		3	
BULAWAYO URBAN	PELANDABA	1		3	3
BULAWAYO URBAN	PUMULA - LUVEVE	1			
BULAWAYO URBAN	MPOPOMA	1			
BULAWAYO URBAN	UNSPECIFIED	-			
SUB-TOTAL		6		9	3
HARARE	HIGHFIELD	1			
HARARE	BUDIRO	1			5
HARARE	CHITUNGWIZA	3			
HARARE	DZIVARASEKWA	1			
HARARE	GLEN NORAH	1			
HARARE	GLEN VIEW	1			
HARARE	HARARE CENTRAL	3			
HARARE	HARARE EAST	3			1
HARARE	HARARE NORTH	3			1
HARARE	HARARE SOUTH	2			
HARARE	HATFIELD	1		2	
HARARE	KAMBUZUMA	2			
HARARE	KUWADZANA	1		6	6
HARARE	MABYUKU	2		300	
HARARE	MBARE EAST	1			
HARARE	MBARE WEST	3			1
HARARE	MUFAKOSE	-	Observers were chased away		
HARARE	ST MARY'S	2			
HARARE	ZENGEZA	2			
HARARE	UNSPECIFIED	0			1
SUBTOTAL		33		308	15

Annexure 13



STATISTICS ABOUT ZESN OBSERVERS DURING POLLING DAYS - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2002

PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY	ZESN Personnel at counting Centre	If No? - REASON	OBSERVERS ARRESTED/DETAINED	Violence Incidents Against Observers
MASH CENTRAL	BINDURA	1		1	2
MASH CENTRAL	GURUVE NORTH	1			
MASH CENTRAL	GURUVE SOUTH	1			1
MASH CENTRAL	SHAMVA	1			
MASH CENTRAL	MAZOWE EAST	1			
MASH CENTRAL	MAZOWE WEST	1	Later chased out	3	3
MASH CENTRAL	RUSHINGA	1	Later chased out	2	
MASH CENTRAL	MT DARWIN NORTH	1			
MASH CENTRAL	MT DARWIN SOUTH	1			
MASH CENTRAL	MUZARABANI	0	Not accredited		
MASH CENTRAL	UNSPECIFIED	-			
SUB-TOTAL		9		6	6
MASVINGO	CHIVI NORTH	1			
MASVINGO	CHIVI SOUTH	0	Not accredited		
MASVINGO	BIKITA EAST	0	Observers not accredited		
MASVINGO	BIKITA WEST	1			
MASVINGO	MWENEZI	0	Observers not accredited		
MASVINGO	CHIREDZI NORTH	1			
MASVINGO	CHIREDZI SOUTH	1			
MASVINGO	GUTU NORTH	0	Observers not accredited	20	
MASVINGO	GUTU SOUTH	1			
MASVINGO	MASVINGO CENTRAL	0	Observers not accredited		
MASVINGO	MASVINGO NORTH	0	Observers not accredited		
MASVINGO	MASVINGO SOUTH	1			
MASVINGO	ZAKA EAST	0	Observers not accredited		
MASVINGO	ZAKA WEST	0	Observers not accredited		
MASVINGO	UNSPECIFIED	3			
SUBTOTAL		9		20	10

STATISTICS ABOUT ZESN OBSERVERS DURING POLLING DAYS - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2002

PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY	ZESN Personnel at counting Centre	If No? - REASON	OBSERVERS ARRESTED/DETAINED	Violence Incidents Against Observers
MATEBELELAND NORTH	BINGA	1		3	
MATEBELELAND NORTH	BUBI-UMGUZA	0	Observers were chased away	3	
MATEBELELAND NORTH	HWANGE EAST	1			
MATEBELELAND NORTH	HWANGE WEST	1			
MATEBELELAND NORTH	LUPANE	1			3
MATEBELELAND NORTH	NKAYI	0	Observers were chased away		
MATEBELELAND NORTH	TSHOLOTSHO	0	Observers were chased away		
MATEBELELAND NORTH	UNSPECIFIED	0			
SUB-TOTAL		4		6	3
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	BULILIMANGWE SOUTH	1			15
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	BULILIMANGWE NORTH	1			
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	BEITBRIDGE	1		3	
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	GWANDA NORTH	1			
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	GWANDA SOUTH	1			
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	INSIZA	1		2	
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	MATOBO	1			
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	UMZINGWANE	1			
MATEBELELAND SOUTH	UNSPECIFIED	0			
SUBTOTAL		8		5	15
MIDLANDS	KWEKWE	1			6
MIDLANDS	SIOBELA	1		4	
MIDLANDS	MKOBA	1			
MIDLANDS	GWERU URBAN	1			2
MIDLANDS	GWERU RURAL	-	Observers were chased away		
MIDLANDS	CHIRUMANZU	1		2	
MIDLANDS	GOKWE CENTRAL	1			
MIDLANDS	GOKWE EAST	1			
MIDLANDS	GOKWE NORTH	1			
MIDLANDS	GOKWE SOUTH	1			
MIDLANDS	GOKWE WEST	1			
MIDLANDS	MBERENGWA EAST	1			

Annexure 13



Annexures

STATISTICS ABOUT ZESN OBSERVERS DURING POLLING DAYS - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2002

PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY	ZESN Personnel at counting Centre	If No? - REASON	OBSERVERS ARRESTED/DETAINED	Violence Incidents Against Observers
MIDLANDS	MBERENGWA WEST	1			1
MIDLANDS	SHURUGWI	1		6	1
MIDLANDS	ZVISHAVANE	1			
MIDLANDS	ZHOMBE	1			
MIDLANDS	UNSPECIFIED	1			
SUB TOTAL		15		12	10
MASH EAST	CHIKOMBA	1			
MASH EAST	GOROMONZI	1		6	
MASH EAST	MARONDERA EAST	1			
MASH EAST	MUDZI	1			
MASH EAST	MARONDERA WEST	1			
MASH EAST	MUREHWA NORTH	1			
MASH EAST	MUREHWA SOUTH	1		50	
MASH EAST	MUTOKO NORTH	1			
MASH EAST	SEKE	1		5	
MASH EAST	UZUMBA MARAMBA PFUNGWE	1			
MASH EAST	WEDZA	1			1
MASH EAST	MUTOKO SOUTH	1			
MASH EAST	UNSPECIFIED	1			
SUB TOTAL		12		61	1
MASH WEST	CHEGUTU	1			
MASH WEST	CHINHOYI	1		1	1
MASH WEST	HURUNGWE EAST	1			6
MASH WEST	HURUNGWE WEST	1			
MASH WEST	KADOMA CENTRAL	1		26	7
MASH WEST	KADOMA EAST	1			
MASH WEST	KADOMA WEST	1		3	21
MASH WEST	KARIBA	1		6	5
MASH WEST	MAKONDE	1			1
MASH WEST	MUMUNDO	1			

Annexure 13

STATISTICS ABOUT ZESN OBSERVERS DURING POLLING DAYS - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2002

PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCY	ZESN Personnel at counting Centre	If No? - REASON	OBSERVERS ARRESTED/DETAINED	Violence Incidents Against Observers
MASH WEST	ZVIMBA SOUTH	1		-	
	ZVIMBA NORTH	1		1	
SUB TOTAL		12		37	41
MANICALAND	BUHERA NORTH	1			
MANICALAND	BUHERA SOUTH	2		1	2
MANICALAND	CHIMANIMANI	1			
MANICALAND	CHIPINGE SOUTH	1			
MANICALAND	CHIPINGE NORTH	1			
MANICALAND	MAKONI EAST	1			3
MANICALAND	MAKONI NORTH	1			
MANICALAND	MAKONI WEST	1			6
MANICALAND	MUTARE CENTRAL	2		3	
MANICALAND	MUTARE NORTH	1		3	2
MANICALAND	MUTARE SOUTH	1		1	1
MANICALAND	MUTARE WEST	1			
MANICALAND	MUTASA	1			
MANICALAND	NYANGA	1			5
MANICALAND	UNSPECIFIED				
SUB TOTAL		16		19	8
GRAND TOTAL		123		480	114

Annexure 14

MEMBERS OF THE ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK

1. Amani Trust
2. Association of Women's Clubs (AWC)
3. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP)
4. Civic Education Project
5. Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ)
6. Federation of African Media for Women (FAMWZ)
7. Fellowship for Reconciliation in Zimbabwe (FORZ)
8. Foundation for Democracy in Zimbabwe (FODEZI)
9. Gender and Politics Group
10. Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)
11. Management Outreach Training Service for Rural and Urban Development (MOTSRUD)
12. Media Institute for Southern Africa Zimbabwe (MISA-Zimbabwe)
13. Media Monitoring Project (MMP2)
14. National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)
15. Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP)
16. Popular Education Collective (P.E.C)
17. Rooftop Promotions
18. Southern African Human Rights Trust (SAHRIT)
19. Think Tank for Integrated Development
20. Training and Research Support Centre (TARSC)
21. Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ)
22. Women's Action Group (WAG)
23. Women and Land Lobby Group (WLLG)
25. Zimbabwe Association of Community Theatre (ZACT)
26. Zimbabwe Association for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of the Offender (ZACRO)
27. Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET)
28. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
29. Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC)
30. Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights)
31. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
32. Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU)
33. Zimbabwe Students Christian Movement (ZSCM)
34. Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN)
35. Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ)